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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation considers the possible impact certain requirements of the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005 (hereafter NCA) has on reckless credit lending by credit providers. 
The dissertation will identify problem areas created by the provisions of the NCA and 
the impact thereof on security or partial performances linked to the credit agreement. 
 
“Reckless credit lending” used to be a new terminology introduced in the credit market 
to increase consumer spending, but it is currently a well-known practice in the credit 
industry. The NCA aims at protecting consumers, especially against present ever-
increasing reckless-credit practices. However, certain provisions relating to reckless 
credit are mostly ambiguous and vague.  
 
The NCA is silent on the development and implementation of guidelines and policies 
relating to the prevention of reckless credit and the consequences of such an order on 
security and/or performances (whether there was partial or full performance). This study 
will discuss the prevention and consequence of reckless credit by referring to the NCA, 
articles written by various authors, as well as court decisions where related concerns 
were addresses by the judges concerned with this issue. 
 
Although the provisions stipulated in the amended NCA improve the position of the 
consumer in the credit market, the legislature should have drafted certain applicable 
provisions with more care and detail. A more detailed draft could circumvent vagueness 
in particular areas of concern. 
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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.  Background Information 
The National Credit Act1 has been under discussion since November 20012 when a 
draft bill was presented to the credit lending industry, which indicated that the way in 
which credit has been provided to consumers in the past was about to change. The 
NCA came into full operation on 1 June 2007.3 
 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) drew up the draft bill in response to a 
number of consumer concerns. The DTI was of the opinion that credit was either too 
freely given without consideration of a consumer’s overall repayment ability, that credit 
was not easily available to all consumers (leading to a perception of discrimination in 
the credit market) and that credit was over-priced and exploitative. Not only did this grim 
picture reflect the inattentive behaviour of the credit providers, but it also indicated the 
likelihood of consumers to overspend easily as a matter of course.4 
 
During the last decade, this reckless behaviour almost became the norm in the global 
credit industry. The ensuing worldwide economic meltdown during 2008 is the 
expensive price that credit providers and consumers are currently paying for their 
irresponsible behaviour.5 
 
South Africa was also affected by the economic meltdown, which is noticeable in the 
statistical data released by Statistics South Africa. In 2007 the South African credit 
                                                          
1
 34 of 2005 (hereafter “NCA”). 
2
  Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in SA 3 
3
 The President assented to the NCA on 10 March 2006 and the NCA came into effect incrementally 
on 1 June 2006, 1 September 2006 and 1 June 2007: See Proc 22 of 2006 in Government Gazette 
28864 of May 2006 
4
 Technical Committee, Credit Law Review, DTI 2003, also see Renke S & Roestoff M “The 
Consumer Credit Bill – A Solution to Over-Indebtedness?”  2005 (68) THRHR 115 
5
 Coetzee H by dissertation “The impact of the National Credit Act on civil procedural aspects relating 
to debt enforcement” 2009 (1) 
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market amounted to approximately R800 billion.6 A year later, consumers owed credit 
providers an estimated amount of R1,12 trillion in house debt7, which resulted in a 
15,6% increase in civil summonses for the period February to April 2009 compared to 
the same period in 20088.  
 
Statistics South Africa recorded the following data in August 20089: 
Actual estimates 
August 
2008 
% change 
between 
August 2007 to 
August 2008 
% change between 
June to August 
2007 and June to 
August 2008 
Number of civil summonses 
issued for debt 
107 490 0.3 0,9 
Number of civil judgments 
recorded for debt 
52 845 -20,8 -13,8 
Number of civil judgments 
recorded for debt (R million) 497,4 -4,8 4,6 
 
It appeared from the data that the number of civil summonses increased while the 
number of civil judgements decreased. The decrease in judgements could be the result 
of debt counselling because by the end of June 2010 approximately 184 000 consumers 
applied for debt counselling since the NCA became operational in 2007.10  
 
By 2012 the number of civil summonses issued for debt showed a 14,1% decrease 
compared with 2011. The fourth quarter of 2012 reflected a 20,6% decrease compared 
with the fourth quarter of 2011. Overall, a 20,8% year-on-year decrease was recorded in 
December 2012.11 
                                                          
6
  NCR Annual Report (2007) at 9 and Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in SA 6 
7
  NCR Annual Report (2008/2009) at 16 and Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in SA 6 
8
 Statistics South Africa on Statistics of Civil Cases for Dept (April 2009). 
9
  Statistics South Africa on Statistics of Civil Cases for Dept (August 2008). 
10
  Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in SA 8 
11
  Statistics South Africa on Statistics of Civil Cases for Debt (December 2012). 
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However, this situation changed again when the total number of civil summonses issued 
for debt increased by 0,3% in the three months ending November 2013 compared with 
the three months ending November 2012. The total number of civil judgements 
recorded for debt continued to decrease by 7,8% in the three months ending November 
2013 compared with the three months ending November 2012. A decrease of 9,3% was 
recorded year-on-year in November 2013. This is reflected in the data published by 
Statistics South Africa12:  
 
Actual estimates 
November 
2013 
% change 
between 
November 2012 
to November 
2013 
% change 
between 
September to 
November 2012  
and September 
to November  
2013 
Number of civil summonses 
issued for debt 
66 603 -6,5 0,3 
Number of civil judgments 
recorded for debt 
32 377 -9,3 -7,8 
Number of civil judgments 
recorded for debt (R million) 438,2 7,7 2,1 
 
Comparing this statistical information to the recent published information13 there are a 
decrease of approximately 6 976 summonses issued for debt and 6 007 less 
judgements records for debt, which is a fortunate event in the credit market: 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Statistics South Africa on Statistics of Civil Cases for Dept (November 2013). 
13
  Statistics South Africa on Statistics of Civil Cases for Dept (February 2014). 
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Actual estimates 
February 
2014 
% change 
between 
February 2013 
and February 
2014 
% change 
between 
December 2012 
to February 2013 
and December 
2013 to February 
2014 
Number of civil summonses 
issued for debt 
59 627 -1,8 -1,9 
Number of civil judgments 
recorded for debt 
26 370 -8,0 -4,6 
Number of civil judgments 
recorded for debt (R million) 402,7 -1,3 -1,8 
 
The National Credit Regulator continuously published statistics, which is a requisite 
from the credit bureaux. This information compared over a two-year period interval 
shows an increase: 
Description As at December 201114 As at July 201315 
Number of credit active 
consumers 
19,34 million 
20.08 million 
(increase of 0.4%) 
Number of consumer that are 
three or more months in 
arrears/adverse information 
46% 47,5% 
Number of consumer that are 
one or two months in arrears  
14,7% 52,5% 
 
In June 2015, the NCR, Ms. Nomisa Motshegare, released updated consumer credit-
activity statistics to the media. The data was determined in March 2015 and published in 
                                                          
14
  NCR Registration and Compliance Division (May 2012).  
15
  “National Credit Regulator urges youth to harness their financial power early on”, Media release, 
July 2013 
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the Consumer Credit Report (CCMR).16 From the report it is evident that there are 23,11 
million credit-active consumers in South Africa, an increase of 3,03 million compared to 
two (2) years previously. According to the NCR, it is also an increase of 1,2% compared 
to the 22,84 million of the previous quarter. Quarter-on-quarter the number of 
consumers with an impaired record has increased with 0,1%. 
 
In the above-mentioned media release, the NCR urged consumers to exercise the 
necessary caution by living within their financial means and to borrow responsibly.17 At 
the same time, the NCA also appealed to credit providers to advise consumers who are 
in default under a credit agreement that they are permitted to apply for debt counselling 
with a debt counsellor.18 Thereby it is possible for consumers to seek relief prior to the 
issuing of summonses and/or granting of civil judgments, which could influence the 
decrease in the number of civil summonses and civil judgments.19 
 
The NCA is consumer credit legislation20 and focusses on levelling the playing field 
between credit providers and consumer debtors. The majority of the South African 
population consists of low-income consumers who do not have cash readily available. 
They often make use of credit for their essential needs but sometimes extend their 
credit activities to luxury wants they cannot afford.  
 
The NCA now aims at protecting consumers who lease or buy durable consumer goods, 
enter into money loans, and to who services are rendered on a credit basis. Using plain 
language, these protections are imposed by introducing new concepts and mechanisms 
that prevent over-indebtedness, reckless credit extensions, and mandatory disclosures 
to consumers. Protection is aimed at regulating cost and marketing practices, 
                                                          
16
  “Credit extensions slow down”, Media release, June 2015 
17
  Which advice is in accordance with section 3(c)(i) of the NCA. 
18
 Section 129 (1) (a), also see a media release in July 2013 “National Credit Regulator urges youth to 
harness their financial power early on” 
19
  In the CCMR (released to the media in June 2015), the NCR advised the consumers who are 
experiencing financial distress to arrange with their credit providers or to seek the assistance of 
registered debt counsellors. 
20
  Desert Star Trading 145 (Pty) Ltd and Another v No 11 Flamboyant Edleen CC and Another (98/10) 
[2010] ZASCA 148; 2011 (2) SA 266 (SCA) ; [2011] 2 All SA 471 (SCA) (29 November 2010) 
11 
 
compulsory credit assessment prior to granting credit, improved consumer education, 
establishment of regulatory bodies, compulsory registration, and regulations of the 
important role players, and prohibition on the waiver of consumer rights. 
 
It is clear that the legislature intended to leave no stone unturned when the NCA was 
drafted, the intention of which is admirable. However, several sections in the NCA 
remain vague and unclear, especially regarding the provision of reckless credit lending. 
For example, the NCA does not state that credit agreements giving rise to reckless 
credit lending are ab initio null and void, as is the case with unlawful credit agreements 
in terms of section 89 of the NCA21. Therefore, the NCA is not clear as to how the courts 
should exercise their discretion in respect of reckless credit agreements.22 
 
 
1.2.  Problem statement and research objective 
Reckless credit lending is, conceptually, new to the South African legal system. Credit 
providers in South Africa must now take cognizance of legislation that gives guidance in 
terms of the particular actions that could class them as being reckless lenders, thus 
avoiding practices that may lead them to suffer the legislative consequences.23 Prior to 
the inception of the NCA, this concept has never before been dealt with by South 
African legislation, and credit providers could not rely on precedent to guide their 
actions.24 Subsequently there have been various court cases dealing with a number of 
the aspects of reckless credit lending, some of which will be discussed in this study. 
 
In terms of section 325 of the NCA the purpose of the Act include, inter alia:  
                                                          
21
 Section 89 deals with unlawful credit agreements, but this section does not indicate reckless credit 
agreements as being unlawful. 
22
  Boraine & Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 651. 
23
 See Vessio 2009 TSAR 274 
24
 “The concepts of ‘reckless credit’ and ‘over-indebtedness’ and the accompanying preventative 
measures, sanctions and debt relief are new to South African credit legislation as these issues were 
not addressed in either the Usury Act 73 of 1968 or the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980” – Van 
Heerden in Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11-1. 
25
 s 3(1) and (c) 
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• the promotion of responsibility in the credit market by encouraging responsible 
borrowing; and 
• the discouragement of reckless credit-granting by credit providers and contractual 
default by consumers. 
 
The NCA proceeds by stating in section 80 that a credit agreement is reckless if, at the 
time that the credit agreement was prepared, or at the time when the loan amount was 
approved or increased, the credit provider:26 
i. failed to conduct the required evaluation; 
ii. entered into an agreement despite the fact that the consumer did not appreciate the 
nature of the obligations, or 
iii. entered into an agreement that resulted in the consumer being over-indebted. 
 
Section 81 and section 82 read together state how reckless credit can be prevented 
through the credit provider’s assessment mechanisms to determine whether a 
consumer can afford the credit, that is, the evaluation to prevent reckless credit lending. 
The NCA has also been amended, and the Amendment Act came in operation in March 
2015. The amended NCA provides for criteria to conduct the affordability assessment27, 
the subject matter of which will be discussed in Part II of this study. 
 
Section 83(2) of the NCA states the type of court orders that can be granted should a 
credit agreement be found to be reckless lending in terms of section 81(1)(a) or 
80(1)(b)(i):  
(2) If a court declares that a credit agreement is reckless in terms of section 80(l) (a) or 
80(l) (b) (i), the court may make an order- 
(a)  Setting aside all or part of the consumer’s rights and obligations under that 
agreement, as the court determines just and reasonable in the circumstances; 
Or 
                                                          
26
  Also see ABSA Bank Ltd v Lowting and Others (39029/2011)[2013] ZAGPPHC 265 (19 August 
2013) par 41 and Kelly-Louw 2014 (26) SAMLJ 29-31 
27
  Chapter 3, Part D of the Regulations was amended by the insertion of regulation 23A,  
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(b)  Suspending the force and effect of that credit agreement in accordance with 45 
subsection (3) (b) (i). 
 
Section 89 deals with instances when a credit agreement will be considered an unlawful 
credit agreement as well as the consequences of such instances of unlawful credit 
agreement. Guidance as to the application of the reckless credit sections of the Act for 
both practitioners and the courts will have to come from the Act itself, as well as from 
reported and unreported precedents. The following comments are thus supported: 
 
To achieve these goals, the act has added a new dimension to credit regulation 
by introducing measures aimed at preventing reckless credit-granting, sanctions 
to be applied in certain instances of reckless credit and debt-relief measures to 
deal with the problem of over-indebted consumers.28 
 
Many of these provisions will have to be interpreted by the courts to give meaning and 
practical import to their content. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “reckless” as 
“disregarding the consequences or danger etc.; rash”, which describes the activity by a 
credit provider when she or he rashly enters into a credit agreement with a consumer 
without considering the consequences or taking the necessary steps to prevent reckless 
credit lending. The legal meaning of words such as the “rights” and “obligations” of the 
consumer as well as those of the credit provider should also be considered as it is 
affected by the sanctions for reckless credit lending.29 
 
In an unreported magistrate’s court case held in Port Elizabeth, the applicant, Mr De 
Kock (the debt counsellor for the first and second respondent), brought an application 
against ABSA Bank Ltd30 to declare the credit agreement reckless lending. The 
magistrate found that ABSA Bank Ltd (the third respondent) granted a home loan 
mortgage recklessly to the first and second respondent and that the loan should be 
                                                          
28
 Van Heerden (n 2) 11-1 
29
  See s 83(2) where the consumer’s rights and obligations can be set aside under the reckless credit 
agreement. 
30
  G de Kock v LJJ Gerber & others, Case nr. 9035/2010 (Magistrate Court of Port Elizabeth) heard 
during April 2010 
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“scrapped”. The consumer, Mr LJJ Gerber, was released from his obligation to repay 
the loan of R350, 000 and it was ordered that he could keep the immovable property. 
Because this appears to be the only judgment of this kind to date and to boot 
unreported, the matter needs to be deliberated to determine whether future loans with 
similar facts are also to be deemed reckless lending. In the cited case, the intention of 
the legislator in determining the ownership and possession of the property in this case 
should also be scrutinised.  
 
The NCA does not provide for discretion or a clear statement as to how the court may 
deal with the security in a loan, that is, should the moneys or goods received or paid for 
be forfeited or should such moneys or goods remain the property of the consumer or 
credit provider.31 Therefore, an analysis is necessary to compare the purpose and aim 
of the NCA to what is just and reasonable. A legal comparison with other countries 
where a similar principle has been adopted regarding international legislation, for 
example Great Britain, is essential. 
 
A further analysis will also be made of the law of contracts pertaining specifically to the 
following legal concepts:  
• restoration; 
• unjustified enrichment; 
• unlawful provisions, and  
• considering illegal contracts that are void. 
 
The private law consequences are twofold regarding an illegal contract that is declared 
void: Firstly, the parties will be prevented from claiming performance from each other.32 
Secondly, where a party has performed in terms of an illegal contract, the par delictum 
                                                          
31
  In this dissertation reference will also be made to the cases of Opperman v Boonzaaier & others 
(unreported WCC case number 24887/2010 of 17 April 2012), Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard & 
Another (CCT 99/13 [2014] ZACC 16; 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC); 2014 (8) BCLR 869 (CC) of 5 June 
2014) and Chevron SA (Pty) Ltd v Wilson t/a Wilsons’s Transport and others (CCT 88/14) [2015] 
ZACC 15 (decided on 5 June 2015). 
32
  Boraine & Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 650; Hutchison et al Law of Contract (2009) 187and 
Christie et el Law of Contract in SA (2007) 406 
15 
 
rule may prevent it from claiming the return of performance based on unjustified 
enrichment where the parties are equally blameworthy.33 
 
The concept of reckless credit is well concretised by the NCA; therefore, the application 
thereof has far-reaching implications for the credit provider. The credit providers need to 
be aware of these implications in order to avoid entering into a reckless credit 
agreement. 
 
 
1.3. Purpose of this dissertation 
The purpose of this study is to determine, by means of a comparative analysis of the 
NCA and other relevant literature, a recommended standard to be applied by the South 
African courts when dealing with reckless credit applications and the consequential 
orders that the Court has discretion to grant. The aim of the comparison is to identify the 
gaps in the NCA and to compare these gaps to the court’s viewpoints and decisions as 
well as with published research articles by various authors regarding these issues.  
 
The comparative method used in this study is to explore the different legal principles 
and systems by interpreting the text, principles, and procedures to determine the 
problem areas within the NCA pertaining to the provisions relating to reckless credit. 
The analysis will duly compare the NCA, and more specifically reckless credit, with the 
consumer credit legislation in Great Britain. The comparative analysis will interpret the 
law bearing in mind the changing social conditions in South Africa as well as 
internationally.   
 
 
                                                          
33
 See Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2007) para 7.3.2; Boraine& Van Heerden 
2010a (73) THRHR 650: Christie et el Law of Contract in SA (2007) 413 – 416 and Trustees of the 
Insolvent Estate of Grahame Ernest John Whitehead v Dumas & another (2013) JOL 30865 (SCA); 
Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment 2008 (130). 
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1.4. Structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation will consist of four parts to meet the objective of analysing the impact 
of the status quo of reckless credit on a credit agreement, whether complete or partial 
performance took place and/or goods were delivered. 
• Part I is a general introduction and orientation to establish a firm basis for 
determining the application of the NCA, the end-to-end process, by providing an 
outline of the credit procedure and to provide an overview of the law of contracts.  
• Part II deals specifically with the application for credit, assessment of affordability, 
prevention of reckless credit and the consequences of an order for reckless credit 
lending by dealing with a comparative analysis of the reckless credit process in the 
South African law together with the regulations that are used to protect credit 
consumers. 
• Part III will initially entail the comparative analysis of internationally developed 
financial sectors by providing a brief overview of the international trend regarding the 
introduction of consumer protective legislation. Subsequently, the development of the 
consumer protection legislation of Great Britain will be considered in more detail as 
this country was the forerunner vis-à-vis the development of consumer credit 
legislation. Furthermore, the development of the South African common law and the 
law of contracts developed between the Roman-Dutch law and the English law will be 
subjected to scrutiny.34 
• Part VI contains a general conclusion, which will include consideration of the 
achievement of the Amendment Act, and recommendation that more steps would be 
needed to address the gaps in terms of reckless credit. 
 
 
                                                          
34
  Christie Law of Contract 8 where it is stated that on recommendation of the Biggs and Colebrook 
report of 1826 that the English law should gradually be adopted for the concepts of contracts 
instead of the Roman Dutch Law. 
17 
 
1.5. Definitions 
The abolished Credit Agreements Act35 used to refer to a credit receiver and a credit 
grantor, while the NCA refers to the main role players as a consumer and a credit 
provider.36 The NCA also regulates a number of transactions, that is, credit agreements, 
instalment agreements, leases, mortgages, pawn transactions, secured loans, and 
credit insurance. A “credit agreement” can be a credit facility, a credit transaction, or a 
credit guarantee.37 
 
It is necessary to understand the meaning of the following defined terminology used 
throughout this dissertation as defined by the NCA of 2007:38 
 
“agreement” includes an agreement or understanding between, or among, two or more 
parties, which purports to establish a relationship in law between those parties. 
 
“consumer”, in respect of a credit agreement to which this Act applies, means  
(a) The party to whom goods or services are sold under a discount transaction, 
incidental credit agreement or instalment agreement; 
(b)  The party to whom money is paid or credit granted under a pawn transaction; 
(c)  The party to who credit is granted under a credit facility; 
(d)  The mortgagor under a mortgage agreement; 
(e)  The borrower under a secured loan; 
(f)  The lessee under a lease; 
(g)  The guarantor under a credit guarantee; or 
(h)  The party to whom or at whose direction money is advanced or credit granted under 
any other credit agreement. 
                                                          
35
 Act 75 of 1980, which Act together with the Usury Act was repealed in June 2006 and replaced by 
the NCA 
36
 s 1 
37
 s 8(1) 
38
 Derived from s 1 of the NCA 
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“Consumer” in the context of the Act includes an individual or a small juristic person. It 
means the person to who credit (a loan) is extended or granted in any form of credit 
agreement. 
 
“credit”, when used as a noun, means 
(a)  A deferral of payment of money owed to a person, or a promise to defer such a 
payment; or  
(b) A promise to advance or pay money to, or at, the direction of another person. 
 
“credit agreement” means an agreement that meets all the criteria set out in section 8 
of the NCA. This broad definition includes: 
(a) a credit facility:39 
(b) a credit transaction:40 
(c) a credit guarantee41, or 
(d) any combination of the aforementioned transactions. 
 
“credit provider”, in respect of a credit agreement to which the NCA applies, means  
(a)  The party who supplies goods or services under a discount transaction, incidental 
credit agreement, or instalment agreement; 
(b)  the party who advances money or credit under a pawn transaction; 
(c)  the party who extends credit under a credit facility; 
(d)  the mortgagee under a mortgage agreement; 
(e)  the lender under a secured loan; 
(f) the lessor under a lease; 
(g)  the party to whom an assurance or promise is made under a credit guarantee;  
(h)  the party who advances money or credit to another under any other credit 
agreement, or 
                                                          
39
  s 8(3) 
40
  s 8(4) 
41
  s 8(5) 
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(i)  any other person who acquires the rights of a credit provider under a credit 
agreement after it has been entered into. 
 
“debt counselling” means performing the functions contemplated in section 86 of the 
NCA. 
 
“debt counsellor” means a neutral person, who is registered in terms of section 44 of 
the NCA, offering a service of debt counselling. 
 
 “instalment agreement” means a sale of movable property in terms of which: 
(a) all or part of the price is deferred and is to be paid by periodic payments; 
(b) possession and use of the property is transferred to the consumer; 
(c) ownership of the property either – 
(i) passes to the consumer only when the agreement is fully complied with; or 
(ii) passes to the consumer immediately subject to the right of the credit provider to 
repossess the property if the consumer fails to satisfy all of the consumer’s 
financial obligations under the agreement; and 
(d) interest, fees or other charges are payable to the credit provider in respect of the 
agreement, or the amount that has been deferred. 
 
“juristic person” includes a partnership, association or other body of persons, 
corporate or unincorporated, or a trust if 
(a)  there are three or more individual trustees; or 
(b)  the trustee is itself a juristic person, but does not include a stokvel. 
 
However, in certain sections of the NCA, a juristic person is exempted from the 
application42 of the Act if the particular juristic person’s section 25 of the Amendment 
Act amended section 83 or annual turnover43 is more than a million rand.44 
                                                          
42
  s 4 
43
  s 4(1)(a)(i) and 4(1)(b) also see Quince Property Finance (Pty) Ltd v Jooste and other (unreported) 
2015 JOL 33336 (WCC)(decided on 2 June 2015) 
44
  GN 713 in GG 28893 of 1 June 2006 
20 
 
“Magistrates’ Courts Act” means the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1944 (Act No. 32 of 
1944. 
 
“mortgage” means a pledge of immovable property that serves as security for a 
mortgage agreement.45 
 
“mortgage agreement” means a credit agreement that is secured by a pledge of 
immovable property.46 
 
“prohibited conduct” means an act or omission in contravention of this Act other than 
an act or omission that constitutes an offence under this Act, by – 
(a) an unregistered person who is required to be registered to engage in such an act; or 
(b) a credit provider, credit bureau or debt counsellor.47 
 
“reckless credit” means the credit granted to a consumer under a credit agreement 
concluded in circumstances described in section 80. 
 
On 15 May 2015, the NCA was amended.48 The Amendment Act introduced new 
definitions, amended some of the definitions, and deleted some definitions. The purpose 
of these amendments was to align the definitions with South African law, following the 
criticism by the courts, academics, and stakeholders.  
 
Otto wrote in his book (2010) about the “… badly worded and embarrassing definitions 
[for example] “mortgage agreement” and “secured loan” …”49 He also referred to certain 
new terminology, which is meaningless in the South African context, for example 
“incidental credit agreements”.50  
                                                          
45
  Also see the amended definition below  
46
  Also see the amended definition below 
47
  Also see the amended definition in Chapter 7 of this study 
48
    Also, see paragraph 2.4 of this study on a discussion regarding the background that lead to the 
amendment of the NCA.  
49
  Otto The NCA Explained p 4 and 22 
50
  Otto The NCA Explained p 5 
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Not all of the amended and/or deleted definitions are applicable to this study, therefore 
only the related definitions will be discussed in this study. 
 
“mortgage” means a mortgage bond registered by the registrar of deeds over 
immovable property that serves as continuing covering security for a mortgage 
agreement.51 
 
“mortgage agreement” means a credit agreement that is secured by [a pledge of 
immovable property] the registration of a mortgage bond by the registrar of deeds over 
immovable property.52 
 
“prohibited conduct” means an act or omission in contravention of this Act [other than 
an act or omission that constitutes an offence under this Act, by – 
(a) an unregistered person who is required to be registered to engage in such an act; or 
(b) a credit provider, credit bureau or debt counsellor.53  
 
There are additional definitions in the NCA of 2007 that are also important. However, 
these definitions will be referred to when a particular matter is discussed in the following 
chapters if the need arises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
51
  s 1(d) of the Amendment Act 
52
  s 1(e) of the Amendment Act 
53
  s 1(g) of the Amendment Act 
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CHAPTER 2: NATIONAL CREDIT ACT54 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Together, the Usury Act, No. 73 of 1968 and the Credit Agreements Act, No. 75 of 1980 
regulated consumer credit in South Africa for more than a quarter of a century. Since 1 
June 2007, the abovementioned acts were abolished and the NCA was introduced55, 
which provides for comprehensive consumer protection56. Legislation protecting 
consumers is an international phenomenon that differs from country to country, 
depending on the needs, political agenda, economic philosophy, and history of a 
particular country.57 
 
The South African credit industry is huge. During June 2012, in a media release58 by the 
Chief Executor Officer of the National Credit Regulator59, Nomsa Motshegare, 
announced that the recent statistics of the National Credit Regulator60 indicate the 
number of credit applications received from consumers as at March 2015 was 10,39 
million for this quarter. From December 2014 to March 2015 an amount of R107,54 
billion of new credit was granted to consumers.   
 
                                                          
54
 Act 34 of 2005 
55
  Otto et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2013) 1-8 & 2-1 and Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit 
Regulation in SA 4 
56
  Otto et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2013) 1-1, also see Standard Bank of SA Ltd. v Kruger 
& Other; Standard Bank of SA Ltd. v Pretorius (2009/45438 & 2009/39057) [2010] ZAGPJHC 28; 
2010 (4) SA 635 (23 April 2010) 5; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd. v Nako & Others (19/2010, 
21/210, 22/2010, 77/2010, 89/2010, 104/2010, 842/2010) [2010] ZAECBHC 4 (8 June 2010) 18 
and Kubyana v Standard Bank of SA Ltd. (CCT 165/13) [2014] ZACC 1 (20 February 2014) 
57
 Otto et al NCA Explained (2010) 1, also see Desert Star Trading 145 (Pty) Ltd and Another v No 11 
Flamboyant Edleen CC and Another (98/10) [2010] ZASCA 148; 2011 (2) SA 266 (SCA) ; [2011] 2 
All SA 471 (SCA) (29 November 2010) 
58
  “Credit extension slow down”, Media Release, June 2015 
59
 Jansen http://www.ncr.org.za [Retrieved on 20 June 2012] 
60
 Hereinafter referred to as the NCR 
23 
 
Further statistics indicate there are 5,724 credit providers61 in South Africa as per the 
last annual report for 2013/2014 issued by the NCR.62 This number as at the end of 
March 2014 has increased with 5% from 2013. 
 
Of the approximately 21,7 million credit active consumers, 9,6 million (44,2%) had 
impaired records.63 Consequently, per month on average 9100 consumers apply for 
debt counselling.64 This statistical information indicates that consumers are not 
managing to pay off their debts, which is disturbing given interest rates are at a 
historical low.65 The NCA seeks to prevent and remedy over-indebtedness as well as 
reckless lending.66  
 
This chapter provides a general overview of the purpose and application of the NCA. It 
also serves as the background for the next chapter where over-indebtedness and 
reckless lending will be discussed in more detail. The focus of this chapter is to take a 
closer look at specific concepts in the NCA underpinning the comparison regarding 
reckless lending. 
 
 
2.2.  Aim of the NCA 
The preamble to the NCA provides the main purpose of the Act: 
• To promote a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer 
credit, and for that purpose to provide for the general regulation of consumer credit 
and improved standards of consumer information; 
                                                          
61
  See paragraph 2.4 for discussion on registered credit providers. 
62
  NCR Annual Report, 2014 on page 9 
63
  NCR Annual Report, 2014 on page 14 
64
  NCR Annual Report, 2014 on page 14 
65
 Mail & Guardian http://www.mg.co.za/article/2011-03-18-concumers-are-struggling-to-get-out-of-
debt [Retrieved on 20 June 2012] 
66
 Ss 3(c) and 3(g); Scholtz, Otto, Van Zyl, Van Heerden and Campbell (hereafter Scholtz et al)(2008) 
12-1; Van Heerden & Otto 2007 TSAR 655; Renke, Roestoff & Haupt (hereafter Renke et al) 2007 
Obiter 229-230, Van Loggerenberg, Dicker & Malan (hereafter Van Loggerenberg et al) 0008 
January/February De Rebus 40. 
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• to promote black economic empowerment and ownership in the consumer credit 
industry; 
• to prohibit certain unfair credit and credit-marketing practices; 
• to promote responsible credit granting and use, and for that purpose to prohibit 
reckless credit granting; 
• to provide for debt re-organisation in cases of over-indebtedness; 
• to regulate credit information; 
• to provide for registration of credit bureaux, credit providers and debt counselling 
services; 
• to establish national norms and standards relating to consumer credit; 
• to promote a consistent enforcement framework relating to consumer credit; 
• to establish the national credit regulator and the national consumer tribunal; to 
repeal the Usury Act (1968) and the Credit Agreements Act (1980), and 
• to provide for related incidental matters. 
 
Section 2(1) of the NCA provides explicitly that the NCA must be applied in a manner 
that gives effect to the purpose of the act as set out in section 3. 
 
Section 3 of the National Credit Act states the objectives of the act affirming the aim of 
the NCA to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans; to 
promote a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective, 
and accessible credit market and industry; and to protect consumers67 by: 
a) promoting the development of a credit market that is accessible to all South 
Africans, and in particular to those who have historically been unable to access 
credit under sustainable market conditions; 
b) ensuring consistent treatment of different credit products and different credit 
providers; 
                                                          
67
  Sebola & another v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another 2012 (8) BCLR 785 (CC), 
ABSA Bank Ltd v Lowting and Others (39029/2011)[2013] ZAGPPHC 265 (19 August 2013) par 48 
and Kubyana v Standard Bank of SA Ltd. (CCT65/13){2014}ZACC 1; 2014 (3) SA 56 (CC); 2014 
($) BCLR 400 (CC)(decided on 20 February 2014) par 20 
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c) promoting responsibility in the credit market by:68 
(i) encouraging responsible borrowing, avoidance of over-indebtedness, and 
fulfilment of financial obligations by consumers, and 
(ii) discouraging the granting of reckless credit by credit providers, and through the 
granting of reckless credit by credit providers the contractual default by 
consumers; 
d) Promoting equity in the credit market by balancing the respective rights and 
responsibilities of credit providers and consumers; 
e)  Addressing and correcting imbalances in negotiating power between consumers 
and credit providers by: 
(i) providing consumers with education about credit and consumer rights; 
(ii) providing consumers with adequate disclosure of standardised information in 
order to make informed choices; and 
(iii) providing consumers with protection from deception as well as from unfair or 
fraudulent conduct by credit providers and credit bureaux; 
f)  Improving consumer credit information and reporting, and regulating credit bureaux; 
g)  Addressing and preventing over-indebtedness of consumers, and providing 
mechanisms for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of satisfaction 
by the consumer of all responsible financial obligations; 
h)  Providing for a consistent and accessible system of consensual resolution of 
disputes arising from credit agreements; and 
i)  Providing for a consistent and harmonised system of debt restructuring, 
enforcement and judgment, which places priority on the eventual satisfaction of all 
responsible consumer obligations under credit agreements.” 
 
The Wallis Report (1997) on the “purpose of regulation” stated:  
 
The first purpose (of regulation), which applies in all sectors of the economy, is to 
ensure that markets work efficiently and competitively. Regulation for this purpose 
includes rules designed to promote adequate disclosure, prevent fraud or other 
                                                          
68
  Also see Kelly-Louw 2014 (26) SAMLJ 25  
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unfair practices, and prohibit anti-competitive behaviour such as collusion or 
monopolisation. This type of regulation does not materially alter or prescribe the 
nature of products or services, but simply aims to ensure that they are traded in 
fair and efficient markets.69   
 
Although section 3 of the NCA clearly aims to promote and advance the social and 
economic welfare of South Africa and to protect the consumers, there are various court 
decisions that voice concerns regarding the errors that occurred in the NCA70, for 
example:  
 
Unfortunately, the NCA cannot be described as the best drafted Act of Parliament, 
which was ever passed, nor can the draftsman be said to have been blessed with 
the craftsmanship of a Chalmers. Numerous drafting errors, untidy expression and 
inconsistencies make its interpretation a particularly trying exercise.71 
 
In addition:  
 
A court is forced to go round and round in loops from subsection to subsection, 
much like a dog chasing its tail. Indeed, the language used in the Act from time to 
time suggests that foreign draftspersons rather that South African lawyers had a 
strong hand in preparing the text.72 
 
In addition73, “It has become a notorious fact that cases requiring the 
interpretation of the NCA result in a scarcely muffled cry of exasperation 
resounding from the leathered benches of the judiciary.”  
 
                                                          
69
 Goodwin-Groen November 2006 FinMark Trust 
70
  Van Heerden Section 85 of the NCA De Jure on page 968 the author stated that the NCA has 
introduced changes into the credit landscape, which resulted in various interpretational issues due 
to poor draftsmanship.  
71
  Nedbank v NCR 2011 ZASCA 35 
72
  FirstRand Bank Ltd v Seyfert [2010] ZAGPJHC 88 
73
  Renier Nel Inc. & Another v Cash on Demand (KZN) (Pty) Ltd. [2011] ZAGPJHC 20 and Kelly-Louw 
Consumer Credit Regulation in SA 5 
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Therefore, it is emphasised that the courts have to use a balancing process when 
interpreting the NCA in the application thereof and not to use an automatic bias in 
favour of the consumer.74 This was concurred in the statement by Malan J in the case of 
Collett v First Rand Bank Ltd75. The judge stated that the NCA serves the interest of the 
consumers; however, the courts are required to balance the interests of the consumer 
against that of the credit provider.76 
 
 
2.3.  Application of the NCA 
The NCA applies to all credit agreements between parties77 and does not prescribe any 
artificial monetary ceiling for natural persons concerned78, and includes credit 
agreements relating to all goods and services. However, in terms of section 6 of the 
NCA, certain provisions of the Act do not apply to a consumer if the particular consumer 
is a juristic person, that is, Chapter 4, Part C,79 and D80. From this section of the NCA, it 
is clear that the purpose of the NCA is to protect the consumer if such consumer is a 
natural person. Provisions regarding the restrictions for juristic persons will be 
discussed in paragraph 2.4 hereunder. 
 
The intention of the legislature is clear that in order for the purposes of the NCA to be 
achieved the Act will apply as follows: 
• To all credit agreements and transactions, for example, money-lending transactions, 
irrespective of the amount, between parties dealing at arm’s length81, and made 
within South Africa or having an effect within South Africa;82 
                                                          
74
  Scholtz in Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit Act par 2.4  
75
  2011 (4) SA 508 (SCA) par 10 
76
  Sebola & another v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another 2012 (8) BCLR 785 (CC), 
Kubyana v Standard Bank of SA Ltd. (CCT 165/13) [2014] ZACC 1 (20 February 2014) and 
Nedbank v NCR 2011 ZASCA 1 also seen in Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in SA 23 
77
 s 4(1) 
78
 Monetary caps is only applicable to juristic persons as stated in s 4(1)(a)(i) and s 7(1)(a) 
79
  Credit marketing practices (sections 74 to 77) 
80
  Over-indebtedness and reckless credit (sections 78 to 88) 
81
 s 4(2) (b), also see Otto (2011) TSAR 547 and Van Zyl in Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit 
Act par 4.2. 
82
 s 4(1) 
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• NCA will control the cost of credit by determining the interest percentage rates and 
charges; 
• NCA will monitor and track reckless lending by stating that it is an offence if a credit 
provider grants credit recklessly and that certain sanctions will be imposed if the 
credit provider is found guilty by a court,83 
• NCA will regulate and control credit bureau activities; 
• Establishment of regulatory bodies such as the National Credit Regulator84 and the 
National Credit Tribunal.85 
 
In the unreported court case of Quince Property Finance (Pty) Ltd v Jooste and others86 
the court held that the NCA applies to a credit agreement when the particular credit 
agreement is regarded as a credit agreement for the purpose of the NCA if it is a credit 
facility, credit transaction, credit guarantee or a combination of it all. Once it is 
determined that the agreement in question is a credit agreement, the next question to 
ask is whether the particular agreement was entered into between the parties dealing at 
arm’s length, if not, then it is not a credit agreement. The NCA does not apply in respect 
of credit agreements where the consumer is a juristic person whose asset value or 
annual turnover equals or exceeds R1 million.87 The implication hereof is that a major 
shift in power took place in that the power was removed from the credit provider and 
more protection was given to the consumer.  
 
On 11 April 2011 the Constitutional Court delivered judgment in Gundwana v Steko 
Development CC and Others 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC). It stated the practice of allowing 
the registrar to declare immovable property specially executable when ordering default 
judgment in terms of rule 31(5) “to the extent that this permits the sale in execution of 
the home of a person” unconstitutional.  
 
                                                          
83
 s 83(1) of the NCA states that is could be during any court proceeding in which a credit agreement 
is being considered. 
84
 s12 of the NCA (hereafter “NCR”) 
85
 s 26 of the NCA (hereafter “NCT”) 
86
  2015 JOL 33336 (WCC)(Judgement date: 2 June 2015) 
87
  s 4(1)(a)(i) and 4(1)(b)  
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In FirstRand Bank Ltd v Folscher88 the court held that a practice directive is issued, that: 
 … if the summons is preceded by a notice in terms of section 129 of the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005, such notice is to include a notification to the debtor that, 
should action be instituted and judgment be obtained against him or her, 
execution against the debtor’s primary residence will ordinarily follow and will 
usually lead to the debtor’s eviction from such home.89 
 
From these abovementioned court cases, it appears that the credit provider is obliged to 
give notice of cancelation of the credit agreement.90 The notice of cancellation should 
provide certain information to the debtor before execution on a writ. The notification 
should include information such as informing the debtor that legal action will be taken, 
judgement obtained and that the debtor’s primary residence will become executable and 
such debtor will be evicted from such residence.91 
 
The protection of the consumer has subsequently been reiterated in the case of 
Standard Bank v Bekker92 where the court stated that the NCA affords a measure of 
protection to mortgagees who are natural persons.93  
 
The NCA substantiated the protection of the consumer by clearly stipulating consumer’s 
rights in Chapter 4, Part A, that is: 
i. the right to apply for credit; 
ii. the right to reasons for credit being refused; 
iii. the right to information in official language; 
iv. the right to information in plain and understandable language; 
                                                          
88
 2011(4) SA 314 (GNP) 
89
 Van Heerden 2011 Northern Law 5 
90
  s 129(1)(a) 
91
  Van Heerden in Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit Act par 12.18 
92
 2011 (6) SA 111 (WCC) 
93
 Other related cases where consumer protection has been concurred includes Nedbank Ltd v 
Fraser and another and four other cases 2011 (4) SA 363 (GSJ), Sebola & another v Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another 2012 (8) BCLR 785 (CC), Kubyana v Standard Bank of SA 
Ltd. (CCT 165/13) [2014] ZACC 1 (20 February 2014) and Nedbank v NCR 2011 ZASCA and 
Barko Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v NCR & Another 2014 JOL 323105 (SCA) (unreported case, n 
415/13, date of judgement 18/9/2014).This is also concurred in section 6 of the NCA, which limits 
application of certain provisions of the NCA to juristic persons. 
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v. the right to receive documents, and  
vi. the right to confidentiality. 
 
However, the NCA also provides for the rights and protection of the credit providers. 
The South African courts may not apply the Act in a manner that will only keep the 
consumers’ interest and rights in mind. The court’s role will continue to be impartial and 
objective in that it will consider the facts of the case, legislation, intention of the 
legislature and the reported precedents. This consideration was clearly depicted in the 
case of Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales.94 The facts were, briefly, that the 
defendants were in arrears on the mortgage loan. The plaintiff issued summons and 
during the summary judgment process, the defendants alleged that they were over-
indebted and that they have commenced engagement with a debt counsellor as 
contemplated in section 79 and 85(a) of the NCA. The plaintiff subsequently filed a 
declaration. In their plea, the defendants admitted to all the allegations contained in the 
plaintiff’s claim. The only defense raised by them was the previously mentioned over-
indebtedness and that they applied for relief from such over-indebtedness in terms of 
section 85 and that the sole purpose of the NCA is to provide protection for consumers.  
 
Gorven J held that an admission of over-indebtedness per se would be inadequate to 
convince the court to exercise its discretion favourably. However, the court rejected the 
submission on behalf of the defendants that the sole, or at least chief, purpose of the 
Act is to provide protection for consumers.  
 
The court indicated that no prioritisation is provided and that in the circumstances where 
the credit provider took all reasonable steps to advise the defendants of their option to 
apply for debt counselling, the defendants only did so a month after the delivery of the 
application for summary judgement. Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff had 
scrupulously complied with the provisions of the Act.  
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 2009 (3) SA 315 (D) 322B-C 
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Whilst consumer protection is a clear object, it is but one factor, albeit a very important 
one, in the purposes of the NCA.95 For this reason, it is clear that even though there is 
some vagueness in the NCA, the aim is understandably to consider all parties in a credit 
agreement in a fair and reasonable manner. 
 
 
2.4.  Recent amendments to the NCA 
Due to the criticisms published against the NCA and practical problems that have arisen 
since the inception of the NCA, the DTI decided to publish the draft National Credit Act 
Policy Review Framework Amended Bill in the Government Gazette.96 The policy 
document attempted to examine the flaws of the NCA, to identify remedial actions 
necessary to address problems that impede the effectiveness of the NCA97 and to close 
loopholes in the legislation. Moreover, noteworthy is that this policy document 
acknowledged that one of the key areas requiring attention is reckless credit.98 
 
On 19 May 2014, the National Credit Amendment Act (hereafter referred to as the 
Amendment Act) was assented by the President, Mr Jacob Zuma.99 The purpose of the 
Amendment Act is to amend and clarify certain provisions of the NCA to ensure that the 
aims set out in section 3 of the NCA can be achieved. The policy document also 
emphasised that “… the NCA is in essence credit legislation where both the policy and 
legislation have always attempted to create a balance of rights, to ensure a sustainable 
consumer credit market.”100 On 13 March 2015, these amendments became effective 
and operational.101 
 
                                                          
95
 This view of the courts was restated in  Rossouw& another v First Rand Bank Ltd t/a FNB Home 
Loans 2010 (6) SA 439 (SCA), Nedbank v National Credit Regulator 2011 (3) SA 581 (SCA) and 
Collett v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2011 (4) SA 508 (SCA) 
96
  GG no 36504 & 36050, 29 May 2013, Vol 575 page 14 
97
  Part 2 of policy document, p 11 
98
  Par 2.3.2.1.3, p 24 
99
  GG no 37665, Vol 587, no. 389 
100
  Par 1.3.9, p 14 
101
  Green Gazette no 38557, 13 March 2015 
32 
 
Throughout this study, reference will be made to both the NCA of 2007 as well as the 
Amendment Act of 2015. The purpose thereof is to compare the original state of affairs 
with the amendments and the effect thereof on the credit market. 
 
 
2.5.  Credit agreements 
The NCA defines the word “credit” when used as a noun as “a deferral of payment of 
money owed to a person, or a promise to defer such a payment; or a promise to 
advance or pay money to or at the direction of another person”.102  
 
An agreement is a credit agreement for the purposes of the NCA if two elements are 
present103, namely: 
• there is some deferral of repayment or prepayment of money, and 
• there is a fee, charge or interest imposed with respect to a deferred amount104 
payable, or a discount is given when prepayments are made. 
 
In the case of Carter Trading (Pty) Ltd v Blignaut105 the court determined that “charge” 
even includes the imposing of the cost to draft the document (the agreement between 
the parties).106  
 
In an unreported court case, Asmal v Essa107 the respondent advanced loans to the 
appellant or to a third party, even though the contractual relationship between the 
parties in this case was in dispute. Appellant paid by means of cheques that were 
dishonoured. The matter was taken on appeal where the appellant argued that the 
loans constituted credit agreements, which were subject to the provisions of the NCA. 
The appeal court held that as per s 8(3)(a)(ii) and 8(4)(f)(ii) the requirements for a credit 
                                                          
102
 s 1 
103
  Also see Asmal v Essa (38/2013) [2014] ZASCA 62; [2014] 3 All SA 115 (SCA) (14 May 2014)  
104
  Reg 39(1) provides the definition for a “deferred amount” 
105
  2010 2 SA 46 (ECP) 
106
  See also Evans v Smith 2011 4 SA 472 (WCC); Otto 2012 De Jure 161 
107
  (2014) JOL 31866 (SCA)(case nr. 38/2013, judgement date 14/5/2014) 
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agreement includes the payment of a “charge”, “fee” or interest”108. In this particular 
case no such charges were attached to the loans; therefore, they were not credit 
agreements as per the provisions of the NCA.  
 
The NCA creates three types of credit agreements: 
• Small credit agreements: a pawn transaction, credit facility or credit transaction 
(excluding Mortgage) of less than R15 000;109 
• Intermediate credit agreement: a credit facility or credit transaction (excluding a 
pawn transaction or mortgage) of between R15 000 and R250 000;110 
• Large credit agreement: a mortgage agreement or credit facility or credit 
transaction (excluding a pawn transaction) equal to or more than R250 000.111 
 
Credit agreement includes the following:112 
• a credit facility (for example credit cards);113 
• a credit transaction (for example an instalment agreement, a mortgage agreement, 
secured loan, a pawn transaction or an incidental credit agreement);114 
• a credit guarantee (for example a suretyship);115 
• developmental credit agreement116; 
• public interest credit agreement117, and  
• Acknowledgment of Debt (AOD).118 
 
                                                          
108
  Also see Janse van Rensburg v Mahu Exhaust cc & another (2015) JOL 33123 (NCK) (unreported 
case nr. 1338/2013, judgement date 21/02/2014) 
109
 s 9(2) read with GN 713 in GG 28893 of 1 June 2006 
110
 s 9(3) read with GN 713 in GG 28893 of 1 June 2006 
111
 s 9(4) read with GN 713 in GG 28893 of 1 June 2006 
112
  Otto 2011 TSAR 547 and Otto 2012 De Jure 162 and Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in 
SA 28 
113
 s 8(1) & (3), also see Van Heerden & Boraine 2011(Vol 2) De Jure 5 
114
 s 8(1) & (4), also see Van Heerden & Boraine 2011(Vol 2) De Jure 5 
115
 s 8(1) & (5), also see Van Heerden & Boraine 2011(Vol 2) De Jure 5 
116
 s 10 
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 s 11 
118
  The Eastern Cape High Court in Port Elizabeth (in the case of Carter Trading (Pty) Ltd. v Blignaut 
2010 (2) SA 46 (ECP)) concluded that an Acknowledgement of Debt (AOD) falls within the borders 
of s 8 of the NCA to be considered a credit agreement as envisaged by the NCA 
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However, the following agreements, irrespective of their form, are not credit 
agreements:119  
• a policy of insurance or credit extended by an insurer solely to maintain the 
payment of the premiums on a policy of insurance; 
• lease of immovable property, or 
• a transaction between a stokvel member and a member of that stokvel in 
accordance with the rules of that stokvel. 
 
To determine whether an agreement constitutes a credit agreement as per the NCA, 
can prove to be difficult. In the case of Renier Nel Inc. v Cash on Demand (KZN) (Pty) 
Ltd120, Wallis J made the following statement considering whether an agreement is a 
credit agreement as per the ambit of the NCA. The court must “… look at the nature of 
the transactions and have regard mainly to their substance rather than their form, as 
well as the whole course of the parties’ dealings.”121 
 
Section 80(1) of the NCA starts with “A credit agreement is reckless ....” It includes all 
categories of credit agreements, irrespective of the amount. The only exceptions will be 
those agreements that do not constitute a credit agreement, as stated in section 8(2) of 
the NCA and those provisions of the Act that will not apply to a credit agreement if the 
consumer is a juristic person.122 
 
Different rules apply to each category, for example regarding the content of the 
agreement123, the disclosure124 (which is required before an agreement may be 
concluded) the form or format in which the agreement must be concluded, and the 
cancelation125, rescission126 and alterations127 of a credit agreement. The credit provider 
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 s 8(2). 
120
  2011 (5) SA 239 (GSJ). 
121
  Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulations in SA 51. 
122
  s 6, also see paragraph 2.4 for more information. 
123
  s 93 and Regulations 30 and 31 
124
  s 92 and Regulations 28 and 29. 
125
  s 122 and 123 
126
  s 121 
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must provide the credit agreement to the consumer in the consumer’s official language. 
This is the language that she or he reads or understands to the extent that this is 
reasonable, bearing in mind usage, practicality, expense, regional circumstances and 
the needs and preferences of the population ordinarily served by the person who deliver 
the document.128 
 
Ease of language use is important to prevent reckless credit lending.129 If the consumer 
received the credit agreement documentation and did not have a general understanding 
and appreciation of the risk and costs of the proposed credit, and of the rights and 
obligations of a consumer under that specific credit agreement, the agreement can be 
considered by the South African courts to be a reckless credit agreement. The credit 
provider must take all reasonable steps to assess and prevent reckless credit lending. 
 
 
2.6.  Limited application of the NCA 
The NCA is limited in its application to incidental agreements and to all credit 
agreements in respect of which the consumer is a juristic person. The exceptions are 
too many to list, therefore only the main applicable exceptions will be reviewed.130 
 
Incidental credit agreements are exempt from the provisions dealing with: 
i. pre-agreement disclosure; 
ii. the form and content of agreements; 
iii. unlawful agreements and unlawful provisions in agreements; 
iv. reckless credit; 
v. registration requirements131; 
vi. marketing practices; 
vii. the surrender of goods; 
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viii. the consumer’s cooling-off right, and 
ix. the dispute settlement mechanisms of the NCA. 
 
Juristic persons132 do not enjoy the protection of the parts and sections that deals with: 
i. marketing practices;133 
ii. negative option agreements;134 
iii. reckless credit;135 
iv. debt review and rescheduling of debts;136 
v. the requirement that a variable interest rate be linked to a reference rate137, and 
vi. rules relating to fees, charges, maximum interest rates and credit insurance.138 
 
As stated under paragraph 1.5 and in section 1 of the NCA, a “juristic person” includes 
partnerships, any association or body of persons corporate or unincorporated (except 
stokvel) and trusts with three or more trustees or trusts whose trustee is a juristic 
person. Evidently, companies and close corporations are also included in the definition 
of a juristic person.  
 
Furthermore, the NCA has limited application as set out in section 6 of the NCA and 
therefore a juristic person may not be able to raise the issue of reckless credit. 
Consequently, Part D of Chapter 4 does not apply to juristic persons and thus a juristic 
person cannot rely on reckless credit granting as a defence under the NCA139. The 
question is, does this exclusion or limited application of the NCA not discriminate 
against juristic persons?  
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Credit Regulation in SA 36 
133
 s 6(a)  
134
 s 6(b) and (c) 
135
 s 6(a) 
136
 s 6(a). 
137
 s 6(d). 
138
 Charging of interest remains purely a matter of agreement between the credit provider and the 
juristic person in its capacity as a consumer. In principle, the credit provider can stipulate any 
interest rate subject only to the common law. See Otto et al NCA Explained (2010) 30. 
139
 s 6(a), s 78(1) and Van Heerden &  Boraine 2011(Vol 2) De Jure 44. 
37 
 
In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hunkydory Investments and Another 194 (Pty) 
Ltd (No 1)140 the debtor-company and surety was defending the summons based on the 
grounds that ss 4(1)(a), 4(1)(b) and 4(2)(c) of the NCA are unconstitutional in that the 
Act does not apply to juristic person. The defendants’ arguments were based on s 9(1) 
of the Constitution141 in that the provisions of section 4 of the NCA infringed on their 
constitutional right to equality. The court founded that the differentiation or 
discrimination was not unfair and the exclusion from the protection of the NCA was not 
unreasonable.142 
 
Continuing on limitations that needs to be mentioned is the sections in the NCA 
pertaining to the registration of credit providers. Not all persons who grant credit are 
required to be registered as a credit provider in terms of the NCA. According to section 
40 of the NCA, a person who has more than 100 credit agreements on the books 
(irrespective of the value of these loans) or to whom an aggregate principal debt of 
more than R500 000 is owed (irrespective of the number credit agreements) must 
register as a credit provider in order to be able to grand credit lawfully,143 with the 
exception of incidental credit agreements.144  
 
The Amendment Act altered section 40(1) to substitute the subsection (a). Therefore, a 
person or associated person must register as a credit provider irrespective of the 
number of credit agreements as long as the principal debt owed exceeds the threshold 
prescribed by the Minister.145 The existing threshold remains at R500,000 as per the 
original Act, but may be reduced to zero to bring about compulsory registration for all 
credit providers dealing at arm’s length. 
Comparing section 40(4) with section 89(2)(d) it is clear that the legislature intended 
that any credit agreement entered into by a credit provider who is not registered (and 
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should have been registered in terms of section 40(1)), would be considered an 
unlawful credit agreement.146 This was supported in the case of JMV Textiles (Pty) Ltd v 
De Chalain Spareinvest 14 CC147 when the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the 
first defendant in terms whereof the plaintiff would sell fabric to the defendant on credit. 
In the agreement, the credit limited was termed as “R50 000/R100 000”. At that point, 
the first defendant was liquidated and the two sureties were sued for payment of 
amounts owed and payable in terms of their suretyship. The defendants consequently 
raised the defence in limine that the plaintiff was not a registered credit provider; 
therefore, the credit agreement was unlawful and void.148 The court concurred.  
 
Therefore, the study will only focus on natural persons who tend to rely on reckless 
credit lending and not juristic persons and/or their sureties, because reckless lending 
does not apply to juristic persons.149 For the purpose of this study, a consumer will be a 
natural person and a credit provider will be considered a duly registered credit provider 
as per the NCA.  
 
 
2.7.  Reckless credit lending 
2.7.1.  Overview 
Regarding reckless lending, section 3 of the NCA clearly states that one of the aims of 
this act is to encourage the consumer as well as the credit provider to be responsible 
and accountable in the credit market.150 On the one hand, the consumer must be 
responsible when borrowing money to avoid over-indebtedness, to fulfil his/her financial 
commitments of consumers, and to deter the consumers from breach of their 
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contractual obligations.151 On the other hand, credit providers must avoid granting credit 
recklessly.152 Should the credit provider fail to be proactive, the credit provider will suffer 
serious consequences.153 
Over-indebtedness and reckless credit lending are two new terms that were introduced 
by the legislature, although the practical implications are not unknown to the credit 
industry. Over-indebtedness and reckless credit are interlinked but not interchangeable. 
Part D of Chapter 4 (ss 78-79) deals with these aspects, which came into operation on 1 
June 2007. 
 
The first sentence of the relevant part of the NCA states that these aspects only apply to 
credit agreements where the consumer is a natural person and not a juristic person154. 
A natural person will be a human being of flesh and blood who have passive legal 
capacity; yet their status may differ depending on their attributes (for example age) and 
circumstances (for example insolvency).155 In effect, this means that business 
proprieties may not seek financial assistance when faced with over-indebtedness and 
reckless credit practices.156 
 
Therefore, consumers have full protection in cases of over-indebtedness and reckless 
credit if they are a natural person. In order to support the protection, the credit provider 
must ensure that adequate procedures are in place to prevent the granting of reckless 
credit by means of assessment mechanisms that should be used in assessing the 
obligations of the credit consumer by the credit provider.157 Should a credit provider 
disregard the lending risks and implementation of proper assessment mechanisms and 
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practice indiscriminate moneylending to consumers who do not have the ability to pay 
back loans, this practice will have a chain reaction on the credit industry and result in 
endangering the economic growth in South Africa and ultimately worldwide.158 
 
 
2.7.2.  Over-indebtedness 
Though over-indebtedness is not relevant to this study, it is import to explain the 
terminology. It is especially relevant when considering section 80 where it is described 
how reckless credit granting may have an impact on the consumer’s financial prospects 
in that by granting a loan without considering section 80 can result in the consumer 
being unable to satisfy all obligations in a timely manner.159 Reference is being made to 
this terminology throughout the NCA and particularly in this study when the different 
types of reckless credit lending is discussed in Part II, paragraph 5.2 of the study. 
 
The NCA fails to define over-indebtedness in section 1 of the Act, even though “reckless 
credit” is defined. Section 79 of the NCA states:  
 
A consumer is over-indebted if the preponderance of available information at the 
time of determination is made indicates that the particular consumer is or will be 
unable to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under all the credit 
agreements to which the consumer is a party …160  
 
The NCA provides guidelines to determine over-indebtedness.161 The overlap between 
over-indebtedness and reckless credit can be explained as follows:  
i. when a credit provider enters into a credit agreement with a consumer and the 
consumer then becomes over-indebted162  as a result of credit lending having 
been granted recklessly;163 or  
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ii. when the consumer is already over-indebted and has applied for debt re-
arrangement and that re-arrangement still subsists, then such new credit 
agreement may be declared reckless credit lending.164  
 
Over-indebtedness and reckless credit allows the consumer to engage in a number of 
debt relief remedies, for example debt restructuring.165 However, such processes and 
procedures will not be discussed in this study; the purpose of this dissertation being to 
investigate the concept of reckless credit, the remedies proposed and the procedural 
implications. 
 
 
2.7.3.  Reckless credit 
Reckless credit lending is, conceptually, new to the South African legal system. By this 
time, credit providers in South Africa should be aware of the factors that could label 
them as reckless lenders, and should avoid practices that may lead them to suffer the 
legislative consequences.166 This is not an easy task since the concept has never been 
dealt with by South African legislation prior to the NCA. Credit providers will have to rely 
on legislation and precedent to guide their actions. 
 
The following observation by Otto is relevant:167 “The provisions in the National Credit 
Act dealing with the prevention and consequences of reckless credit are not only far 
reaching, but also extremely important to all concerned. The provisions contain a huge 
amount of detail ….” 
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According to the Cambridge Dictionary, the typical meaning of the word “reckless” is 
“doing something dangerous and not worrying about the risks and the possible 
results.”168 The Oxford Dictionary defines “reckless” as “disregarding the consequences 
of danger.”169 Compared to section 80 of the NCA, it is clear that the legislator 
considered the meaning of the word. The legislator also went one step further to provide 
not only for the act of disregarding the consequences, but also to include the failure by 
the credit provider to analyse the credit potential of a potential consumer, and/or 
incorrectly analysing the credit potential of the consumer.170  
 
Consequently, the following questions are raised: When is a credit agreement reckless? 
Moreover, how can one recognise reckless lending?  
 
Section 80 states that reckless lending can occur in one of three ways: 
(1) the credit provider fails to conduct a proper assessment at the time of the 
application by the consumer171 and grants the credit to the consumer; or 
(2) if a consumer is over-indebted at the time of applying for credit, and the credit 
provider was aware of the consumer’s financial situation and still proceeded to 
approve the credit agreement, or 
(3) the consumer did not understand the risk, cost, and/or obligations entailed in the 
credit agreement.  
 
Such an allegation of reckless credit lending must be referred to a court for 
consideration and if the court finds the agreement as “reckless credit”, it may order:  
• the facility to be suspended, during which time all rights and obligations will be 
frozen. Interest, cost and fees may not be collected by the credit provider, nor may 
the normal repayment be expected from the consumer for the duration of the 
suspended period as determined by the Court;172 or 
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• the facility may be partially or fully wiped (also known as “writing back” or “setting 
aside”) of all rights and obligations in terms of the credit agreement by the credit 
provider.173 The court will determine the order that is just and reasonable in the 
circumstances. When the credit provider attends to the order, no adverse information 
may be reported to the credit bureaux. 
 
Upon declaring a credit agreement as reckless credit lending, the court must also 
consider whether the consumer is over-indebted at the time of the court proceedings.174 
Should the court have found the particular credit agreement reckless on the grounds 
that the granting of the credit resulted in the over-indebtedness and concludes that the 
consumer is indeed over-indebted at the time of the court proceedings, the sanction 
imposed by the court may be to suspend the particular credit agreement for a certain 
period of time.175 
 
If the evidence proves that credit provider failed to conduct a proper assessment176 at 
the time of application by the consumer and/or the consumer did not understand the 
risk, cost and/or obligations entailed in the particular credit agreement, the court may 
impose the sanction where the particular credit agreement will be partially or fully wiped 
or suspended.177 This is the provision as per the NCA. Conversely, in a recent case the 
constitutional court found this provision to be unconstitutional.178 A full discussion of the 
constitutionality of section 83(2)(c) will be discussed in paragraph 6.3.1 of this study. 
Application for reckless credit is only applicable to credit agreements entered into after 1 
June 2007 and in terms of section 78(2) the provisions in ss 81 to 84 do not apply to179: 
i. a school loan or a student loan; 
ii. an emergency loan; 
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iii. a public interest credit agreement; 
iv. a pawn transaction; 
v. an incidental credit agreement, or 
vi. A temporary increase in the credit limit under a credit facility provided that these 
transactions have been reported to the NCR.  
 
All sections relating to reckless credit undoubtedly require that a credit provider must 
avoid entering into a reckless credit agreement with a prospective consumer. This 
underlines the statements in section 3(c) (ii) of the NCA affirming it as one of the 
purposes of this Act that discourage reckless credit lending. 
 
However, the NCA does not state that a credit agreement granted recklessly is ab initio 
null and void as is the case with unlawful credit agreements in terms of section 89 of the 
NCA.180 The Act only states the courts may, when declaring a credit agreement to be 
indeed reckless credit lending, that such particular credit agreement, depending on the 
type of reckless credit, inter alia be set aside all or part of the consumer’s rights and 
duties in terms thereof or suspend its operation.181  
 
The NCA is not clear in all respects as to how the courts should exercise their discretion 
in this regard. This vagueness is especially applicable on instances where the credit 
agreement before the court is a loan with security, that is, should the moneys or goods 
received or paid be forfeited, or remain the property of the consumer or credit 
provider.182 During 2010, the media reported a case that was heard in the magistrate’s 
court in Port Elizabeth183, where the magistrate acted mero motu in setting aside a 
residential mortgage bond that amounted to a reckless credit agreement, while the 
consumer remained the owner of the property. 
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It is therefore indistinguishable whether the court may exercise its discretion in terms of 
section 83(2) (a) of the NCA or another NCA provision when deciding what should 
happen to the money or goods. Consequently, the section referring to unlawful 
provisions and unlawful agreements will also have to be considered in the execution of 
the comparative analysis. Furthermore, these provisions and the application thereof will 
also have to be compared with the law of contracts in South Africa, the precedents, the 
constitutional accuracy184, as well as with international legislation.   
 
 
2.7.4. Overview of the end-to-end process 
In chapter 3, the legal bond created when entering into a contract is discussed. The 
illustration/flow diagram below puts the conception of the legal bond in perspective in 
terms of credit agreements as a specific contract. Therefore, the following pictorial 
process map illustrates each segment in the creation of a legal bond in terms of a credit 
agreement as per the law of contracts and the credit legislation. 
  
The pictorial process is an introductory overview of the credit application to the credit 
granting process in Part II of the study, therefore each of these segments will be 
discussed in the relevant subsection and context. The process discussion will refer to 
the relevant sections of the NCA as well as the Amendment Act. 
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2.8.  Conclusion 
The NCA and Regulations initiated by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), were 
designed to solve specific problems in the consumer credit market properly (only credit-
related issues are within DTI’s mandate). In the context of the NCA, this means that 
creditworthy borrowers from low-income households and the small and micro sectors 
are not excluded from access to credit185. 
 
The fundamental purpose of the NCA is to achieve integrity in the credit market and 
eliminate the multitude of unfair practices, inappropriate disclosure and anti-competitive 
practices from the market.186The purpose of the legislation is to create a single system 
of credit regulation and a national credit regulator to administer the credit industry.187 
 
The NCA sets credit legislation in South Africa on par with similar legislation in 
developed countries.188 The NCA is likely to reduce undesirable credit practices 
significantly, but it may take some time for the financial system to adjust and then to 
expand under the new law. The provisions of reckless credit lending are aimed at 
encouraging responsible borrowers of all income levels and keeping lenders 
accountable. However, the sanctions that have to be imposed on reckless credit 
agreements remain vague and uncertain in the Act.  
 
A comparative analysis is required to note the similarity or dissimilarity of the purpose 
and aim of the NCA to what is just and reasonable. In this dissertation, the legal 
comparison needs to be done in relation with the South African legislation, as well as 
with the international legislation in countries where a similar principal has been adopted, 
before recommendation can be made as to how the courts should deal with reckless 
credit agreements that have security, that is money or goods.  
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In this chapter, an introductory overview was given regarding the application of the 
NCA. The issues contained and introduced in the overview will be discussed more 
closely in Part II of the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: INTERACTION: NCA AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
CONTRACT 
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3.1.  Introduction 
In order to appreciate the nature and extent of the legal obligations to which the NCA 
applies, it is important to explore the origins of legal obligations generally and to make 
specific reference to the most significant sources thereof. The obligations where the 
object of performance is payment sounding in money (pretium) and the delivery of a 
thing (merx) are predominantly relevant to this dissertation. 
 
The general scope of the NCA has been determined in Chapter 2 of Part I. In the 
chapter at issue, the general foundation of the law of contract will be reviewed, and an 
analysis will be done of the specific obligations to which the dissertation will apply. 
 
It is of paramount importance to establish the principle of particular terms of the law of 
contract to determine the application thereof on credit agreements while taking 
cognisance of the principles of the NCA regarding reckless credit lending and the 
consequences of a reckless credit order. 
 
 
3.2.  Law of obligations 
“Obligation” is a term originating from the Latin word obligare, which means “to tie” or “to 
bind together”. Thus, an obligation is a legal tie or bond (iuris vinculum) that binds 
together legal subjects in a form of a legal relationship.189 
 
Legal consequences flow from legal facts, and a legally recognised obligation is an 
example of such a legal fact.190 An obligation is a legal bond between two or more 
persons. It comprises both a right and a duty191, which means that a legally recognised 
debtor-creditor relationship would exist where the parties acquire rights and duties, 
before it can be referred to as an enforceable personal obligation.192 The debtor bears a 
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duty to make the performance agreed upon and the creditor has a right to claim that 
performance. The creditor’s right is the converse of the debtor’s duty.193 
 
The types of obligations found in law are natural and civil obligations, differentiated as 
follows: 
• A natural obligation is rights and duties that are recognised in law, but not 
enforceable through a court of law194, for example a wager. 
• A civil obligation is rights and duties that are legally recognised and 
enforceable195, for example a contract. 
 
This study is only concerned with civil obligations. A few examples of legal facts giving 
rise to obligations are contracts, delicts as well as various other causes like negotiorum 
gestio196 and unjustified enrichment. A credit agreement is a specific type of contract, 
applicable to civil obligations. Furthermore, the principle and operation of unjustified 
enrichment, is a direct consequence of the sanctions that could be imposed by a court 
when a credit agreement is found to be reckless credit lending. The matter of unjustified 
enrichment is more closely discussed in paragraph 3.3.3 of this chapter. 
 
 
3.3.  Law of contracts 
According to the Roman law, contractus refers to an undertaking between persons, 
which bring about obligations and which comply with certain requirements.197 These 
obligations include legal consequences, namely the right to claim performance and the 
duty to perform. 
 
A contract is essentially an agreement between two or more parties that intends to 
create enforceable obligations (animus contrahendi). It must be borne in mind that a 
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contract is an agreement made with the intention of creating an obligation.198 In other 
words, when parties199 conclude a contract they have the expectation that the law will 
acknowledge their agreement and attach legal consequences thereto.200 If the parties 
do not envisage legal consequences, the agreement between them is not a contract. 
This legal fact is known as a juristic act.201 In addition, a contract that exists between 
two or more persons is a multilateral legal act, usually two-sided because two persons 
or two groups of persons are in relationship with each other202. 
 
The law of contract in South Africa is “essentially a modernised version of the Roman-
Dutch law of contract”, which is itself rooted in Roman law.203 Over the years, the law of 
contract in South Africa has developed and currently provides for a legal framework by 
which contractual parties can conclude business and exchange resources, knowing that 
the law will uphold their agreements and, if necessary, enforce the terms and 
conditions. Therefore, the law of contract in South Africa underpins and regulates 
private enterprise in the interest of fair dealing, subject to the fulfilment of the 
contractual requirements. 
 
The basis of a contract is the consensus reached between the contracting parties as to 
their respective legally binding rights and duties (responsibilities).204  This contract is a 
reciprocal contract in which rights and duties are created for all parties to the contract. A 
case in point is a bank who undertakes to advance money to a borrower, while the latter 
undertakes to repay the money205 with interest over an agreed period. Therefore, the 
bank has a duty to provide the borrowed money to the borrower and the borrower has a 
right to claim performance from the bank. However, on the converse side, the bank has 
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a right to receive repayment at interest, while the borrower has a duty to pay the 
borrowed money back with interest over the agreed period.206 
 
The agreement between parties need not be expressed in a particular noticeable form 
in order to constitute a contract.207 The law recognise that the agreement may either be: 
• an expressed contract and terms, whether orally or in writing,208 and 
• tacit contracts and terms, where the intention of the parties are determined by their 
implied conduct and actions.209 
 
In order to be recognised as a valid and binding contract, the formation of an agreement 
must satisfy the following requirements:210 
a. Consensus: the minds of the parties must meet on all material aspects of their 
agreement; 
b. Capacity: the parties must have the necessary capacity to contract; 
c. Formalities: where the agreement required, unusually, to be in a certain form (for 
example in writing and signed), these formalities must be adhere to211; 
d. Legality: the agreement must be lawful, that is not prohibited by statute or common 
law; 
e. Possibility: the obligations undertaken must be capable of performance when the 
agreement is entered into, and 
f. Certainty: the agreement must have a definite or determinable content, so that the 
obligations can be ascertained and enforced. 
According to the law of contracts, the contractual parties has the freedom to contract, 
which means that the individuals who want to enter into an agreement are free to decide 
whether, with whom, and on what terms they want to enter into a contractual 
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relationship.212 The terms of a contract is, however, open to abuse and it is up to the law 
and courts in South Africa to provide for the fair operation of the particular contract. Van 
Der Merwe et al stated as follows213: 
 
The extent to which the legal systems accept responsibility to ensure justice by 
means of the principles and rules, which apply to specific areas of the law as well 
as through more general concepts, may vary considerably. 
 
In Barkhuizen v Napier214 the honourable judge made the remark that public policy “… 
imports the notions of fairness, justice and reasonableness …” and that public policy 
would prevent enforcement of a contractual term if its enforcement would be “… unjust 
or unfair …”215 However, in social reality equality seldom exists and  many contracts are 
entered into out of need.216 It repeatedly occurs that the “weaker” party is powerless and 
may have to surrender to the terms of the “stronger” party’s will without the option of 
negotiation.217  
 
Consumer protection measures used to be antiquated and disorganised. South Africa 
needed to develop and implement a comprehensive framework of legislation, policies, 
and government authorities to regulate consumer protection by enhancing consumer 
rights and eliminate improper business practices.218 As a result, the legislator has 
attempted to protect consumers from abuse by introducing consumer protection 
legislation (National Credit Act 34 of 2005219 and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
                                                          
212
 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2007) para 1.3.4 page 11 
213
 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2007) page 317 
214
  2007 5 SA 323 CC 
215
  Christie Law of Contract 19 
216
  Aronstam Consumer Protection, Freedom of Contract and the Law (1979) 14 
217
  Hopkins 2003 TSAR 153 and Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 157  and 163 
218
  Jacobs et al. Fundamental consumer rights (2010) PELJ (13) 303 
219
  See s61, 62 and 66 of the NCA dealing with unfair discrimination and Chapter 4 Part C as well as 
s92 that steer clear of general provisions relating to unconscionable, unfairness, unreasonableness 
in favour of targeting specific practices relating to the making of contract. However the NCA is not 
stating that reckless credit lending is considered to be a contract that is “unconscionable, unfair 
and/or  unreasonable” and that is challenge with the NCA and important for the purpose of this 
dissertation.  
53 
 
2008220). For example, if a consumer wants to enter into a credit agreement with a 
registered credit provider, the credit agreement will be regulated by the NCA. However, 
if the consumer wants to purchase good and/or services from a supplier, and the 
transaction does not constitute a credit agreement, the Consumer Protection Act will 
regulate that particular agreement. The Consumer Protection Act is not applicable to 
credit agreements that falls within in the scope of the NCA.221 
 
In this study, it is appropriate to focus on the general concept that motivates the rules 
governing the operation of a contract between the contractual parties. Such a general 
concept in the South African legal system is “good faith” (bona fide).222 Good faith is a 
fundamental concept in all civil law systems, with a long history going back to Roman 
law. Yet, it is a legal system whose nature and content are controversial and gravely 
misunderstood. This controversy was evident in the constitutional court case of 
Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd.223 The court indicated 
that the matter of good faith will continue to enjoy attention when addressing the role of 
good faith in contracts. Even the Consumer Protection Act224 emphasise in section 40 
that parties to a contract should act in good faith and the parties to the contract should 
refrain from behaving in an improper and unconscionable manner that is against the 
boni mores.225 
 
It appears difficult to define the concept of “good faith”. A precise, positive, and 
unequivocal meaning seems elusive. In the long run, a merely functional definition of 
the concept seems to suffice; that is, good faith is the standard used to judge the 
behaviour of the parties to a contract, which standard includes that the parties should 
behave honestly and fairly when dealing with each other.226 This notion is the corner 
stone in the law of contract on which the South African courts relay heavily and that 
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comes back to the doctrine of freedom to contract: Contractual parties must be able to 
negotiate freely on the terms of their agreement, and full effect should be given to the 
agreement – although this doctrine is not absolute.227 
 
In Brisley v Drotsky228 the parties entered into a standard form of a lease agreement for 
a residential premise. The fact that the contractual parties signed a standard form of 
lease agreement indicated that the parties probably not properly negotiated the 
contract. It gave rise to the question whether there was even a freely negotiated 
agreement at all. 229 Consequently, the courts indicated that the role of good faith was 
merely an underlying principle of the contract law; a principle that considers the 
underlying existing substantive rules and doctrines, and does not give rise to a 
substantive ground or defence enabling the court to set aside a contract or refuse to 
enforce a contractual term.230  
 
Good faith most certainly can play a fundamental and informative role in the 
development of the principles of contract law, especially when entering into certain 
types of contracts or with certain specific contractual relationships.231 It is argued that 
the modern law of contract should provide leniency to judges when applying the good 
faith principle and reasonableness in contracts between parties when ensuring fairness 
and protection to the weaker party.232 The purpose of good faith in the law of contract is 
to represent a society’s view of what is fair, just, and reasonable between contractual 
parties. 233 This purpose of good faith was reiterated in section 48 of the Consumer 
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Protection Act234 in which legislation provided the consumer with the right to fair, just 
and reasonable terms and conditions in terms of a contract.235 
 
Compared with a credit agreement, which in itself is also a standard form of contract, 
good faith in this sense may be developed by way of a specific application or by 
imposing a duty on the contractual parties, that is, the credit provider, and the 
consumer, to act fairly and reasonably.236 Hawthorne criticised the court in the Afrox-
case237 in that although the court acknowledged the widespread use of modern 
standard form contracts, the court did not consider the effect such contracts have on 
consensus. A contractual party, such as a consumer entering into a standard credit 
agreement, has no freedom to contract or to negotiate the credit agreement terms and 
conditions.238 Such limitation of freedom to contract comes back to the statement that a 
consumer enters into a credit agreement because of a necessity that results in an 
inequality of bargaining power.239 Generally, consumers are ignorant of the terms and 
conditions in a standard form credit agreement or they are generally unable to 
understand the terms and conditions. Most standard forms of credit agreements are 
drafted by lawyers in language that are commonly incomprehensible to the 
nonprofessional.240 
 
The NCA attempted to overcome this difficulty by stating that all credit documentation 
must be produced in plain and understandable language241. Otto describes plain 
language as “… languages that enable an ordinary consumer with average literacy skills 
and minimal credit experience to understand the content, significance, and import of the 
documentation.”242 Generally, all contractual parties to any kind of contract should 
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demonstrate a minimum degree of respect for the interests of the other party, to the 
point that he does not use the contract (or in this case, the credit agreement) to protect 
his own interest unreasonably: good faith thus requires “ordinary business decency”.243 
 
However, it appears that the appeal courts have been expressly unwilling to recognise 
good faith as a “free-floating”244 basis for judicial intervention and control when 
considering the consensual contractual terms.245 In fact, the courts have rejected the 
notion that they have the discretion to disregard the good faith contractual principles if 
said principles are regarded to be unreasonable or unfair.246 
 
Good faith is a specific duty that will also include the concepts of public policy and 
public interest, as is seen with the National Credit legislation. The legislature attempted 
to ensure that the credit provider is not protecting its own interest over that of the 
consumer. Given the considerable imbalance of power between the credit providers and 
consumers under the previous credit legislation, the South African Law Commission 
attempted to level the bargaining position between the credit provider and the consumer 
when the NCA was introduced.247 Consequently, the NCA comprises of provisions 
aimed at ensuring that contract terms are not unfair, unreasonable, or unjust, which will 
be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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3.3.1. Unlawful agreements  
An underlying principle of the law of contract (pacta sunt servanda or sanctity of 
contract) is that agreements seriously concluded should be enforceable.248 However, 
agreements that are clearly damaging to the interests of the community as a whole, 
whether they are contrary to law or morality (contra bonos mores), or if they are in 
contradiction to social or economic interest, should not be enforceable.249 Said contracts 
are illegal on the grounds of public policy.250 The law regards illegal or unlawful 
contracts either as void and thus unenforceable, or as valid but unenforceable. Hence, 
contracts of a particular kind may be prohibited in terms of legislation or may be 
prohibited in terms of public interest or policy.251 Therefore, the NCA also included 
unlawful agreements, as it is part of the common law pertaining to the law of contracts. 
 
The NCA declares certain credit agreements as unlawful, and forbids certain individual 
terms and provisions in credit agreements.252 Section 89 of the NCA declares that an 
entire credit agreement will be deemed unlawful in the following circumstances253:  
• agreements concluded with an unassisted un-emancipated minor; 
• agreements concluded with a person who have been declared mentally unfit; 
• agreements concluded with a person under an administration order, without the 
administrator’s consent; 
• agreement resulted from negative option marketing; 
• agreement concluded with an unregistered credit provider; 
• agreements concluded by a credit provider who was subject to a notice from the 
NCR or a provisional regulator to stop extending credit. 
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However, a credit agreement will not be considered unlawful if the consumer 
deliberately (directly or indirectly) induced a credit provider to believe that she or he has 
the legal capacity to enter into a credit agreement. It will also not be considered unlawful 
if the consumer fails to disclose that she or he is subject to an order restricting their 
ability to conclude a credit agreement254, that is, to say the consumer acted mala fide. If 
a credit agreement is unlawful, only an order of court must declare the agreement 
void255  and unenforceable as from the date the credit agreement was entered into.256   
 
Comparing these provisions of the NCA to the common law, the NCA does not grant the 
same discretion to the courts as the common law does257. In terms of the common law, 
neither party to an unlawful contract is entitled to restitution of performance if both acted 
improperly (the par delictum rule).258 The party who is in possession of performance has 
a stronger right and both parties will forfeit their respective performances unless the 
court is prepared to relax the strict operations of the par delictum rule by doing simple 
justice between man and man.259 However, in terms of the NCA, the court must 
retrospectively pronounce the particular agreement void if a credit agreement is 
unlawful.260 
 
When the court has declared such an agreement void, the credit provider is required to 
refund all payments made by the consumer with interest to the consumer261. 
Furthermore, all the purported rights of the credit provider to recover money or goods 
delivered to the consumer are cancelled unless the court concludes that, in doing so, 
the consumer could be unjustly enriched262. Alternatively, the money or goods may be 
forfeited to the State.263 
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These consequences are indeed extensive, because whatever order the court makes, 
the credit provider loses his security (if goods were delivered) and/or repayment 
(amount borrowed with interest), while performance is restored to the consumer. The 
assumption is that credit providers must avoid entering into a credit agreement that 
could constitute an unlawful credit agreement and that the NCA wants to ensure that the 
bona fide consumer is protected.264  
 
Section 89 of the NCA does not consider a reckless credit agreement as an unlawful 
agreement; thus, the debt relief afforded in respect of a reckless credit agreement is 
limited to the relief set out in section 83 and does not extend to the relief provided in 
section 89(5) of the NCA in respect of unlawful credit agreements.265 However, the NCA 
does not state that a reckless credit agreement is ab initio null and void as in the 
instances of unlawful credit agreements, which yet again indicates, that the NCA is not 
written in a clear and precise manner. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 
of this study.  
 
 
3.3.2.  Unlawful provisions in agreements 
The NCA stipulates that a credit agreement must not contain unlawful provisions. In this 
regard, the NCA provides a long list of provisions deemed unlawful. Only a few 
applicable to the comparative analysis are mentioned:266 
• defeating the purposes or policies of the NCA; 
• deceiving the consumer; 
• purporting to waive the consumer’s rights or depriving the consumer of them; 
• purporting to avoid the credit provider’s statutory duties, to override the NCA, to 
authorise the credit provider’s failure to do something required by the NCA, or to do 
something unlawful in terms of the NCA, or 
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• waiving common law rights prescribed by the Minister.267 
 
As with unlawful agreements, only a court can declare such unlawful provisions in a 
credit agreement void268. The unlawful provisions will be void from the date that it is 
purported to take effect and should be removed from the rest of the credit agreement, 
which will remain valid and in full force and effect. Otherwise, the credit provider may 
alter the unlawful provision to the extent required to render it lawful, if it is reasonable to 
do so regarding the agreement as a whole. 
 
Alternatively, the court may declare the entire credit agreement unlawful269 and may 
order that the credit provider must refund to the consumer any money paid by the 
consumer under that agreement to the credit provider, with interest. Furthermore, all the 
rights of the credit provider to recover any money paid or goods delivered to the 
consumer under that agreement are: 
• cancelled270, or  
• forfeited to the State271, unless the court concludes that doing so in the 
circumstances would unjustly enrich the consumer.  
 
It does not appear to be desirable to declare a whole credit agreement unlawful when 
considering this stipulation in the NCA. Compared to the approach of the courts in the 
past, the courts would currently rather separate an unlawful provision from the credit 
agreement and enforce the remainder of the contract, unless such separation will leave 
the parties with a contract substantially different from the one the parties originally 
intended.272 Surely the courts will apply the same principle273 they had in the past when 
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considering an credit agreement and whether the provision constitute unlawfulness and 
would not exploit this unusual discretion.  
 
Unlawful provision also does not refer to, or include, reckless credit lending; therefore, 
the purpose of referencing this section of the NCA seems to be irrelevant. Although, in 
Chapter 5 of this study, reference will be made, supported by literature, that there are 
credit providers who include a clause in their credit applications and agreements stating 
that the consumer fully understands and appreciates the risks, cost and obligations 
under the particular credit agreement, and that the South African courts have to date not 
found such a clause to be an unlawful provision. 
 
It appears that including such a clause could:  
• defeat the purpose or policies of the NCA;  
• deceive the consumer;  
• purporting to waive the consumer’s rights;  
• deprive the consumer of his/her rights;  
• purport to avoid the credit provider’s statutory duties; 
• override the NCA;  
• authorise the credit provider’s failure to do something required by the NCA; 
• do something unlawful in terms of the NCA, or  
• result in the consumer’s common law right being waived. 
 
As a result a comparative analysis was done between section 90 (unlawful provisions of 
credit agreements), section 80 (reckless credit) and section 81 (prevention of reckless 
credit). The following has been found: 
i. One of the purposes or policies of the NCA are to prevent credit providers to enter 
into a reckless credit agreement.274 If the credit provider thus includes a clause to 
confirm with the consumer she or he understands and appreciates the risks, cost 
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and obligations under the credit agreement, the credit provider is complying with 
the purpose of the NCA. 
ii. The insertion of the clause is not to deceive the consumer, as it is part of the credit 
application form; therefore, it is clear and precise to the content and application of 
such a clause. 
iii. The insertion of the clause will not result in the consumer waiving any rights given 
to the consumer in terms of the common law of the NCA. 
iv. The clause does not result in the credit provider avoiding their statutory duties, 
because the credit provider will still do an assessment as required. 
 
Hence the importance of including unlawful credit agreements and unlawful provision 
within a credit agreement into this study regarding reckless credit. By including such a 
clause, the credit provider has complied with its duties in terms of the NCA. In addition, 
the credit provider has taken preventative steps to avoid entering into a credit 
agreement that could have been declared reckless credit agreement if the consumer did 
not understand the risk, cost and obligations in terms of the particular credit agreement. 
 
 
3.3.3.  Law of unjustified enrichment275 
Once the court has found a credit agreement to be reckless lending, the court has 
discretion to make an order in terms whereof the agreement can be suspended or 
partially or fully wiped off.276 However, the NCA is silent as to what should happen in 
instances where the parties have already performed in terms of the reckless credit 
agreement. However, what about restoration? Should the credit provider not be able to 
reclaim any amount of the credit granted to the consumer or the return of the goods 
delivered to the consumer in terms of the instalment agreement or mortgage 
agreement?277 Moreover, on the flip side: Should the consumer not be entitled to 
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reclaim any payments made by the consumer to the credit provider? If there is no 
restoration, the above will result in another cause of action, which is unjustified 
enrichment. The law of unjustified enrichment is that branch of the law that applies, in 
the simplest of terms, to situations where one person’s estate has been unjustifiably 
enriched at the expense of another person. 
 
Eiselen and Pienaar define an obligation arising from unjustified enrichment succinctly 
as: “An obligation arising whenever one person’s estate has been increased at the 
expense of another person’s estate and sufficient legal ground (causa) for the retention 
of such increase is lacking.”278 
 
In conjunction with the law of contract and the law of delict, the law of unjustified 
enrichment constitutes the third main source of obligations in South African law. 
However, this was not always the case; the Roman and classical Roman-Dutch idea 
determined that these obligations were quasi-contractual. This view remained popular in 
the formative years of South African law. Conceptually this meant that cases of 
unjustified enrichment were traditionally not understood as a distinct type of obligation, 
but were treated as a peculiar sub-species of contract279. However, the trail-blazing 
work of especially De Vos and Scholtens in the mid-20th century led to the 
abandonment of the quasi-contract theory and recognition of the fact that the field of 
unjustified enrichment constitutes a separate source of obligations in its own right.280 
 
The goal of the law of unjustified enrichment is either to reverse a transfer of value 
(usually a transfer of money or property, although enrichment can occur by 
consumption) that has occurred without good cause, or to restore the aggrieved party to 
the position the person was in, in a patrimonial sense, prior to the making of the undue 
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transfer of value that has resulted in the impoverishment of her or his estate. Hutchison 
defines an unjustified enrichment as taking place “… when there is a shift of wealth from 
one person’s estate to another’s without a good legal ground or cause for this shift.”281 
 
There are four requirements to prove liability for unjustified enrichment, viz. 282 
1.  The defendant must have been enriched. 
2.  The plaintiff must have been impoverished. 
3.  The defendant’s enrichment must have been at the expense of the plaintiff. 
4.  The enrichment must be unjustified (sine causa). 
 
Element four requires that, in order to institute an enrichment action for the recovery of 
a performance in South African law, it is necessary for the plaintiff to show, in addition to 
the fact that the defendant was enriched at the plaintiff’s expense, that the enrichment 
occurred sine causa. This means it must be clear that there was no legally recognised 
ground for the enrichment.  
 
In addition to the general elements of enrichment, the specific factors and requirements 
applicable to the relevant traditional enrichment action must also be proved in order for 
the plaintiff to have a restitutionary remedy in terms of one of the actions. The purpose 
of the restitutionary remedy is that the parties are entitled to be restored to their 
previous positions.283 For example if the parties entered into a sale agreement the seller 
must return the purchase price to the purchaser and the purchaser must return the 
subject matter of the sale.   
 
In South Africa, the Supreme Court of Appeal has been quite happy to recognise and 
impose liability in situations and circumstances where liability would not have existed 
under the traditional enrichment actions in Roman or Roman-Dutch law. However, the 
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court will only do so if modern circumstances and equities necessitate it, and if a 
particular form of traditional enrichment action is amenable, in some way, to 
development. The traditional actions will remain of paramount importance. It will only be 
extended in an ad hoc fashion.284 
 
In terms of the NCA, the law of unjustified enrichment read together with unlawful 
agreements seemed to ignore the common law principles. Subsequently two cases will 
be compared to analyse the approach the courts took in terms of section 89(5)(c). For 
the purpose of this study, section 89 will be read together with section 40(4) of the NCA. 
 
Section 40(4) reads as follows: 
(4)  A credit agreement entered into by a credit provider who is required to be 
registered in terms of subsection (1) but who is not so registered is an 
unlawful agreement and void to the extent provided for in section 89. 
 
Section 89(5) reads as follows: 
89.  Unlawful credit agreements 
(5)  If a credit agreement is unlawful in terms of this section, despite any 
provision of common law, any other legislation or any provision of an 
agreement to the contrary, a court must order that- 
(a)  the credit agreement is void as from the date the agreement 
was entered into; 
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(b)  the credit provider must refund to the consumer any money paid 
by the consumer under that agreement to the credit provider, 
with interest calculated – 
(i)  at the rate set out in that agreement; and 
(ii)  for the period from the date on which the consumer paid 
the money to the credit provider, until the date the money 
is refunded to the consumer; and 
(c)  all the purported rights of the credit provider under that credit 
agreement to recover any money paid or goods delivered to, or 
on behalf of, the consumer in terms of that agreement are either 
– 
(i)  cancelled, unless the court concludes that doing so in the 
circumstances would unjustly enrich the consumer; or 
(ii)  forfeit to the State, if the court concludes that cancelling 
those rights in the circumstances would unjustly enrich 
the consumer. 
 
In Cherangani Trade and Investment 107 (Edms) Bpk v Mason NO and Others285 the 
Free State High Court (FSHC) held that the credit agreement was unlawful in terms of 
section 89, because at the time that the parties entered into the particular agreement, 
the credit provider was not a registered credit provider286 and had not applied for 
registration287. The FSHC acknowledged that s 89(5) provides discretion to the court 
when having to decide whether the consumer would be enriched by the cancellation of 
the credit provider’s rights. Consequently, the court held that in this case the consumer 
would have been enriched, and accordingly declared the credit provider’s right to 
recover payment from the particular consumer, forfeited to the State.288 
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In the case of NCR v Opperman289 Mr Opperman lent R7 million to Mr Boonzaaier 
during 2009 to assist with property development. Mr. Opperman was not registered as a 
credit provider. When Mr. Boonzaaier admitted that he could not repay the debt, Mr. 
Opperman applied for the sequestration of Mr. Boonzaaier’s estate. During the 
proceedings concerns about the constitutional validity of section 89(5)(c) arose. The 
Western Cape High Court (WCHC) declared on 17 April 2012 that section 89(5)(c) was 
inconsistent with section 25 of the Constitution as it permits the arbitrary deprivation of a 
person’s property. Section 25 of the Constitution states that every person has a right not 
to be deprived of their property. As a result, on 10 December 2012 the Constitutional 
Court concurred with the WCHC. The Constitutional Court found the provision to be a 
disciplinary measure to protect consumers against unregistered credit providers, which 
decision was the same as in Cherangani Trade and Investment 107 (Edms) Bpk v 
Mason NO and Others290. The provision of s 89(5)(c) compels a court to declare the 
agreement void and order that the unregistered credit provider’s right to claim restitution 
based on unjustified enrichment of the consumer, be cancelled or forfeited to the state, 
with no discretion to a court to keep the restitution claim intact. However this provision is 
in contradiction to section 25 of the Constitution and therefore section 89(5)(c) is 
invalid.291  Hence, the court held that the common law position regarding unlawful 
contracts would prevail until the legislature replace it. 
 
Section 89 is aimed at protecting consumer against unregistered credit providers, which 
is in line with the general purpose of the NCA.292 Section 89(5)(c), in its original format, 
prescribed to the court that the court must give a particular order in cases where a credit 
agreement was entered into by an unregistered credit provider. The court has no 
discretion and may only make one of the following orders:  
a. declare the credit agreement as void; and 
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b. order the credit provider to refund the consumer any money paid; and 
c. order that all the purported rights of the credit provider are either cancelled, or 
forfeited to the State, if the court finds that cancelling those rights in these 
circumstances would unjustified enrich the consumer. 
 
The effect of this provision is to limit the credit provider’s common law right to restitution. 
The Constitutional Court found this to be in contravention of section 25 of the 
Constitution and therefore held that section 89(5)(c) is unconstitutional. Therefore, if 
parties entered into an agreement, which is subsequently found to be void, the parties 
to the agreement may claim restitution based on the cause of action such as unjustified 
enrichment, if the requirements of the action are met. The option is to remove the 
second requirement in section 40 introducing the threshold of R500 000 from the NCA, 
and allow the court judicial discretion. 
 
The NCA has been amended accordingly293, which included the alteration of section 
40(1).294 However the existing threshold remains at R500,000 as per the original Act, 
but may be reduced to zero to have compulsory registration for all credit providers 
dealing at arm’s length.295 
 
Should the court found the credit agreement to be reckless lending by the credit 
provider, section 83(2)(a) provides the court with the power to order the setting aside of 
all or any of the rights and obligations of the consumer under that reckless credit 
agreement. Conversely, this section of the NCA does not prohibit or limit the credit 
provider from claiming back the money or goods delivered (restitution) in terms of 
another cause of action, for instance unjustified enrichment as the case may be with 
unlawful credit agreements.296 
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294
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3.3.4.  Conclusion 
Section 81(3) of the NCA clearly provides that a credit provider must not enter into a 
reckless credit agreement with a prospective consumer. Section 3(c) (ii) of the NCA also 
states that it is one of the purposes of the NCA to discourage reckless credit. 
 
However, the NCA does not state that credit agreements that give rise to reckless credit 
lending are ab initio null and void as is the case with unlawful credit agreements in 
terms of section 89 and section 90 of the NCA. The NCA states that the Court may 
declare a credit agreement entered into after 1 June 2007 to be reckless and may then, 
depending on the type of reckless credit, inter alia  set aside all or part of the 
consumer’s rights and duties297 in terms thereof or suspend298 its operation. 
 
The NCA is not clear in all respects as to how the courts should exercise their discretion 
in this regard. Where the performance in terms of the credit agreement has not yet 
occurred, the court may rule that the consumer has no further rights and obligations. In 
effect, for all practical reasons this will amount to the cancelation of the credit 
agreement and it will mean that the contractual relationship between the credit provider 
and the consumer ends. 
 
However, what about the scenario where partial performance occurred in terms of the 
credit agreement as well as the performance of the merx in terms on the contract? The 
NCA does not provide a clear guideline in this regard, and the issue subsequently 
presents itself as to the way in which the provisions of the NCA should be applied by the 
court? 
 
The NCA does not provide detailed information regarding restoration; thus, whether the 
credit provider will be able to reclaim any amount of the credit granted or goods 
delivered to the consumer, and whether will be entitled to reclaim any payments made 
by the consumer to the credit provider. Section 83(2)(a) states explicitly that the court 
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may set aside all or any of the rights and obligations of the consumer under that 
agreement (reckless credit agreement), but the section does not prohibit or limit the 
credit provider from claiming money or goods delivered in terms of another cause of 
action such as unjustified enrichment.299 
 
The mentioned common law remedies have not yet been tested in a court of law in this 
context, which pose some risk for the claimant/plaintiff. Due to the vagueness and 
uncertainty of section 83(2)(a) of the NCA a court will have to interpret it in terms of 
section 3 of the NCA where the purpose of the NCA is set out.300  
 
 
3.4.  Law of contracts versus credit agreements 
A credit agreement is a contract in which the financial institution enters into an 
agreement with a consumer, in terms of which the financial institution (known as a credit 
provider) will pay an amount or amounts to the consumer as applied for by the 
consumer.301 In return, the consumer will make deferred repayment to the credit 
provider302  for which the credit provider may charge a fee or interest.303 
 
Consequently, a credit agreement is a contract in terms whereof the parties (both the 
credit provider and consumer) have reached consensus as to their respective legally 
binding rights and duties (responsibilities). The credit agreement is a reciprocal contract, 
in which rights and duties are created for both the credit provider and the consumer in 
the particular credit agreement. 
 
The NCA granted many rights to consumers, though only a few rights on the credit 
providers. The same goes for the duties, because for every right the consumer has, the 
credit provider carries a duty. The rights and duties are discussed in detail in the book 
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written by Otto304, of which only those rights and duties that are applicable to this 
dissertation will be depicted in the following table: 
Table 1 
Co
n
su
m
er
 
Rights Duties Credit
 p
ro
vid
e
r
 
1. To apply for credit and non-
discrimination305 
1. To assess credit application using its 
own evaluation methods (which must be 
fair and objective306) to determine 
whether there is a reasonable possibility 
that the consumer will be able to repay 
the loan 307 in order to prevent reckless 
credit agreements.308 The credit 
application was also amended to provide 
for a more restrictive measurement.309 
2. To receive documentation in the 
official language that the 
consumer reads or 
understand310 
2. To provide the documentation in the 
prescribed form in plain language311 and 
take reasonable steps to ensure that the 
consumer has a general understanding 
of the risk, cost and obligations under the 
credit agreement312. If the credit provider 
fails to comply with this duty, the credit 
agreement may be considered by the 
court to be a reckless credit 
agreement.313 
3. To apply for debt review and 
rearrangement of credit 
obligations 314 and whether a 
credit agreement appears to 
be reckless315 
3. The credit provider is required to assist 
with any reasonable request by the debt 
counsellor to give support to the 
process, for example to determine the 
consumer’s state of indebtedness, the 
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prospects for responsible debt re-
arrangement316 and investigation into the 
allegation of reckless credit lending.317 
 
Derived from the summary in the table above, it appears that the legislature imposes a 
huge responsibility on the credit provider to ensure that the credit agreement entered 
into with the potential consumers is done in a responsible manner to make certain that 
the potential consumer can afford to repay the credit loan. 
 
However, on the converse side, the only duty the potential consumer has to the 
application for a credit loan is to disclose fully and trustfully any request for information 
made by the credit provider as part of the assessment to prevent reckless credit lending 
and over-indebtedness.318 If the consumer fails to comply with the duty imposed on her 
or him and the court finds that the failure of the consumer to do so materially affected 
the ability of the credit provider to make a proper assessment319, the failure to fulfil this 
duty will result in a complete defense in favour of the credit provider to an allegation that 
the particular credit agreement is reckless credit lending.320 
 
If the court finds the credit agreement to be reckless credit granting, the Act states 
clearly that only the rights and obligations of the consumer will be partially or fully set 
aside.321 No mention is made of the rights and obligations of the credit provider, nor 
does the Act make any mention to restitution.322 The Act is silent in this regard. 
 
3.5.  Conclusion 
A credit agreement is a specific type of contract to which the law of contract and the 
principles of a valid and enforceable contract is applicable. Without a doubt, a credit 
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agreement constitutes a reciprocal contract and that every right has an obligation as its 
counterpart. If the rights and obligations of the consumer to a reckless credit agreement 
are cancelled, it should imply that the rights and obligations of the credit provider will 
necessarily also fall way. However, the NCA does not state this clearly; in fact, the NCA 
is silent in this regard. 
 
Against the general background as discussed in Chapter 3 of Part 1, the following parts 
will constitute a comparative analysis of the NCA and other relevant literature and 
legislation. Relating matters under scrutiny will be the discretion or power the South 
African courts have when dealing with reckless credit applications and the 
consequential orders that the Court may grant, particularly where either or both parties 
have already performed in terms of such a credit agreement, or if there is security 
attached to the particular credit agreement. 
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PART II: APPLICATION OF THE NCA IN PRACTICE  
CHAPTER 4: APPLICATION FOR CREDIT 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the law of contracts, the legal bond is formed by the parties themselves when 
determining the nature of their respective obligations, as long as the obligation(s) and 
bond lie within the limits of the law.323 It is therefore imperative that the parties have the 
intention to conclude a contract that is lawful and enforceable: one party has the 
intention to make an offer to another party who in return accepts the offer.324 Yet, not all 
contractual parties negotiate from a position of equality and the dominant party often 
takes the opportunity to lay down the terms of the contract.325 
 
For many years, numerous South Africans have been induced into credit agreements of 
which they did not understand the terms and conditions and/or where the consumer 
could not afford to repay the credit.326 Hence, the bargaining position was unequal in 
favour of credit providers. Many countries have adopted consumer protection legislation 
to regulate the credit-grantor and credit-consumer relationships because these 
relationships can give rise to abuse and exploitation.327 Vote328 substantiates the 
likelihood of exploitation:  
 
A needy debtor, pressed by tightness of ready cash, will readily allow any hard 
and inhuman terms to be written down against him. He promises himself 
smoother times and better fortune before the day put into the commissary term, 
and thus hopes to avert the harshness of the agreement by payment; though such 
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a hope, quite slippery and deceptive as it is, not seldom finds nothing at all to 
encourage it in the aftermath. 
 
Some of the most important objectives of the NCA were related to the likelihood/reality 
of exploitation: to address the consumer’s unequal bargaining position, control the use 
of remedies by credit providers, educate consumers, and provide consumers with 
relevant information regarding their credit agreements.329 However, one of the important 
aspects of the NCA is that a consumer is entrenched with the right to apply for credit.330 
Any application for credit will constitute an invitation to do business.331 Once the credit 
provider has done a proper assessment and determined whether the consumer can 
afford the credit agreement, the credit provider must provide the consumer with a pre-
agreement statement and quotation.332 Hereafter the consumer will have a five (5) 
business day cooling-off period333 during which the consumer can decide whether she 
or he accepts the pre-agreement statement and quotation or not.334 In terms of the law 
of contract, the pre-agreement, statement and quatation will represent an offer to the 
consumer to enter into a credit agreement with the particular credit provider.335 By 
accepting the pre-agreement statement and quotation, the consumer will accept the 
offer to enter into a credit agreement with the credit provider.336 Upon acceptance by the 
consumer, a legal bond will be created between the parties in terms whereof certain 
obligations will result from the legal relationship.337 
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In this chapter, the “offer and acceptance process” between a consumer and a credit 
provider in a credit agreement relationship will be analysed and discussed to determine 
the impact that such a legal bond has on the parties to the agreement and the court’s 
discretion when determining that such an agreement is deemed a reckless credit 
granting agreement. During the study, the law of contracts will be used as a 
comparison. This chapter will also compare the operations of section 81(4)338 with the 
current precedents to determine how the courts will apply this section when a consumer 
alleges that a particular credit agreement is reckless credit lending by a particular credit 
provider. 
 
 
4.2. Application for credit 
It has been established that the aim of NCA include inter alia:339  
i. the promotion of responsibility in the credit market by encouraging responsible 
borrowing;  
ii. the avoidance of over-indebtedness;  
iii. the fulfilment of financial obligations by consumers;  
iv. discouragement of reckless credit-granting by credit providers and contractual 
default by consumers;  
v. addressing and preventing over-indebtedness of consumers, and  
vi. providing mechanisms for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of 
satisfaction by the consumer of all responsible financial obligations. 
 
Furthermore, as indicated, the provisions of the NCA relating to reckless credit apply 
only to natural persons.340  Section 60 of NCA indicates that a natural person341 has the 
right to apply for credit with a credit provider.342 The right is restricted to application 
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only and not for credit to be granted343 failing which the credit provider will be risking 
entering into a reckless credit agreement without having the opportunity to do a proper 
assessment of affordability.  
 
Reckless lending is, theoretically, new to the South African legal system. Registered 
credit providers in South Africa have to be aware of what will turn them into reckless 
credit lenders. Registered credit providers344 must implement processes and 
procedures to avoid practices that may cause them to suffer the legislative 
consequences.345 Moreover, upon inception of the NCA, credit providers could only rely 
on precedent to guide their actions. Subsequently the NCA was amended to clarify 
certain uncertainties, which is aimed at assisting all role players.346   
 
The South African courts have broad powers or discretion when a particular credit 
agreement that is in dispute, constitutes reckless credit lending347 and, if so, to deal with 
the particular credit agreement in accordance with the provisions of the NCA. The NCA 
clearly states that credit providers may not enter into reckless credit agreements with 
consumers.348 Although a vast majority of the duties lies with the credit providers to 
prevent the contracting of a reckless credit agreement, the NCA placed the onus on the 
credit consumer when applying for credit: the NCA states that the consumer must 
answer fully and truthfully any requests for information made by the credit provider as 
part of the assessment.349 This is a measurement introduced by the NCA to prevent 
consumers from abusing the reckless lending provisions.350 
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If a consumer fails to provide full disclosure, it could serve as a complete defense, 
raised by the credit provider, against an allegation of reckless credit.351 This defense will 
only be successful if a court or the National Consumer Tribunal finds that the 
consumer’s failure materially affected the credit provider’s ability to make a proper 
assessment.352 
 
The duty on the consumer is extended to the point that a consumer who applies to enter 
into a specific credit agreement with a specific credit provider, may not during the time 
that the credit provider is considering the aforementioned application, enter into any 
further credit agreements with any other credit provider. Should the consumer enter into 
another  credit agreement during this period, the consumer has a duty to disclose the  
full details thereof to the first-mentioned credit provider in order to enable such  credit 
provider to include such information in the assessment. 353 
 
In the case of Horwood v First Rand Bank Ltd354 Judge Meyer reiterated the duty placed 
on the consumer to answer fully and trustfully any requests for information made by the 
credit provider as part of the assessment. It will only be complete defense to an 
allegation that a credit agreement is reckless if the failure to do so by the consumer “… 
materially affected the ability of the credit provider to make a proper assessment.” In 
this case the judge went on to analyse the information provided by the applicant and the 
stages of credit granting, together with the assessment mechanisms used by the 
defendant to determine the defendant’s creditworthiness. The court found, that the “… 
expenses which the respondent avers were presented to it by the applicant do not 
disclose any debt repayments under other credit agreements. The applicant’s risk 
profile obtained from a credit bureau, according to the respondent showed the applicant 
to be a satisfactory credit risk.” 
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Moreover, the judge relied on the Reiter v Bierberg case355 where the court stated that 
an applicant is entitled to cite relevant evidence in a replying affidavit that serves to 
contest or disprove the statements made in the answering affidavit. Ms Horwood and 
her representative, Mr Oosthuizen, elected not to disclose true information relating to 
her income and expenditure to the respondent, therefore the applicant has failed to cite 
the relevant primary facts or evidence to contest First Rand Bank Ltd formal statements 
on this issue.356 
 
It is therefore apparent that the NCA places an onus on the consumer when applying for 
credit and while the application of credit lending is being considered, the particular 
consumer must fully and trustfully answer any requests for information made by the 
credit provider as part of the assessment.357 Vessio made an interesting observation in 
this regard:358 
 
The wording of this section is interesting in that the positive responsibility 
appears to be on the credit provider to ask the correct information-gathering 
questions. The consumer is saddled with merely answering “fully and 
truthfully”. Accordingly, it is submitted that credit providers be fully advised 
as to what questions they should be posing to their potential clients and the 
forms that they request their potential clients to complete should be 
comprehensive in scope. 
 
In the matter of Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Kelly359, the defendants also relied on 
reckless credit lending. In the formal statement of the first defendant he stated that he is 
not certain that an adequate assessment was undertaken, as “limited financial 
information” has been provided.. Apparently, the defendant shared Vessio’s view that 
the credit provider failed to do a comprehensive assessment. In this matter, the court 
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went ahead to examine whether the information provided by the defendants complied 
with the requirements stated in section 81(4) of the NCA as relied upon by the plaintiff’s 
counsel. The court found that:  
... the content of the credit agreement gives no basis for a finding by the 
court in terms of s 81(4) of the Act that the defendant answered any 
questions in connection with the assessment untruthfully or incompletely or 
that any such flaws in the information provided by the defendants materially 
affected the ability of the plaintiff to make a proper assessment. 
 
In Africa Bank v Greyling360, the defendant also alleged that credit was granted 
recklessly and that no assessment was done as required by the NCA361. However, the 
defendant provided salary slips and completed income and expenditure statements, 
which she also signed and on which she provided a fictitious salary. Consequently, the 
court found that there was no bona fide defense set out by the defendant.362 The court 
also found that the allegations made by the defendants concerning the required 
comprehensive assessment to be “broad-brush allegations” and that the court is unable 
to determine that the financial information provided by the defendants was inadequate 
to enable a proper assessment by the credit provider.  
 
For this reason credit providers may develop and implement their own application forms 
and use their own evaluation mechanisms to assess the consumer’s credit information 
provided the means are fair and objective; for example, it is permitted to obtain 
information can be obtained from a credit bureau.363 The consumer has a duty to 
complete the application form given by the credit provider in full, giving the correct 
information so that the credit provider is inclined to believe the information given by the 
consumer to be correct and trustworthy. Failure by the consumer to comply will result in 
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a complete defense in favour of the credit provider against an allegation made by the 
consumer that the particular credit agreement was reckless lending.364  
 
 
4.3. Protection against discrimination in respect of credit 
Once the credit provider has done an assessment365 and established that due to 
reasonable commercial reasons consistent with customary risk management and 
underwriting practices, the consumer will not be able to afford the repayment of the 
credit agreement, the credit provider may refuse the application for credit.366 However, 
the credit provider may not refuse the application for credit based on unfair 
discrimination against a consumer in terms of race, religion, pregnancy, marital status, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, gender, sexual orientation, age367, disability, language, or 
culture.368 Section 61 of the NCA clearly states that consumers are protected against 
discrimination, which section is aligned with section 9(3) of the Constitution369 and 
Chapter 2 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act.370 
 
Section 66(1) of the NCA also states that a credit provider may not discriminate against 
a consumer or penalise the consumer for exercising his rights in terms of the NCA or an 
agreement.371 Therefore, the credit provider must consider the application for credit 
fairly. Fair consideration comprise scoring processes, procedures and mechanisms or 
models to manage, underwrite, and price credit risk372 that will prevent reckless credit 
lending and over-indebting a consumer. 
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4.4. Conclusion 
All consumers, irrespective of whether she or he is a natural person, juristic person or 
an association of persons, have the right to apply for credit; however, the consumer 
does not have the right to be granted the credit.  
 
When applying for the credit, the consumer has a duty to disclose fully all financial 
information. When comparing the law cases, it is clear that the South African courts 
have relied on the provision of section 81(4) of the NCA to the letter. In addition, the 
courts also considered the facts presented by the parties and in the court 
documentation, fairly and in accordance with the spirit of the NCA.373 The courts did so 
before reaching a conclusion as to whether the consumer completely adhered to her or 
his obligation in terms of the NCA. The Act states that the consumer must provide all 
information requested by the credit provider and to the credit provider. Provision must 
be done in a full and trustworthy manner to ensure the credit provider can conduct a 
proper assessment as to whether the particular consumer is able to repay the cost and 
obligations in terms of the particular credit agreement 
 
In conclusion, the credit provider may not discriminate unfairly against the consumer 
when the credit application is considered, or question whether the consumer will be able 
to afford the repayment of the credit agreement. The discrimination factor was 
compared to relevant applicable legislation. However, the prevention of unfair 
discrimination will not put an end to the credit provider’s duty to be aware of the granting 
of reckless credit.  
 
The challenging question is whether the credit provider’s application form for credit 
should be comprehensive in scope as well as the degree and the comprehensiveness 
of their assessment mechanism in determining whether the consumer will be able to 
repay the particular credit agreement. 
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CHAPTER 5: ASSESSMENT, A STEP TO PREVENT RECKLESS 
CREDIT LENDING 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5.1. Introduction 
The NCA aspires to increase access to credit to as many consumers as possible374, and 
at the same time aims to prevent over-indebtedness.375 One of the mechanisms 
introduced by the NCA to counter over-indebtedness is the concept of reckless credit. 
 
In section 81(2), the legislature obliges the credit provider to conduct a proper 
assessment of the ability of every consumer to meet her/his obligations, taking 
reasonable steps to investigate and evaluate the consumer in terms of: 
• the understanding and appreciation of the obligations of the proposed credit 
agreement376, and 
• the debt repayment history of the particular consumer under other credit 
agreements377, and  
• the ability to meet these obligations in a timely manner, that is, the consumer’s 
financial means.378 
 
The assessment required by section 81 of the NCA is more comprehensive than a mere 
affordability assessment.379 The credit provider must also ensure that the consumer has 
a general understanding of the risks, cost, and obligations and is able to afford the 
repayment of the credit agreement.380 
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 s 3(a). 
375
 s 3(c). 
376
  s 80(1)(b)(i); Scholtz et el Guide to the NCA footnote 164 in para 11.4.3 and Kelly-Louw Consumer 
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Reckless credit, in essence, penalises the credit provider who disregard the provisions 
of the NCA and the consequences of granting credit without proper assessment. The 
disregard of the credit provider could lead to a situation where the consumer becomes 
over-indebted because of reckless credit granting.381 
 
This chapter will address the assessment mechanisms used by credit providers to 
prevent entering into reckless credit agreements. The mechanisms will also be 
compared with relevant literature and court cases used by the court when dealing with 
reckless credit applications. 
 
 
5.2. Assessment mechanisms 
The South African Law Commission382 identified consumer education and the supply of 
information as the most important objectives of consumer credit legislation.383 It stands 
to reason that these objectives place a duty on credit providers to grant credit to all 
natural persons in a responsible and accountable manner.384 
 
Prior to entering into a credit agreement, a credit provider is compelled by the NCA to 
conduct a credit assessment to determine whether the consumer understands  her or 
his  risks, costs, rights and obligations under the particular credit agreement and 
whether the consumer can actually afford the credit.385 The obligation is on the credit 
provider to make sure that all reasonable steps have been taken to assess the aspects 
as listed in section 81(2)(a) and (b), that is:386 
1. the proposed consumer understands the risks and costs of the proposed credit; 
                                                          
381
 Van Heerden & Boraine 2011(Vol 2) De Jure 44 
382
 South African Law Commission Working Paper 46, Project 67 (1993) Part III: Policy Considerations 
and the Essentials of Consumer Legislation at 61 - 64 
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 Stoop 2009 (21) SA Merc LJ 365  
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2. the proposed consumer understands the rights and obligations under the proposed 
credit agreement, and 
3. the credit provider assesses the debt re-payment history of the proposed 
consumer under credit agreements;387 
4. the credit provider assesses the existing financial means, prospects and 
obligations of the proposed consumer, and 
5. the credit provider has reasonable grounds to conclude that any commercial 
purpose may prove to be successful, if the proposed consumer stated such a 
purpose when applying for the proposed credit agreement. 
 
However, the NCA fails to set out the reasonable steps to assess the relevant 
aspects388. Originally, section 82 merely stated that a credit provider may 
determine for itself the evaluative mechanisms and models or procedures to be 
used in meeting its assessment obligations.389 Conversely, this section must 
also be read together with section 61(5), which states the following:390 
 
(5) A credit provider may determine for itself any scoring or other evaluative 
mechanism or model to be used in managing, underwriting and pricing credit risk, 
provided that any such mechanism or model is not founded or structured upon a 
statistical or other analysis in which the basis of risk categorization, differentiation 
or assessment is a ground of unfair discrimination prohibited in section 9(3) of the 
Constitution. 
                                                          
387
  In the unreported case of Nkume v FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a First National Bank 2013 JOL 30339 
(ECM) the applicant applied for credit. The respondent replied to the applicant that the credit 
bureau showed that she had an adverse credit record. The applicant then requested reasons for 
the refusal of the credit (as per section 62, however the respondent refused the request. The 
applicant brought an application to court to compel the respondent, whereupon the respondent 
then provided reasons for the refusal of credit. The court then granted the applicant a cost order 
against the respondent because the respondent could not explain their delay to comply with the 
applicants request for reason. 
388
  Van Heerden & Boraine 2011(Vol 2) De Jure 7, also see Chapter 7 where the legislature address 
amendments to the NCA by introducing Assessment Regulations 
389
  s 82(1), also see Vessio 2009 TSAR 274 279; Scholtz et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2013) 
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This was concurred in the case of Mercantile Bank Ltd v Hajat391 when the respondent 
alleged that the applicant failed to conduct an assessment as required by section 81(2) 
of the NCA. The court noted that section 82(1) of the NCA permits the credit grantor to 
determine its own procedures for the conduct of risk assessment. After considering the 
evidence, the court found that the applicant did conduct an assessment as required by 
the applicable legislation and that the respondent had no merit in his defense. Judgment 
was granted in favour of the applicant. 
 
Concerning developmental credit agreements, the NCR must pre-approve the 
mechanism prior to the implementation of the designed assessment mechanism, model, 
and procedure.392 In respect of other types of credit agreements, the NCR may publish 
guidelines proposing evaluative mechanisms, models, and procedures used in terms of 
section 81.393 The original section of the NCA also stated in section 82(3) that the 
guidelines published by the NCR were not binding on a credit provider.394 It was 
submitted that the particular sections of the NCA were vague, therefore the court had 
pronounce and could determine whether the credit provider’s assessment (evaluation) 
mechanism, model and procedure were fair and objective395 in preventing reckless 
credit lending evident in the discussion of the following court cases. 
 
In the case of Desert Star Trading 145 (Pty) Ltd and Another v No 11 Flamboyant 
Edleen CC and Another396 the applicants applied for a winding-up order against the 
respondents. The applicants’ claims against the respondents were based on 
suretyships that were signed by the sole member of the close corporation on behalf of 
the said close corporation.397 The respondents questioned the locus standi of the 
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applicants as creditors398, alleging that the applicants failed to do an assessment when 
Mr Eugene Ehlers applied for the loan and ceded the close corporation as security for 
the repayment of the credit loan. The first respondent alleged if the appellant did an 
assessment as required by s 81(2)(a)(i)-(iii) and (b) of the NCA, the appellants would, 
without a doubt, have concluded that there were no reasonable prospect of repaying the 
amount loaned, because both principal debtors had no employment, fixed earnings, or 
assets (one principal debtor was a student and the other one a housewife), except for 
the house that was mortgaged with the credit provider. The respondent concluded that 
in these circumstances the credit agreement was a reckless credit agreement in terms 
of 81(3) of the NCA. The Supreme Court of Appeal then fittingly refused the winding-up 
order. However, the court did not make any decisions on whether the debt was reckless 
lending, although there were strong indications that the principal debt could be reckless 
credit.399  
 
In Horwood v First Rand Bank Ltd400 the court stated that when considering whether a 
credit provider has or has not taken the reasonable steps to meet the assessment 
obligations as determined in section 81(2) and section 82(1), the court will have to 
determine objectively on the facts and circumstances of each case presented to 
court.401 In this case the consumer stated that her credit agreement was reckless credit 
lending as per section 80(1)(a).402 Fortunately, the credit provider could manage to 
prove that an assessment was done at the time that the credit agreement was 
concluded, and counter alleged that the consumer failed to answer the requested for 
information fully and trustfully. Therefore, the credit provider could not do a proper 
assessment.403 
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  The respondents alleged that the one applicant was not a registered credit provider in terms of the 
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In another unreported case, Africa Bank Ltd v Greyling404 the applicant entered into two 
credit agreements with the respondent for the purchase of buying vehicles. Upon failure 
to repay the instalments, the respondent terminated the credit agreements. During the 
summary judgement application, the respondent filled a defense of reckless credit 
lending. The court held that the applicant did indeed conduct a risk assessment, 
therefore the court refused to uphold the contention of the respondent. This case 
illustrates that though no details regarding the risk assessment was provided during the 
summary judgement procedure, the fact that a risk assessment was done was sufficient 
not to consider the defense of reckless credit lending. 
 
The NCA states that if a credit provider repeatedly fails to meet its obligations under 
section 81, or if the credit provider continuously uses assessment mechanisms, models 
or procedures that do not result in fair and objective assessment, the matter can be 
referred to the National Consumer Tribunal (hereafter referred to as Tribunal) by the 
NCR.405 The Act gives the Tribunal the power to compel a credit provider to apply the 
published guidelines by the NCR or any other alternative guidelines that is aligned with 
industrial practices and as determined by the Tribunal. This was supported in the case 
of the National Credit Regulator v Rufus Alfonso Financial Consultants CC406. The 
applicant brought an application to the Tribunal, stating that the respondent was 
contravening section 81(2) (a) (i) and (iii) of the NCA by failing to perform affordability 
assessments with consumers applying for credit. After considering all the facts and the 
law, the Tribunal found the respondent repeatedly contravened the NCA, and imposed 
an administrative fine on the respondent in accordance with the powers given to the 
Tribunal by the NCA. 
 
The purpose of the NCA is twofold, namely (1) to discourage reckless credit and (2) the 
NCA is also designed to facilitate access to credit by consumers who were previously 
denied access. Comparing these purposes with one another appears to be conflicting. If 
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the courts were to evaluate the credit provider’s assessment mechanisms (in order to 
prevent reckless credit granting) over-critically, it could result in credit not being readily 
available to the less affluent consumers of our society.407 
Until April 2015, the NCR had not published any guidelines for assessment purposes, 
as stated in section 81, thus making the validity of the section and imposing sanctions 
for non-compliance difficult. However, on 13 March 2015, the Amendment Act 
introduced new guidelines in the amended section 24 and Regulation 23A.408 
 
 
5.3.   Amendment of the provisions for a standard affordability assessment 
The Amendment Act aims to standardise affordability assessments with the introduction 
of the Affordability Assessment Regulations.409 Credit providers must still determine 
their own evaluative measures and procedures; though it must be aligned with the 
amended regulations.410 These regulations will be applicable to all credit agreements as 
listed in Chapter 3, section 2411. 
 
The amended regulations set out a comprehensive list of duties for the credit provider, 
i.e.:  
• the credit provider must take “practicable steps” to access the consumer’s allowable 
income and discretionary income in order to determine whether the consumer has 
the financial means and prospects to repay the loan amount;412 
• the credit provider is required to take “practicable steps” in order to confirm the 
gross income of the consumer by looking at the most recent three (3) months’ pay 
slips and most recent three (3) months’ bank statements of the particular 
consumer;413 
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• the credit provider must calculate the consumer’s existing financial means, 
prospects and obligations (as per sections 78(3) & 81(2)(a)(iii) of the NCA);414 
• the credit provider may accept the consumer’s declared necessary expenses, 
subject thereto that it is lower than the Minimum Necessary Expense Norms 
Table415, and 
• the credit provider must take into account the consumer’s debt repayment history 
under the consumer’s other credit agreements (as per section 81(2) of the NCA).416 
 
The consumer’s duty still includes that she or he must accurately disclose to the credit 
provider all financial obligations that will enable the credit provider to conduct an 
affordability assessment417, and the consumer must provide authentic documentation to 
the credit provider when conducting the affordability assessment.418 The legislator refers 
to the credit provider’s obligation to conduct the affordability assessment in that the 
credit provider must take “practicable steps”. In order to consider the intention of the 
legislator when using these words, Eiselen drafted an opinion stating that the credit 
provider has some freedom to decide how to implement the reasonable steps and on 
the course that will result such implementation to be reasonable, practical and 
reliable.419 
 
Although these regulations are a step in the right direction to combat reckless lending 
and assisting credit providers from entering into reckless credit agreements, this is 
merely the tip of the iceberg. Kelly-Louw stated that the regulations dealing with 
affordability assessment are the “bare minimum” and that credit providers should not 
think they are fully compliant if they simply comply with these regulations.420 Kelly-Louw 
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  Chapter 3, Reg 23A(8) of the Amendment Regulations. 
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recommended that the credit providers keep sufficient records of all assessments to 
prove in court that proper assessment was conducted before they entered into a credit 
agreement with a prospective consumer.421  
 
This recommendation raised the question whether a credit provider should keep record 
of this additional documentation as required in the Amendment Act for the three-year 
period as prescribed in the NCA.422 
 
Eiselen is of the opinion that the amended regulation 23(4) does not require from the 
credit provider to keep the additional documentation, because the Amendment Act 
merely states that the credit provider must take practicable steps to confirm the gross 
income from the documentation provided by the consumer.423 It therefore appears that 
the wording used by the legislator is yet again vague and ambiguous. Eiselen 
concluded that the provisions should be interpreted that these amended provisions 
cannot reasonably require the credit provider to retain the documentation or copies 
thereof for three years. He is furthermore of the opinion that it should be sufficient if the 
credit provider implements a system: 
 
“… where employees who work face to face with prospective consumers require 
the production of the documents and in their own handwriting or on an electronic 
system key in the fact that the relevant documents have been inspected, the 
nature of those documents and what the documents revealed.”424  
 
Regulation 55 of the NCA impose a duty on registered credit providers to retain the 
following documentation425 in respect of each consumer:426 
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422
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(i) application for credit;  
(ii) application for credit declined; 
(iii) reasons for decline of application for credit; 
(ii)   pre-agreement statement and quote;  
(iv) credit agreement entered into with consumer;  
(iv)   documentation  in  support  of  steps  taken  in  terms  of  section  81(2)  of  the 
act;  
(v) record of payments made, and 
(vi) documentation in support of any steps taken after default by consumer. 
 
The records required to be maintained must be kept in either paper or electronic 
format427 and must be readily accessible for a period of three (3) years428 from date of 
termination of the credit agreement429. 
 
Section 81(2)430 requires the credit provider not to enter into a credit agreement unless 
the credit provider has taken reasonable steps to assess the proposed consumer’s 
existing financial means, prospects, and obligations.431 The heading for regulation 23(A) 
subsection 3 to 7 of the Amendment Regulations reads “Existing financial means and 
prospects”. Consequently, it appears the legislator intended credit providers to keep 
records of the additional documentations set out in Regulation 23A for three years from 
the date of the cancellation of said particular credit agreement. Such retained 
documents will contribute to the credit provider’s burden of proving that they did not 
enter into a reckless credit agreement with a particular consumer. 
 
                                                          
427
  Reg 55(2)(a) 
428
  Reg 55(2)(b) 
429
  Reg 56(1)(a) 
430
  Section 81 deals with the prevention of reckless credit 
431
  Section 81(2)(a)(iii) 
93 
 
The comparison between the NCA, the Amendment Act, Kelly-Louw’s opinion, and that 
of Eiselen would have to be tested in a court of law to determine whether the amended 
list432 of documentation needs to be retained as per regulation 55 of the NCA. 
 
5.3. Provisions for the automatic removal of adverse information 
In section 81(2), the legislator requires the credit provider not to enter into a credit 
agreement unless the credit provider has taken reasonable steps to assess the debt 
repayment history of a consumer under credit agreements.433 
 
A consumer’s repayment record is crucial for the credit market as it contributes to the 
smooth operations of the market. Credit providers rely on the credit information held on 
consumers by credit bureaux’s in the assessment process of credit granting. The credit 
information indicates to the credit provider whether the consumer has a good or bad 
repayment history and it also determines the consumer’s credit profile.434 
 
Therefore, it is vital that credit bureaux keep current and accurate credit information of 
consumers, especially considering that the NCA requires the credit provider to 
determine the consumer’s credit worthiness to ensure the consumer is able to afford the 
repayment of the prospective loan.435 Should the credit provider fail to adhere to this 
part of its duty to prevent reckless credit granting, the consequences will be severe.436 
 
Because of this dependency of credit providers on credit bureaux, the NCA has also 
introduced prescriptive provisions and regulations governing credit bureaux’s. For 
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example, it is compulsory for credit bureaux to register437 with the NCR and to record 
the relevant type of consumer credit information.438 
 
Section 71 specifically deals with the removal of credit records of consumers regarding 
debt and judgements, the maximum retention periods of that consumer’s credit 
information as well as the prescribed standards when maintaining the consumer credit 
information.439 Since inception of the NCA440, credit information amnesty was 
published441 to clarify and correct the credit information of consumers that were 
incorrectly recorded with the credit bureaux.442 However, this removal of credit 
information was not a once-off amnesty. The Amendment Act now provides for an 
ongoing automatic removal of certain adverse consumer credit information and 
information regarding paid up judgements.443  
 
Section 71A is inserted in the principal Act444 after section 71, which instructs credit 
providers to provide to all registered credit bureaux notification, within seven (7) days 
after settlement by a consumer of any obligation with that particular credit provider.445 
The notification must inform the credit bureaux of the following446: 
(a) that the obligation under such credit agreement was the subject of an adverse 
classification of consumer behaviour;  
(b) that the obligation under such credit agreement was the subject of an adverse 
classification enforcement action against a consumer; 
(c) that the obligation under such credit agreement was the subject of an adverse 
listing recorded in the payment profile of the consumer, or 
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(d) that the obligation under such credit agreement was the subject of a judgement 
debt447. 
 
The credit bureau, who receives the notification, must remove any adverse listing within 
seven (7) days after receipt of such notification from the credit provider.448 Should the 
credit provider fails to send the required notification to all registered credit bureaux, the 
consumer may file a complaint with the NCR.449 However, the Amendment Act is silent 
regarding the situation where the credit bureaux fail to adhere to the notification, as the 
Amendment Act does not stipulate which remedies will be available to the consumer 
and/or credit provider if the credit bureaux do not remove the adverse information as the 
credit provider requested. However, the consumer still remains responsible for the 
repayment of any outstanding credit obligation in terms of any credit agreement even 
though the adverse information pertaining to a specific credit obligation was removed 
from the credit bureaux.450  
 
The removal of adverse information was most probably the most debated amendment 
to the NCA. The NCR’s reason for the Amnesty Regulations, which provides for an on-
going removal of credit information, is that it would benefit the low and middle-income 
group. This assistance will include providing them access to credit in the forms such as 
educational loans and home loans, but as well as increasing employment 
opportunities451. The NCR also motivated this amnesty by stating that it will assist those 
consumers who do not have the money to afford the fees for the rescission of judgment 
applications for those debts that have been paid in full.452 
 
The removal of adverse information will have a severe impact on credit providers, 
especially considering that section 81(2)(ii) requires from the credit provider to take 
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reasonable steps to access the debt re-payment history of the consumer under other 
credit agreements(credit obligations) the consumer has with credit providers. 
Essentially, by removing the adverse information, the consumer will have a “clean slate” 
and the notion of “credit history” or good and bad credit records will be non-existent. 
Consequently, this will have a negative impact on the credit providers. How will they be 
able to comply with their duty to do an assessment of the consumer’s ability to repay a 
loan in order to prevent the granting of reckless credit? 
 
This concern is further raised by the fact that on 1 April 2014, all credit bureaux’s were 
given two (2) months in which they had to remove any adverse consumer classification 
from the records of those consumers who have settled their obligations with credit 
providers. This credit information amnesty includes all judgements debts (that were paid 
up subsequent to the judgement being granted by a court) as well as adverse 
classifications such as “default”, “legal action”, “handed over for collection” and “write-
off”. This kind of amnesty is not good because it is only to the benefit of the 
consumer.453 
 
 
5.5.  Consumer comprehension 
On the one side of the coin the NCA aims to increase access to credit to as many 
consumers as possible, but on the flip side the objective of the NCA is also to prevent 
over-indebtedness and reckless credit lending. The Act places an obligation on the 
credit provider to implement mechanisms to ensure that all objectives of the NCA is 
met, including the conduct of a proper assessment of each consumers ability to meet 
the obligations in terms of the desired credit agreement. 
 
Section 81(2)(a)(i) states that one of the reasonable steps needed to be taken by the 
credit provider is to access the consumers “general understanding and appreciation” of 
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the risks and cost as well as the rights and obligations of the consumer under the credit 
agreement. This requires that the credit provider must have a process or mechanism 
that enables the credit provider to determine the ability of the consumer to understand 
and appreciate the credit agreement that the said consumer wants to enter into with the 
particular credit provider. 
 
The NCA attempts to assist the credit provider in this regard by including the following 
sections in the Act: 
a. section 63(2) states that the credit provider must propose to the Credit Regulator 
at least two official languages that the credit provider intends to use in 
documentation;454 
b. section 63(1) states that the consumer has the right to receive the documentation 
in an official language that the consumer can read or understand considering the  
implications such a right has on the credit  provider with regard to the financial 
expenses, practicality and regional areas;455 
c. section 64(1) and (2) states that the documents provided to the consumer must be 
in plain language that will enable the ordinary consumer with an average literacy 
skill to understand the content of the document.456 
 
In the recent court case of Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Dhlamini457 the 
respondent bought a second hand motor vehicle financed by the applicant. The 
respondent was a 52-year-old man who does not understand English and completed 
schooling up to standard one. Within four days after he bought the vehicle he returned it 
to the dealer, as he was not satisfied with the condition of the vehicle. He also 
demanded the repayment of the R15 000 deposit. The deposit was not returned to the 
respondent and the applicant commenced with the notice prescribed in section 
129(1)(a) of the NCA. The court found the respondent to be “functionally illiterate” and 
found on the evidence that the salesperson of the dealer failed to explain the terms of 
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the agreement to the respondent. The court also analysed the providing of the 
documentation in the official language, with which the applicant also failed to comply. 
The contract was entered into in KwaZulu-Natal where isiZulu is the predominant 
African language. Due to the failure of the applicant to comply with the rights of the 
consumer in terms of section 63 and 64 the court found in the favour of the respondent 
with cost. 
 
The case in point emphasised that documentation made available by the credit provider 
to the consumer must be in an official language which needs to be plain to the extent 
that the consumer with average literacy skills could have a general understanding and 
appreciation of the content of the said documentation.458 The case also stated that this 
documentation must be in the pre-required format459 with the use of plain vocabulary 
and sentence structures.460   
 
Furthermore, consumer protection is not only emphasized in the NCA, but a whole Act 
was drafted with the sole aim of protecting consumers against abuse and exploitation in 
the marketplace.461 Du Preez points out that “vulnerable and/or illiterate consumers 
should not only be protected, but also empowered”.462 However, the Consumer 
Protection Act is not applicable to credit agreements.463 Nevertheless, section 2 of the 
Consumer Protection Act states should there be any inconsistency between this Act and 
any other legislation, including the NCA, the inconsistency must be interpreted 
concurrently.464 This means that the Consumer Protection Act must be applied 
concurrently with the NCA, otherwise, the provisions that provides greater protection to 
the consumer will prevail465 even if it implies the Consumer Protection Act.466 
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This will have far-reaching consequences for the credit providers. The credit provider’s 
responsibility goes beyond just sourcing information concerning the consumer’s 
financial situation and repayment ability, but extends to ensuring that the consumer 
understands and appreciate the risks and costs of the proposed credit agreement and 
their rights and obligations in terms of that agreement.467 
 
 
5.6. The stage when a credit agreement becomes reckless credit   
The NCA states that a credit agreement will be reckless credit lending if, at the time that 
the credit agreement was entered into, or at the time when the amount approved in 
terms of the agreement is increased468 other than an increase of a credit limit of a credit 
facility469:  
1. The credit provider failed to carry out an assessment as required by section 81(2), 
irrespective of what the outcome of such an assessment might have been at the 
time,470 or  
2. The credit provider, carried out an assessment as required by section 81(2), and 
continued to enter into the particular credit agreement with the consumer, 
notwithstanding the fact that the majority of information available to the credit 
provider indicated that:  
2.1. the consumer did not generally understand or appreciate  her or his risks, 
costs or obligations under the proposed credit agreement,471 or  
2.2. by entering into that agreement would result into the consumer being over-
indebted.472 
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468
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Comparing section 80(1) (a) and section 80(1) (b), it appears that the legislature 
intended to create three types of reckless credit473 as explained in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
The first type of reckless credit is where the credit provider fails to comply with their 
duty to do an affordability assessment, irrespective of the financial position of the 
consumer.474 Thus, failure to comply with section 80(1) (a) of the NCA has the effect 
that the particular credit agreement is per se reckless.475 Otto makes the following 
remark in this regard: 
 
This section is penal in nature. Even if it turns out that the credit granted was not 
reckless in nature by any means, it will nonetheless be treated as such simply 
because the credit provider did not undertake a proper assessment. This is to 
prevent credit providers from taking short cuts by simply accepting an apparently 
creditworthy debtor on face value.476 
 
In ABSA Bank Ltd v COE Family Trust477 the credit provider failed do an assessment as 
contemplated in section 81(2). One debtor who signed a suretyship was a student who 
had no income. In this case, the court dealt with an application for summary judgment, 
which was opposed by the defendant/respondent on the basis that the plaintiff/applicant 
did not conduct a proper assessment in terms of section 81(2) of the NCA. The court did 
not make a decision regarding the completion of a proper assessment or not; or 
whether the credit was granted recklessly. The court merely stated that evidence in a 
trial may be relevant to determine the circumstances; therefore summary judgment was 
refused.478  
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The second type of reckless credit is when the credit provider conducts an 
assessment479 and enters into a credit agreement with the consumer even though the 
majority of the information gathered indicates that the particular consumer does not 
understand or appreciate the risks, costs or obligations under the proposed credit 
agreement.480 Van Heerden provides the following example for such a type of credit 
agreement. The credit provider fails to explain to the potential consumer the interest to 
be charged on the particular credit agreement, or the administrative costs to be charged 
on the monthly instalments.481 In other words, this type of reckless credit implies that a 
credit provider has a duty to inform the consumer of his/her risks, cost, and obligations 
under the particular credit agreement.482 Some credit providers have consequently 
included in their credit applications and agreements a clause that states that the 
consumer fully understands and appreciate the risks, cost, and obligations under the 
particular credit agreement. The courts have to date not found such a clause to be an 
unlawful provision483  unless the credit provider has conducted a proper assessment as 
contemplated in section 81(2) of the NCA.484 
 
The third type of reckless credit deals with instances where the majority of information 
available to the credit provider485 indicated that entering into that particular credit 
agreement would render the consumer over-indebted, yet notwithstanding, entered into 
the specific credit agreement with the consumer.486 This type of reckless credit is when 
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a credit provider has done a proper assessment and the assessment mechanism 
indicates that the consumer cannot afford the repayment of this specific credit 
agreement. Yet the credit provider ignores this lack of affordability and enters into the 
credit agreement, resulting in the consumer to become over-indebted.487 Therefore, 
determining the stage when the particular credit agreement was reckless credit lending, 
will be a factual enquiry.488  
 
Section 83 gives a court the discretion, despite any provision of law or agreement to the 
contrary, in any court proceedings in which a credit agreement is being considered, to 
declare a credit agreement to be reckless489. Comparing the wording of section 83 with 
section 85 it appears that the court may suo motu declare a credit agreement 
reckless490, whereas a court can declare a consumer over-indebted in terms of section 
85 only if it is alleged that the consumer is over-indebted.491 Hence, it is not a 
prerequisite for a consumer to allege that the particular credit agreement was reckless 
lending; the court may on its own discretion consider the possibility whether the credit 
agreement was granted recklessly by the credit provider. This discretion of the court to 
act mero motu is even extended to the clerks of the court.492 According to the case law, 
if a clerk has reason to believe that a particular credit agreement may have been 
granted recklessly, the case must be referred to the to court for consideration and 
possible judgment. 
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Yet, a consumer may also allege that an agreement is reckless, in which instance the 
consumer bears the onus of proving the allegation. This principle was supported in the 
case of SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha493 when the court provided certain 
guidelines regarding the type of information required to be given by the consumer who 
alleges reckless credit granting. If the consumer alleges that it was a:  
a. type one reckless credit – the consumer must provide details of the negotiations 
leading up to the conclusion of the agreement, parties involved should be identified 
and details regarding the credit application, which the consumer signed, must be 
revealed;494 
b. type two reckless credit – consumer must provide evidence validating the 
consumer’s level of education and experience at the time when the consumer 
entered into the credit agreement with the particular credit provider, as well as 
disclosing previous credit transactions entered into by the consumer;495 
c. type three reckless credit – consumer must provide evidence of all her or his 
indebtedness at the time when the particular credit agreement was concluded (that 
is the entire consumer’s income and expenditure).496  
 
In the case Mercedez-Benz Financial Services SA (Pty) Ltd v Holtzhauzen497 the 
defendant claimed that the credit agreement was granted recklessly; however in making 
this allegation the defendant failed to outline his financial position at the time when the 
alleged reckless credit was extended to him. The judge, AJ Dolamo, stated that in order 
for the court to have determined whether the defense of reckless credit is a bona fide 
defense for purposes of opposing summary judgment such an outline of the defendant’s 
financial position at the time when the alleged reckless credit was granted needed to be 
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provided to the court. Consequently, determining the stage when a credit agreement 
became reckless is the time the credit agreement was entered into.498  
 
 
5.7. Pre-agreement statement and quotation 
The NCA requires from a credit provider not to enter into a small499, intermediate,500 or 
large501 credit agreement unless the credit provider has given the consumer a pre-
agreement-statement502 and a quotation503 in the prescribed format.504 Although this 
statutory pre-requisite is not a determining factor as to whether a credit provider granted 
credit recklessly, for the purpose of this study it is a factor to consider. 
 
A quotation for a small credit agreement must disclose the following information505: 
• credit amount; 
• deposit to be paid; 
• instalments; 
• interest rate, and 
• other fees and charges. 
 
A quotation for an intermediate or large credit agreement is very similar in that the 
following information must be disclosed506: 
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• credit amount; 
• deposit deducted; 
• total of additional charges; 
• instalments in respect of the total amount deferred; 
• total cost, and  
• interest rate. 
Said quotations are binding upon the credit provider for a period of five business days, 
subject to certain conditions.507 In principle, the quotation is an option created by 
statute, with the prospective consumer as the option holder.508 This quotation and 
statement ensures that the consumer is able to compare cost of different credit products 
from different credit providers509 and places the consumer in a position to make 
informed choices regarding credit. 
 
Stoop510 argues convincingly that the pre-agreement quotation and statement 
simultaneously serve as an indirect measure that can be used to prevent consumers 
from concluding credit agreements that will make them over-indebted “… because 
better-informed consumers are protected against taking up credit without proper 
thought.”  
 
The question is whether this argument should not also apply to matters of reckless 
credit lending. If the credit provider complies with the NCA requirements concerning the 
pre-agreement quotation, and statement of all essential information about the 
prospective credit agreement is fully disclosed in plain and simple language that can be 
considered an indirect measure aimed at preventing the consumer to enter into a 
reckless credit lending agreement. 
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Should a credit provider fail to comply with the formalities in regard to the pre-
agreement disclosure, the credit agreement will still be valid but the credit provider may 
be fined511 for up to R1 million or 10% of its annual turnover during the preceding 
financial year, whichever is the greatest.512 If the credit provider continues to contravene 
the NCA and/or fails to comply with the provisions of the NCA, the NCR may request 
the NCT to cancel the credit provider’s registration to practice as a credit provider.513 
 
The consequences of failure to adhere to section 92 are severe for the credit providers, 
but they should not only consider the legislative consequences of disclosing the pre-
agreement but also the possibilities of using the pre-agreement disclosure statement. 
This can be proof that the consumer knew and could appreciate the risks and costs of 
the proposed credit agreement that would have prevented the consumer from entering 
into a possible reckless credit agreement.   
 
 
5.8. Conclusion 
Section 81 of the NCA is possibly the most important section in the NCA because it 
forces the credit provider to do a three-phase assessment before entering into a credit 
agreement with a consumer.514 This particular section undoubtedly requires the credit 
provider to implement a comprehensive assessment mechanism or model and not 
merely an affordability assessment.515 Credit providers have to design, develop, and 
implement their own assessment mechanism, models, and procedures, as long as it is 
fair and objective and does not discriminate.516 Prior to the Amendment Act, the credit 
providers had no guideline(s) when doing so and had to rely on the courts for guidance 
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in order to avoid the dire consequences of reckless credit granting.517 Subsequently, the 
credit providers have some guideline(s) in the form of the assessment regulations.518  
 
The NCA is certainly one of the most important pieces of legislation in South Africa, 
because it aims at protecting consumers, but also aims to balance the right of 
consumers with that of credit providers. Any amendment to streamline the 
implementation and enforcement of the NCA is appreciated, therefore the amendments 
as discussed in this part of the study, are much needed. However, there are many of 
the provisions that still need to be attended to by the legislature. For example section 
89(5)(c) that has been found to be unconstitutional, as well as the gap regarding what 
should happen to immovable as well as movable assets during suspension periods 
when rights and obligations are set aside. 
 
Three types of reckless credit lending were identified and discussed. Comparing these 
types with each other indicates the following: 
i. A credit provider has an obligation to conduct an affordability assessment on all 
credit applications in terms of section 81(2). Failure to comply with this legislative 
requirement will render the credit agreement reckless per se even if the consumer 
was perfectly able to afford the repayment of the loan.519 
ii. The second obligation is that the credit provider must explain the risk, cost and 
obligations under the particular credit agreement to the consumer to such an 
extent that the consumer understand and appreciate these risks, cost and 
obligations. The credit provider can do so by including a clause in the credit 
application and agreement confirming that the consumer understands and 
appreciate all the risks, cost, and obligations of the agreement. 
iii. The third obligation of a credit provider is not to enter into a credit agreement if the 
proper assessment indicates that the consumer cannot afford the repayment of the 
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particular credit agreement and entering into the credit agreement will result in the 
consumer becoming over-indebted. 
 
The court has the discretion to consider reckless lending without the consumer bringing 
same to the court’s attention. In matters where a consumer alleges reckless lending, the 
consumer must provide evidence to substantiate the allegation. Should the court find 
the particular credit agreement to be reckless, the court has the discretion to impose 
certain prescribed sanctions, which will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: REMEDIES FOR RECKLESS CREDIT 
 
6.1. Introduction 
One of the objectives of the NCA is to prevent credit providers from granting credit 
reckless to consumers520 by establishing pre-assessment requirements521 and imposing 
severe sanctions522 or remedies in those instances where the court finds that the 
particular credit provider granted the credit recklessly as per the definition. “Reckless 
credit” is defined as “… credit granted to a consumer under a credit agreement 
concluded in circumstances described in section 80”.523 Section 80 of the NCA 
describes the three types of reckless credit, as discussed in Chapter 5 of this study.  
 
In addition to the abovementioned objective of the NCA, the legislator made it clear that 
a credit provider must take reasonable steps to prevent entering into a reckless credit 
agreement.524 In the following instances, the court may make certain orders as per the 
powers given to the court in section 83 of the NCA.525 
• where the court determines that a particular credit agreement was indeed reckless 
credit granting due to the fact that the credit provider failed to conduct an 
assessment as required by the NCA526, or  
• where the credit provider conducted an assessment and enters into a credit 
agreement with the specific consumer even though it was clear to the credit 
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provider that the consumer did not generally understand the risks, cost or 
obligations of the proposed agreement527, 
• or the credit provider conducted the assessment and entered into the agreement 
with the specific consumer even though this particular credit agreement will render 
the consumer over-indebted.528  
 
In the chapter at issue, the sanctions stated above will be discussed in accordance with 
each type of reckless credit. In doing so, it could be determined which sanction will be 
the most appropriate remedy for a particular type of reckless credit. 
 
 
6.2. Powers of the court 
In section 83(1) of the NCA it is stated that the court may declare a credit agreement 
reckless during any court proceeding concerning credit agreements.529 Upon comparing 
the wording of section 83(1) with section 85530 it appears that the court, to whom the 
credit agreement is being presented, may determine mero motu whether the credit 
agreement was reckless granting or not531. This possibility does not have to be brought 
to the courts attention by either the consumer or a debt counsellor, unlike situations 
where over-indebtedness exist and such allegation must be made clear to the court.532 
 
Section 130(4)(a) of the NCA also states that during any debt procedure in a court, 
where the court has found the credit agreement was reckless lending533 the particular 
court is compelled to make an order in terms of section 83.534 In comparing the wording 
of section 130(4)(a) with section 83, it appears that the court has discretion when 
considering whether a credit agreement is reckless or not, however, the court does not 
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have discretion to deviate from the power given to the court by section 83.535 The court 
may only make those orders that are provided for in section 83. 
 
In SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha and Two Similar Cases536 the court 
considered the question of a defences based on reckless credit. The respondents 
raised a defense of reckless credit on the applicant’s application for summary judgment 
and return of each vehicle after the respondents failed to make payments in terms of the 
lease agreement, which was entered into to purchase a taxi. The court held that a 
consumer (and/or defendant) that raise the defense of credit being granted recklessly 
by merely making “bald, vague, or sketchy” allegation would not be enough to fight off 
summary judgment. The consumer must provide details to support an allegation of 
reckless credit before the court can consider such a defense. The consumer, who 
alleges that credit has been extended recklessly, bears the onus of proof.537 
 
In Africa Bank Ltd v Greyling538 the judge concurred with the previous judge that 
defendants have the tendency to use reckless credit as a defense without the sufficient 
particularity to comply with the reckless credit requirements. Hence, the defense for 
reckless credit lending should not be “inherently and seriously unconvincing” and should 
contain a reasonable amount of verification detail.539 
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6.3. Court orders for reckless credit agreements 
Notwithstanding any provisions of law or agreement to the contrary, during any court 
proceedings540 in which a credit agreement is being considered the court may declare 
the credit agreement to be reckless lending should the evidence prove that the credit 
provider failed to comply with section 80541  of the NCA. Though “court” is not defined in 
the NCA, Judge Du Plessis542 stated the following:  
 
Section 83 of the NCA gives the courts the power to declare that a credit 
agreement is reckless. I have held that the clerk of the court is not a court as 
envisaged in the NCA. If clerks of the court have reason to believe that a 
particular credit agreement may be an instance of reckless credit as provided for 
in section 80 of the NCA, they must refer the request for consent judgement to the 
court. 
 
For that reason, magistrates are the presiding officers who are referred to as “courts” 
and they have the power to decide whether a particular credit agreement is reckless 
lending or not.543 In order for a magistrate to exercise this power the magistrate as the 
court may call for evidence (for example documentary evidence) to prove whether a 
particular credit agreement is reckless as defined in section 80 of the NCA.544 
 
Considering section 80 and section 83, the legislator clearly states that if a court finds 
that a particular credit agreement is reckless lending due  to the credit provider failing to 
conduct an assessment as required by the Act545, (first type of reckless credit as 
discussed in par 5.2 of this study); or the credit provider did conduct an assessment and 
entered into the credit agreement with the consumer, even though it was clear to the 
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545
  s 80(1)(a) and s 80(2) 
113 
 
credit provider that the particular consumer did not generally understand or appreciated 
the risks, cost or obligation of the proposed credit agreement546, (second type of 
reckless credit as discussed in par 5.2 of this study), the court hearing the matter has 
the discretion to make either of the following orders:547 
(a) setting aside all or part of the consumer’s rights and obligations under that 
particular credit agreement548, or 
(b) suspend the force and effect of the particular credit agreement.549 
 
It is submitted that when comparing the wording of section 83(2) (a) with section 83(2) 
(b) it is only with setting-aside orders that the court may do so if the said court deems 
“just and reasonable” under the circumstances. With suspension, the legislator omitted 
to indicate whether the court has the same discretion to make the order in such 
circumstances where the court deems it just and reasonable. 
 
The NCA provides no guidelines as to how or when the court must decide between 
setting aside the rights and obligations of the consumer and suspending the credit 
agreement. Moreover, if the court should decide to set aside the consumer’s rights and 
obligations, the question is how the court should exercise its discretion between setting 
aside such rights and obligations in part or in full. Usually the court has facts before it 
that will direct it as to the remedy or sanction it may impose.550 What is clear though is 
that when the court declares a credit agreement reckless, the court may only grant a 
single order, not both.551 
 
 
                                                          
546
  s 80(1)(b)(i)  
547
  Vessio 2009 TSAR 282;  Van Heerden & Boraine 2011 (Vol 2) De Jure 13; Otto NCA Explained 78, 
Jordaan Credit Law of SA 59, Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 224 and Standard Bank of South African 
Ltd v Kelly and Another (23427/2010) [2011] ZAWCHC 1 (decided on 25 January 2011)  
548
  s 83(2)(a) also see Boraine & Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 652 and Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 
224 
549
  s 83(2)(b) and s83(3)(b)(i) also see Boraine & Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 652 and Renke 
2011 (74) THRHR 224 
550
  Boraine & Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 652 
551
   Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 224 as well as the use of the word “or” between s 83(2)(a) and (b) 
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6.3.1. Court order setting aside the credit agreement 
The NCA only states that the court may set aside the reckless credit agreement in those 
circumstances where the court finds it “just and reasonable”.552 No further power or 
criteria given by the NCA to the court to determine in which circumstances the credit 
agreement may be set aside completely or when the reckless credit agreement may 
only be set aside in part.553  
 
It is therefore unclear which type of reckless credit granting by a credit provider will 
justify that the consumer’s rights and obligations under the particular reckless credit 
agreement can be set aside in total and which type of reckless granting will allow the 
setting aside of only a part of the consumers rights and obligations. Even in the last 
instance, according to the credit legislation it is unclear which part of the reckless credit 
agreement may be set aside.554 Should it be the interest for a certain period (term) of 
the credit agreement, costs, or payments made by the consumer to the credit provider? 
Section 83(2) merely states the court may either set aside all or part of the consumer’s 
rights and obligation or suspend the credit agreement if the credit provider failed to do 
an assessment (typed one)555, or if the credit provider conducted an assessment but 
failed to ensure the consumer understood her or his rights and obligations under the 
particular credit agreement (type two).556 
 
The NCA is also unclear what should happen to the performances (if any) by the 
consumer and the credit provider in terms of the reckless credit agreement.557 For 
example, the consumer applies to a credit provider for an instalment agreement to 
purchase a motor vehicle. During the assessment phase, the credit provider fails to 
comply with the requirements in terms of section 80(1) and grants the instalment 
agreement. After six months of struggling to make payments on the instalment 
                                                          
552
  s 83(2)(a) 
553
  Van Heerden in Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11-72 and Boraine & Van 
Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 652 and Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 227 
554
  Van Heerden in Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11-72 
555
  s 80(1)(a) 
556
  s 80(1)(b)(i) 
557
  Boraine & Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 653 
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agreement, the consumer approaches the court and the court finds the credit 
agreement to indeed be reckless lending and impose a sanction in terms of section 
83(2)(a). The NCA only states that the consumer’s rights and obligations under that 
reckless credit agreement must be set aside in part or in total.558 The legislator therefore 
failed to state what should happen to the payments already made by the consumer to 
the credit provider or what should happen to the motor vehicle(the security), that is, 
should restoration take place or not. 
 
If neither the consumer nor the credit provider has performed in terms of the reckless 
credit agreement, it is suggested that the court could then set aside the consumers’ 
rights and obligations in its entirety in terms of that particular credit agreement.559 In 
effect, the contractual relationship between the consumer and the credit provider (the 
legal bond560) will end as the credit agreement is cancelled.561 It would then be as if 
there has never been a credit agreement entered into between the credit provider and 
the consumer. However, it will become problematic in the specific circumstances where 
one or both of the parties (credit provider and/or consumer) have performed in terms of 
the credit agreement. In the absence of clear guidelines in the credit legislation, it is 
uncertain how the court should apply the provisions of the NCA.  
 
A further comparison indicates that the NCA only mention that the consumer’s rights 
and obligations in terms of the reckless credit agreement will be set aside, but the Act is 
silent about those rights and obligations of the credit provider.562 Boraine and Van 
Heerden are of the opinion that the reason the NCA is silent about the credit provider’s 
rights and obligations is that credit agreements are usually a reciprocal contract and for 
every right there is an obligation as its counterpart.563 These authors, therefore, 
concluded that if the rights and obligations of the consumer (as referred to in the NCA) 
                                                          
558
  Boraine & Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 653 
559
  Boraine & Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 653 
560
  See Chapter 3 of this study where the creation of the legal bond is discussed 
561
  Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 227 
562
  Boraine & Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 653 
563
  Boraine & Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 653 
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are cancelled, it means by implication that the rights and obligations of the credit 
providers are automatically also cancelled and that the NCA does not need to state this 
fact explicitly.564  
 
Should this be the case, then restoration ought to take place. The credit provider ought 
to be able to reclaim any amount lent to the consumer (credit amount granted) or goods 
delivered to the consumer and as the counterpart the consumer ought to reclaim any 
payments made by the consumer to the credit provider565, otherwise there will be a 
situation of unjustified enrichment.  
 
However, this was not the case in the matter of De Kock v Gerber & Others566. Mr and 
Mrs Gerber were pensioners when they applied for a second mortgage loan of R350, 
000 with ABSA Bank Ltd over an immovable property valued at R1,5 million. Mr Gerber 
received a pension of R3 777 per month, which was the only income, and their monthly 
expenses were R2 427. The amount available to repay the mortgage loan of R4 237 per 
month was R1 350. Nevertheless, ABSA Bank granted them the loan and registered the 
mortgage bond.  
 
When Mr and Mrs Gerber were unable to repay the instalment, they applied for debt 
counselling. The debt counsellor applied to the magistrate’s court in Port Elizabeth for 
the particular mortgage loan to be declared reckless lending. ABSA Bank failed to 
oppose the application. The court held that the loan was granted recklessly in terms of s 
80 of the NCA and the mortgage loan was set aside in terms of s 83(2)(a). However, the 
court documentation made no mention of what happened to the loan of R350 000 
granted to the respondents567. Consequently, the respondents remain to reside in the 
property and ABSA Bank had to write off the amount borrowed to the respondents. The 
                                                          
564
  This is supported in the article by Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 227 and also see Nagel et al 
Commercial law 2006 24 
565
  Boraine & Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 653 and Boraine & Van Heerden 2010 (Vol 13) 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 98/508 
566
  Unreported case, number 9035/10, 21 April 2010, Magistrate’s Court, Port Elizabeth. 
567
  Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in SA 313 
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outcome of this case had a negative impact on ABSA Bank’s reputation and risk, and 
caused the Bank a great deal of distress.  
 
The NCA states clearly568 that the court may set aside all or any of the consumer’s 
rights and obligations under the credit agreement that has been found by the said court 
to be reckless lending. However, there is no indication or statement in the NCA that 
forbids, limits, or excludes the credit provider from claiming money or goods delivered to 
the consumer.569  
 
In the case of SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Nako570 Kemp AJ stated the following 
obiter: “I am also satisfied that the respondents would in any event have to hand back 
the vehicles if the agreement is set aside or suspended.” In the summary judgement 
application the respondents filed as a defense for their non-performance (making 
payments in terms of the lease agreements) that the agreements constitute reckless 
credit lending. Kemp AJ concurred with Plasket J571 that it is not a defense for 
respondents (defendants) to a claim for the return of the vehicles that the credit 
extended had been granted recklessly.572  
 
In S.A Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Chesane573   Boruchowitz J were in the same mind 
as Kemp AJ when Boruchowitz J held:  
 
Even should the respondent be successful at the trial in demonstrating that the 
credit grant to him was reckless, then and in that event the probabilities are that 
                                                          
568
  s 83(2)(a) 
569
  Boraine & Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 653 and Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 227 
570
  (19/210, 21/2010, 22/2010, 77/2010, 89/2010, 104/2010 & 842/210) [210] ZAECBHC 4 (8 June 
210) 15 
571
  In the case of SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd. v T Booi & Others (unreported case) (4077/2009, 
5065/2009, 4021/2009 & 5069/2009) [2010] ZAECG (20 May 2010) 19 
572
   This decision was also concurred by Judge J. Goosen in the case of SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) 
Ltd v Campher [2012] ZAECGHC 9 (24 February 2012) in paragraph 15 when Goosen J stated that 
reckless credit is of equal application to the defence of an alleged over-indebtedness raised in 
terms of s 85. 
573
  2010(6) S.A.559 (GSJ) at 27 
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the court hearing the matter will, in terms of s 83(2)(a) of the NCA, set aside all or 
part of the respondent’s rights and obligations in terms of the credit agreements, 
in which event the vehicles will be returned to the applicant, and any remaining 
indebtedness of the respondent to the applicant will be the subject-matter of the 
court’s discretionary re-organisation. It is highly improbable that the trial court will 
allow the respondent to retain possession of both vehicles, operate them for profit 
as taxis, and not make any payment therefore to the applicant. 
 
Comparing the vagueness of section 80(1) to section 89(5)(c)574, where clear provisions 
are made for this cause of action, the NCA has omitted to make provision for the cause 
of action575 in those circumstances where performance has been made in terms of a 
reckless credit agreement. Section 83(2)(a) does not prohibit or limit the rights of a 
credit provider to claim restitution, the section merely states that the reckless credit 
agreement may be set aside in full or in part.576 
 
In the case of Opperman and Others577 the Constitutional Court had to consider the 
unconstitutionality of s 89(5)(c)578. The High Court found that this particular section was 
contrary to s 25(1) of the Constitution579 because it allows for the arbitrary deprivation of 
property by preventing any claim by the credit provider against the consumer for the 
repayment of the money and does not leave the courts  with a discretion to decide 
otherwise.580 The majority of the Constitutional Court concurred with the High Court in 
that the provisions of s 89(5)(c) of the NCA resulted in arbitrary deprivation, which is in 
contradiction of s 25(1) of the Constitution. The court further stated that the deprivation 
was not a reasonable and justifiable limitation of the right of the consumer. Therefore 
                                                          
574
  Section in the NCA that deals with unlawful credit agreements 
575
  The restrictions of the common law remedies have not been tested in respect to this vagueness in 
s83(2)(a), which does pose a risk for a plaintiff claiming unjustified enrichment  
576
  Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 227 
577
  Unreported case, number CCT 34/12 
578
  s 89 must be read together with s 40. See discussion in par 3.3.3 of this study. 
579
  The Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 
580
  Opperman v Boonzaaier and Others (WCC), unreported case no 24887/2010, also see Cool Ideas 
1186 CC v Hubbard & Another (2014) ZACC 16 (date of decision: 5 June 2014) as well as Troskie 
v Von Holdt & Others (2704/2012)(2013) ZAECGHC 31 (date of decision: 11 April 2013) and 
Chevron SA (Pty) Ltd v Wilson t/a Wilsons’s Transport and others (CCT 88/14) [2015] ZACC 15 
(decided on 5 June 2015). 
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the common law position regarding unlawful contracts will prevail until the legislature 
replaces section 89(5)(c).581 
 
In comparison are the cases relating to the Brusson scheme. In terms of this scheme, 
financially distressed homeowners seek financial assistance from Brusson Finance 
(Pty) Ltd. The latter advertised in local newspapers by inviting home owners in need of 
finance to contact the advertiser for help, regardless of whether the home owner have a 
good or bad credit rating. The homeowner was then required to sign various 
documentation, of which included a blank offer to purchase, a blank Deed of Sale, a 
memorandum of undertaking and agreement. In due course, the homeowners became 
aware that their property, which they did not intend to sell, was sold to a third party. In 
due course, Brusson Finance (Pty) Ltd was liquidated. When credit providers started 
executions steps against the immovable property (which form part of the security of the 
underlying credit agreement), the credit providers became aware of the scheme and the 
victims of the scheme. During the different court cases, the courts came to different 
conclusions, as briefly discussed: 
a) Ditshego and two others v Brusson Finance (Pty) Ltd582: Jordaan stated in his 
judgement that the Brusson scheme was a simulated transaction and that the 
agreements concluded therein were unlawful and void. 
b) ABSA Bank v Boshoff583: Goosen had to consider a summary judgement 
application. The defendant relied on the aforementioned case and alleged that the 
mortgage loan agreement of ABSA Bank Ltd should be declared unlawful. Goosen 
found that Jordaan did not declare the mortgage loan agreement in the Ditshego 
case as unlawful. Quite the reverse and Jordaan ordered the restitution of the 
property subject to the bondholder’s (ABSA Bank Ltd) rights. Jordaan concluded 
that the Brusson scheme was unlawful, but the obligations that arose from the 
mortgage loan agreement remained enforceable. Consequently, Goosen granted 
summary judgement in favour of ABSA Bank Ltd. 
                                                          
581
  Also see Chevron SA (Pty) Ltd v Wilson t/a Wilsons’s Transport and others (CCT 88/14) [2015] 
ZACC 15 (decided on 5 June 2015). 
582
  An unreported case, number 5144/2009 [2010] ZAFSHC 68 (decided on 22 July 2010). 
583
  An unreported case, number 2410/2012 [2012] ZAECPEHC 58 (decided on 28 August 2012). 
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c) Radebe v Nedbank and others584: Nicholls found that Radebe was entitled to an 
order setting aside all the agreements that had been concluded with Brusson and 
the investor. Restitution of the immovable property of Radebe was ordered on the 
basis that Radebe had no intention to transfer ownership of the property. 
d) Mabusa v Nedbank ltd. and another585: Mavundla had to decide whether 
judgement obtained by Nedbank against the third party (who bought the property 
through the Brusson scheme) should be rescinded in terms of the common law. 
The judge concurred that the applicant did not intend to sell her property and 
therefore the property had been fraudulently transferred out of the applicant’s 
name into the name of the third party. Consequently, the judgement obtained by 
Nedbank prejudicially affected the applicant’s right and title to the property in 
question. The court granted rescission of the judgement. 
 
There are many more cases in regards to the Brusson scheme.586 Without a doubt there 
will be many more as credit providers seek redress in recovering credit loans that they 
had made to the Brusson investors. All the various judgements were passed from 
different approaches; in some the underlying credit agreements were held to be 
enforceable, while in other judgments the credit agreements were set aside because it 
was unlawful and therefore had no force and effect. 
 
In SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha and Two Similar Cases the court indicated 
that the respondents would never have entered into a credit agreement due to the credit 
provider’s recklessness, in which case it will be “just and reasonable to set aside the 
agreement”.587 Such an order will then result in the agreement being void, as if there 
has never been a credit agreement. Consequently, the credit provider, who is the owner 
                                                          
584
  An unreported case, number 31495/13 [2014] ZAGPJHC 228 (decided on 25 September 2015). 
585
  An unreported case, number 67456/2010 [2014] ZAGPPHC 513; 2015 (3) SA 369 (GP)(decided on 
26 June 2014). 
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  Moore and Another v Sherriff for the District of Vereeniging and others (22082/2013) [2014] 
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others (46283/2013) [2015] ZAGPJHC 164 (decided on 13 August 2015). 
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  2011(1)SA 310 (GSJ) par 47 and also see Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in SA 311 
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of the vehicle in terms of the lease agreement, would be entitled to restoration of the 
vehicle. The consumer, who has no further obligations under the particular credit 
agreement588, will be relieved of any further indebtedness or deficiency claim under the 
reckless credit agreement.589 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, reckless credit agreement is not considered an unlawful 
credit agreement.590 In terms of the common law, an unlawful credit agreement is 
deemed null and void. If a court was to declare the credit agreement to be reckless 
lending, and the same court imposes that the agreement must be set aside, it has the 
effect of declaring the contract null and void.591 Consequently, when a court finds a 
credit agreement to be reckless credit granting and the said court imposes a remedy in 
terms whereof the consumer’s rights and obligations are set aside (either all or in part), 
the court will still have to consider restoration not in terms of the NCA but in terms of the 
common law.592 
 
 
6.3.2.  Court order suspending the force and effect of the reckless credit 
agreement 
Comparing section 82(2)(a) with section 82(2)(b) the legislator was somewhat more 
precise. In this instance, the Act provided detail of the effect suspension will have on a 
reckless credit agreement. Should the court make an order in terms of when the 
reckless credit agreement should be suspended, section 84 of the NCA explains the 
effect or consequences of the suspension on the particular credit agreement for the 
period593 as determined by the court who that found the credit agreement to be reckless 
lending.  
                                                          
588
  s 83(2)(a) 
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  Boraine & Van Heerden 2010 (Vol 13) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 98/508 and Boraine & 
Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 651 
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The consequences include the following:  
1) The consumer (as the other party to the reckless credit agreement) will not be 
required to make any payment under the reckless credit agreement.594 
2) No interest, fee, or other charge under the agreement may be charged to the 
consumer595 by the credit provider. 
3) The credit provider’s right(s) under the reckless credit agreement or in terms of any 
other applicable legislation are unenforceable.596 
 
Upon expiry of the suspension period, as determined by the court, the force and effect 
of the particular reckless credit agreement will become enforceable again.597 All the 
respective rights and obligations of the credit provider and the consumer under the 
particular reckless credit agreement will be “revived”, and the credit agreement 
becomes fully enforceable except to the extent that a court may order otherwise.598 
 
The credit provider may not charge any amount to the consumer with respect to any 
interest, fee, or other change that could not be charged during the suspension period in 
terms of section 84(1) (b).599 Nevertheless, once the credit agreement is revived, the 
credit provider is entitled to charge all the fees and interest applicable to the 
agreement.600 
 
The following gaps are identified in section 84 of the NCA:   
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  s 84(1)(a) also see Van Heerden in Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11-72,  
Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 224 and Van Heerden & Boraine 2009 12 (3) Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 17 
595
  s84(1)(b) also see Van Heerden in Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11-72, 
Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 224 and Van Heerden & Boraine 2009 12 (3) Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 17 
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• What should happen to the security during the suspension period, for example does 
the consumer continue to reside in the immovable property601 under the mortgage 
home loan, or may the consumer continue to use the motor vehicle under the 
instalment agreement? 
• There is no specification or time limit indicated in the NCA for the suspension 
period, which could result in court orders suspending credit agreements over a 
considerable period.602 
 
In SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha and Two Similar Cases603, the court 
actually considered whether the consumer would be entitled to keep the taxi, which is a 
depreciating security, while not making any payments in terms of the lease agreement if 
the court order the reckless credit agreement to be suspended for a specified period.604 
The court stated that there was no basis for reading into the NCA a provision that a 
consumer may continue to use security during the suspension period. 605 The court was 
of the opinion that it is “… unlikely that the legislature intended that the consumer could 
keep the money and the box”.606 
 
The intention of the legislator is clear on the nature of the consequences and the 
severity of these consequences on a credit provider who grants credit recklessly. 
However, what is not clear from the NCA is how the court should decide which one of 
the orders it should make for which type of reckless credit agreement. In fact, the Act is 
silent regarding this matter. 607 Evidently, the court has judicial discretion, which means 
that the court must be provided with sufficient facts to consider when making an order 
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  In an article by Van Heerden & Boraine (2011 (44 Vol 2) De Jure), the authors argued that with 
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before the court can exercise such discretion.608 This discretion should be exercised in 
line with the purpose of the NCA by “promoting responsibility in the credit market by 
discouraging reckless credit granting by credit providers and contractual default by 
consumers.”609 Furthermore, the court must also consider the other purpose of the 
NCA, namely to promoting equity in the credit market by balancing the competing rights 
of the consumers and credit providers.610 
 
 
6.4.  Provisions affecting reckless credit 
Section 25 of the Amendment Act amended section 83 of the NCA. The Amendment 
Act introduces a new heading for section 83 of the NCA. The heading use to be “Court 
may suspend reckless credit agreement” and reads now “Declaration of reckless credit 
agreement”.  
 
Furthermore, section 83 was amended to include “Tribunal” in declaration of reckless 
agreement. This means that not only a court but also the National Credit Tribunal is 
empowered to declare an agreement reckless during proceedings611, even though there 
has not yet been a case law where a credit agreement has been declared reckless 
credit lending612.  
 
An example of a matter being referred to the NCT613 is the case of Lewis Stores and 
Monarch Insurance. The NCR investigated the credit insurance policies offered by 
Lewis Stores and Monarch Insurance to pensioners and self-employed consumers that 
will cover the loss of employment. The NCR stated that the loss of employment cover 
was unreasonable and imposed unjust cost on the pensioners and self-employed 
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consumers because they could not claim benefits under this cover. The policy only 
intended to cover outstanding balances under the consumers’ credit agreements in the 
event of the consumer being retrenched or found to be redundant, which would not be 
the case for a pensioner and/or a self-employed consumer.614 The NCR referred the 
matter to the NCT to make an order in terms whereof Lewis and Monarch Insurance 
have to refund the policies holders and to impose administrative fines. However, it is 
submitted that the Lewis Store matter bears no reference to reckless credit but the 
policy premiums could have resulted in a consumer becoming over-indebted. This 
example also illustrates the power of the NCR to refer a matter to the NCT as per the 
NCA. 
 
Section 134 of the NCA deals with alternative dispute resolution. The Amendment Act is 
amended to include that any person who refers a matter to the NCR may also have the 
option to refer an allegation of reckless credit as a ground for a complaint to the NCR 
and alternatively to the NCT with jurisdiction.615 Therefore raising an allegation of 
reckless credit is not only limited to the court during proceedings, but can also be raised 
with the Regulator or Tribunal. This amended is beneficial because it will assist in 
swifter action against reckless credit grantors. 
 
 
6.5. Administrative fines 
Administrative fines are also a new development in the enforcement of legislation in the 
new democratic South Africa, which is noticeable in the post-apartheid legislations.616  
 
In section 151 of the NCA empowers the Tribunal to impose an administrative fine 
against the credit providers (and/or wrongdoers) in terms whereof they are punished in 
respect of their required or prohibited conduct.617 
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Section 1 defines prohibited conduct as “an act or omission in contravention …” of the 
NCA by, for example, a credit provider. Section 150 continue to provide the Tribunal 
with the power to make an order as to when conduct will be prohibited and what the 
consequence/remedies might be for such prohibited conduct.618 For example, if the 
credit provider were to grant credit recklessly, this act or omission by the particular 
credit provider can be considered prohibited conduct as it is in contravention of the 
NCA. Consequently, the Tribunal may then impose an administrative fine on the credit 
provider.619 
 
This discretion given to the Tribunal is limited to a fine that may not exceed: 
• 10% of the wrongdoer’s annual turnover during the preceding financial year620, or 
• R1 000 000.621 
 
According to section 151(4)(a) annual turnover will include: 
 
… at the time an administrative fine is assessed, is the total income of that credit 
provider during the immediately preceding [financial] year under all credit 
agreements to which the Act applies, less the amount of that income that 
represents the repayment of principal debt under those credit agreements.622 
 
However, can the Tribunal impose an administrative penalty if there is no reference to 
annual turnover of the respondent? In the matter of NCR v Werlan Cash Loans623 the 
court held that the applicant is empowered by the NCA to proceed with enforcement 
action against both registered and unregistered entities. In this case, the respondent did 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
617
  It also includes prohibited or required conduct as per the Consumer Protection Act 
618
  s 150(a)-(i) also see NCR v Marang Financial Services (NCT/16157/2014/140(1)) [2015] ZANCT 3 
(decided on 24 February 2015) 
619
  s 150(c) and 151 
620
  s 151(2)(a) 
621
  s 151(2)(b) 
622
  Also see Reg 16 (a) and (b) 
623
  (NCT/3867/2012/57 (1))(2013) ZANCT 5 (13 February 2013) 
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apply for registration as a credit provider. A preliminary certificate was issued, but the 
respondent failed to provide the subsequent information requested by the applicant to 
consider in order to issue the complete certificate for registered credit providers.  
 
Subsequently the applicant approached the tribunal for an order in terms of section 40 
and 151. Because the respondent was not yet a registered credit provider, the 
respondent also did not provide the applicant with the statutory financial returns in terms 
whereof the tribunal could consider the fine of 10% of the respondent’s annual turnover. 
The tribunal held that section 151(2)(b) provides an administrative fine of 10% of the 
annual turnover during the preceding financial year of the respondent or payment of R1 
million. Accordingly the tribunal found that where there are no evidence available 
regarding annual turnover, the tribunal has the option to award a penalty not exceeding 
R1 000 000.624 
 
The tribunal cannot just impose such an administrative fine. The NCA provides a list of 
factors625, which the Tribunal must consider when determining the appropriate fine: 
• The nature, duration, gravity and extent of the contravention; 
• Any loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention; 
• The behaviour of the respondent; 
• The market circumstances in which the contravention took place; 
• The level of profit derived from the contravention; 
• The degree to which a respondent has co-operated with the National Credit 
regulator and the Tribunal, and 
• Whether the respondent has previously been found in contravention of the NCA.626 
 
The NCA continues to state that the fine must be paid to the National Revenue Fund 
and if the wrongdoer fails to pay the fine, then the NCR may institute proceedings 
                                                          
624
   NCR v Werlan Cash Loans (NCT/3867/2012/57 (1))(2013) ZANCT 5 (13 February 2013) par 32 
625
  s 151(3) 
626
  s 151(3)(a)-(g) 
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against the wrongdoer in the High Court within three years of the imposition of the 
administrative fine by the Tribunal.627 
 
In the matter of NCR v Vaidro 178 CC t/a Vuleka Cash Loans628 the National Credit 
Regulator brought an application to the Tribunal seeking deregistration of the 
respondent in terms of s 57(1). The NCR alleged (among others) that the respondent 
failed to conduct affordability assessments and engaged in reckless lending in the 
period between 4 January 2011 and 1 August 2012.629 The respondent did not oppose 
the application, therefore the Tribunal found in favour of the NCR “… in the light of the 
unopposed evidence presented,”630 and the respondent’s registration as credit provider 
was cancelled.631 
 
Administrative fines will thus be applicable to credit providers who grant credit 
recklessly. Should the NCR find that a particular credit provider failed to comply with 
section 80(1)(a) and or section 80(1)(b), then the credit provider’s conduct can be 
considered to be in contravention of the provisions of the NCA as contemplated in 
section 150 and 151 of the NCA. The NCR or a person associated with the NCR632 will 
issue a notice to comply on the wrongdoer in terms of section 55(1)(a)(i). If the 
wrongdoer fails to comply with the notice, the matter will be referred to the Tribunal for 
an appropriate order,633 which can include the administrative fine, as discussed above. 
This order was also confirmed in Barko Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v NCR & 
Another634. The full bench of the Supreme Court of Appeal held that section 55(1)(a) 
authorises the NCR to issue a compliance notification when the NCR has reasonable 
ground to believe that the other party has failed to comply with the provisions of the 
                                                          
627
  Van Zyl in Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 17-6 
628
  NCT/7321/2013/57(1)(P) 
629
  The conduct of the respondent where prohibited under s 81(2) read with s 1, which act or omission 
was also in contravention of Regulation 55(1) of the NCA 
630
  Par 7.2 of the NCT/7321/2013/57(1)(P) 
631
  In terms of s 150(g) 
632
  s 55(1)(a) 
633
  s 55(6)(b) 
634
  2014 JOL 32315 (SCA) (unreported case, nr 415/13, date of judgement: 18/9/2014) 
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NCA or is engaging in activity in a manner that is in consistent with the NCA. However, 
there are yet no actual cases where the NCT have imposed such fines. 
 
This authorisation is a remedy imposed by the legislature to ensure that credit providers 
do not continue with prohibited conduct. Not only will such a continuation have a 
financial impact on the credit provider, it will also have an impact on the reputation of 
the credit provider and possibly result in deregistration as credit provider.635 
 
 
6.6.  Conclusion   
Section 83(1) provides power to the court to suo motu look into a possibility that a 
particular credit agreement could be reckless lending.636 Comparing section 83 to 85, 
where an allegation of over-indebtedness must be brought to the court’s attention, the 
court does not require an allegation of reckless credit. However, the court may not 
deviate from the powers given to the court in terms of section 83 and may only make 
the order provided for this particular section.637 
 
If a court declares a credit agreement reckless in terms of sections 80(1)(a) or 
80(1)(b)(i), it may make an order setting aside all or part of the consumer's rights and 
obligations under that agreement, as the court determines to be just and reasonable in 
the circumstances. Alternatively, it may make an order suspending the force and effect 
of that specific credit agreement in accordance with section 83(3) (b) (i).  
If the court, after considering the credit agreements, finds that despite having conducted 
an assessment638 the credit provider proceeded to enter into the credit agreement with 
the consumer notwithstanding the fact that that particular credit agreement will render 
the consumer over-indebted, then the court must determine:  
                                                          
635
  s 57(1) and 150(g) 
636
  Scholtz et el par 11.4.5, also see African Bank Ltd. V Myambo 2010 (3) SA (GNP) 298 
637
  Van Heerden & Boraine 2011(Vol 2) De Jure par 2.5.2 
638
  s 80(1)(a) and s 80(2) 
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(a) whether the consumer is over-indebted at the time of the court proceeding639; and 
(b) if the consumer is indeed over-indebted, the court may make an order declaring 
the credit agreement reckless lending and suspend the force and effect of that 
particular reckless agreement until such date as determined by the court640 and 
restructure the credit obligations of the consumer.641 
 
For the restructuring order, the court will have to consider the consumer’s current 
means and ability to meet their current financial obligations as well as the date upon 
which these obligations will be fully satisfied.642 Therefore, reckless credit and over-
indebtedness will sometimes intersect with one other, for example, the consumer can 
become over-indebted because of reckless credit granting.643 Then the consumer will 
be entitled to the remedies as discussed in this chapter.644 As a result the defense of 
reckless credit and over-indebtedness are often interconnected, for example if the 
consumer failed to disclose all the relevant information upon application of credit, the 
agreement will not be considered reckless credit lending. Failure to disclose requested 
information materially affects the ability of the credit provider to make a proper 
assessment.645 As a result, the agreement will not be reckless credit, but the consumer 
could be declared over-indebted and his current credit obligations could be 
restructured.646 
 
The significance of a determination of reckless credit by a court is that it has the effect 
that a consumer can in some instances obtain significant debt relief, for instance by the 
setting aside of the agreement, or at the very least the suspension of the agreement 
and the restructuring of his other credit agreement debt. The court has the discretion to 
                                                          
639
  s 3(3)(a) 
640
  s 83(3)(b)(i) 
641
  s 83(3)(b)(ii) 
642
  s 83(4)(b) also see discussion in Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in SA 307 - 308 
643
  Vessio 2009 TSAR 274 
644
  s 83(3)(b)(i)-(ii) 
645
  Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in SA 300-301 
646
  s 87 
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raise the issue of reckless credit in any proceeding in which a credit agreement is being 
considered, for example during summary judgement applications.  
 
Furthermore, the credit provider has a duty to conduct a proper assessment of the 
consumer’s financial position, prior to entering into a credit agreement with the particular 
consumer. The credit provider also have a duty to ensure that the consumer understand 
and appreciate the risks and costs under the potential credit agreement and determine 
whether the consumer will be able to replay the instalments under the credit agreement.  
 
If, however, a court declares that a credit agreement is reckless in terms of section 
80(1) (b) (ii), it must further consider whether the consumer is over-indebted at the time 
of the court proceedings. If the court then concludes that the consumer is over indebted, 
it may make an order suspending the force and effect of that credit agreement until a 
date determined by the court when making the order of suspension. In addition, it may 
then also restructure the consumer's obligations under any other credit agreements in 
accordance with section 87. 
 
Should a credit provider continue to grant credit recklessly, the NCR may file a notice on 
the particular credit provider to comply with the provisions of the NCA647 and that the 
credit provider should not act in contravention of the conditions of his registration as 
credit provider.648 If the credit provider ignores the notification or fails to comply with the 
provisions of the NCA, the NCR can approach the Tribunal for filing an administrative 
fine against the particular credit provider649 because of the prohibited conduct of the 
credit provider. 
 
                                                          
647
  s 55 also see Van Heerden & Boraine 2011 (44 Vol 2) De Jure 8 
648
  s 48 
649
  s 150 and 151 
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Reckless credit agreements are not considered unlawful (or illegal) contract650, 
consequently the relief available in section 83 is limited for reckless credit agreements 
compared to the relief presented in section 89(5) in respect unlawful agreements.651 In 
terms of section 89 the consequences are severe in that the security is forfeited to the 
State and the credit provider will be able to claim for restoration of any performance 
based on for example on unjustified enrichment of the consumer.652 
 
Though the common law provisions regarding unlawful contracts will not be applicable 
to reckless credit agreements, it appears the courts are of the opinion that a consumer 
may not be unjustifiably enriched. The credit provider has a right to restoration. In the 
Gerber653 case, the court adhered to the court’s power in terms of section 83, but failed 
to consider the common law principles regarding enrichment and restoration. This 
omission was rectified in the Opperman654 case as well as the Mbatha655 case. In the 
first instance, the Constitutional Court stated that it is unconstitutional to allow for 
arbitrary deprivation of property by preventing any claim by the credit provider against 
the consumer for the repayment of the money. In the second instance the court held “… 
that it is unlikely that the legislature intended that the consumer should keep the money 
and the box.” These were significant court cases, which shaped the issue regarding 
security in reckless credit agreements. 
 
Even though the purpose of the NCA is to protect the consumer, this purpose must not 
be considered the only purpose when interpreting the NCA.656 By doing so, one will lose 
sight of the other objectives657 of the NCA. This in turn could result in the interpretation 
                                                          
650
  See discussions in par 2.5.2 and 3.3.1 of this study, also s 89 sets out the various instances of 
unlawful agreements, which does not include or refer to a reckless credit agreement 
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  Van Heerden & Boraine 2011(Vol 2) De Jure par 2.5.2. 
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  Van Heerden & Boraine 2011(Vol 2) De Jure par 2.5.3.1 also Boraine & Van Heerden 2010 
THRHR 1 
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  De Kock v Gerber and Others, unreported case, number 90358/2010 in the Magistrate’s Court of 
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  National Credit Regulator v Opperman & others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) 
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  SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha & two others 2011 (1) SA 310 (GSJ) 
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  SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd. v Nako & Others (19/2010, 21/210, 22/2010, 77/2010, 89/2010, 
104/2010, 842/2010) [2010] ZAECBHC 4 (8 June 2010) 18 
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  s 3 and see paragraph 2.2 page 16 - 17 
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of being bias in favour of the consumer, which could result in being unfair towards the 
rights of the credit providers.658 
 
In several cases discussed in this study, the defendants alleged that the credit 
agreements were reckless lending; however, in none of the matters the courts 
determined or found any credit agreement to have been granted recklessly. In some 
instances the allegations of reckless credit granting was left undecided, turned down or 
left open. This raises the question of the effectiveness of the remedy of reckless credit. 
 
Boraine and Van Heerden659 raised the same questions. These authors concluded that 
from a debt relief point of view, a court ordering a credit agreement to be reckless 
lending would not “… necessarily offer a lasting solution to a debtor’s over-
indebtedness”.660 The reason for this conclusion is that even if a court found a credit 
agreement to be reckless lending and order that the consumer’s right and obligations be 
set aside in full or in part, the credit provider may in terms of the common law claim for 
restoration.661 This is because the NCA does not state that a reckless credit agreement 
is illegal and therefore null and void662 and restoration is not prohibited in the NCA.663 
Furthermore, even if the court declares the agreement reckless and then suspends664 
the force and effect of such agreement, it will bring some relief to the consumer in terms 
of the repayment obligation. However, once the suspended period comes to an end, the 
particular consumer will again become liable to repay the money owed to the credit 
provider. 
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  s 3(d) where the NCA also promotes equity in the credit market by balancing the respective rights 
and responsibilities of credit providers and consumers.  
659
  Boraine & Van Heerden 2010 (Vol 13) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal page 14 
660
  Boraine & Van Heerden 2010 (Vol 13) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal page 15 
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  Opperman v Boonzaaier and Others (WCC), unreported case no 24887/2010 
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  See Chapter 3 in this study for discussion. 
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  Boraine& Van Heerden 2010a (73) THRHR 650 
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7.1. Introduction 
Towards the end of the century (late 1990s to the early 2000’s, there was a significant 
increase in over-indebted consumers in South Africa. This was a result of various 
factors:665 
• after South Africa became a democracy666 the historically disadvantaged 
consumers, who had no access to credit in the formal financial market and who had 
little financial experience or education, were now able to gain easy access to credit; 
and/or 
• affirmative action and transformation of the civil service; and/or 
• over eager borrowing by consumers, without consideration to whether it is 
affordable or not; and/or 
• credit provider’s lack of consideration as to whether the consumers are able to 
repay credit loans. 
 
Consequently, in 2001 the DTI decided to review the consumer-credit legislation and 
investigate the problems that existed in the consumer-credit market.667 In order to do so, 
a Technical Credit Law Committee was established, which gave rise to various research 
reports and obtaining of expert opinions.668 Some of these opinions were even obtained 
from outside the borders of South Africa, for example Meagher (IRIS Centre, University 
of Maryland, United States of America) Regulation of Payday Lenders in the United 
States.669 From the recommendations and findings of this committee, an official Policy 
Framework for Consumer Credit 670 was drafted that formed the basis of the NCA. The 
DTI appointed various experts to assist with the drafting of the new credit legislation, 
which also included people beyond the borders of the country.671  
 
                                                          
665
  Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in SA 13 
666
  1994 
667
  Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in SA 15 
668
  See the comprehensive list in Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in SA 15 fn 102 
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  2002 
670
  August 2004 
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  Parties involved in the drafting of the NCA can be found in Kelly-Louw (2008) 20 SA MERC LJ 200 
fn 29 at 207 
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Legislation protecting debtors/consumers is an international trend, even though the level 
of protection and context may differ from country to country. The reason for the different 
approaches is that the needs, circumstances, resources, political agenda, economic 
philosophy, and history differ in each country.672  
 
The following part of the study will analyse the global view pertaining to the credit ability 
of consumer’s and the impact it has on the credit market. 
 
 
7.2. Overview of the international trend 
Due to the economic recession that started during 2007 and 2008 and consumers 
losing their jobs, worldwide concerns were raised about the large number of consumers 
that had difficulty managing their debts. Clearly, the development was a worldwide 
phenomenon and not an isolated trend and/or concern in South Africa.  
 
Friedman and Mandelbaum673 discuss how the world dominance historically moved 
from Great Britain in the 19th century to the United States in the 20th century and in the 
21st century to China. However, the United Stated did not skip the recession that most 
countries where facing. The United States also faced the economic turmoil. According 
to the authors, five factors contributed to the economic recession in the United States, 
namely:674 
i. The leaders of the country ignored the fact that the world has changed structurally, 
and still is, and they failed to confront the challenges of the new world. 
ii. United States failed to give attention to public education, national debt, and deficit. 
iii. Unites Stated failed to promote entrepreneurial initiatives, research and 
development. 
iv. Many consumers stretched their economic and financial resources too thinly 
resulting in consumers extending themselves beyond their means. 
                                                          
672
  Otto in Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 1-1 
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  “That Used to Be Us” (2012) 
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  These factors are discussed in an article “Looking back to Move Forward” (2013) pages 91 - 97 
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v. Unites States political system was polarised. 
 
In a Texas law journal, a research paper was published on over-indebtedness of the 
American consumer.675 The article stated that consumer over-indebtedness is a result 
of consumers having easy access to credit cards and the granting of mortgage loans.676 
The author pointed out that due to the economic turmoil during 2007 and 2008, the 
housing market revealed that many of the United States’ consumers were approved for 
loans they could not afford on their actual income677, and consumers did not fully 
understood the terms of their loans.678 Debt relief measures in United States can be 
found in their bankruptcy legislation, though there are authors who are convinced that 
over-indebtedness of consumers should be dealt with outside the bankruptcy laws.679 
When comparing the two documents the different approach to bankruptcy legislation is 
conspicuous: the article mentions consumers receiving credit counselling prior to filing 
their bankruptcy petition680, whereas the NCA refers to debt counselling. Interesting to 
note is that the United States bankruptcy legislation aims at making it harder for the 
over-indebted consumer to avoid repaying their debts681 by emphasising that the 
consumer should behave responsibly.682 Responsible lending is also encouraged.683 
 
The economic recession during 2007 and 2008, also lead to concerns for Europe as 
were seen in the European Commission’s Research note 4/2010.684 The document 
examined households who had difficulty in paying outstanding loans in terms of their 
income level, age of the consumer, and the number of children in the household. 
However, the document mostly focused on over-indebtedness in households that had 
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  Dickerson Texas International Law Journal 2008 (43) at 135 
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difficulty to meet their monthly obligations; a concern prioritised in the International 
Consumer Debt Report published during May 2001. The INSOL (International 
Federation of Insolvency Practitioners) published a report regarding consumer debt, in 
which they recommended that overspending and over-indebtedness should be 
prevented before it happens.685 
 
In 2007, a policy was drafted by the European countries to encourage responsible 
lending.686 The strategy aimed at:  
i. encouraging lenders to grant responsible and affordable credit; 
ii. encouraging credit relations to be transparent and understandable; 
iii. cautioning credit lending to be done carefully, responsibly and fairly; 
iv. emphasised the effectiveness of protective legislation, and  
v. addressing over-indebtedness as a public concern. 
 
During 2008, the European Parliament and Council published a directive on credit 
agreements for consumers687, which gave members of the European Union (EU) until 
June 2010 to incorporate the provisions of the EU directive into each member’s own 
national laws. The principles also aim at protecting consumers.688 
 
The following provisions are briefly discussed as an overview and introduction to this 
study: 
• The EU Directive requires creditors disclosing information to the consumer of the 
credit or loan, which information may not result in unfair and misleading 
practices.689 Standard disclosure denotes, for instance, pre-contractual 
disclosure690 that will allow consumers to compare different offers. Therefore, the 
information disclosed to the consumers must contain adequate data regarding the 
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  INSOL International Consumer debt report: report of findings and recommendations (2001) 29 
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  ECRC/NCRC “Principles of responsible credit” (2007) at 1 
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  Directive 2008/48/EC, that also repealed Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ LI33/66)  also see 
Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 210  
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cost of the credit691, terms and conditions and the consumer’s obligations in terms 
of the proposed credit agreement.692   
 
Compared to the EU Directive (2008), it is clear the South African legislation 
(NCA) promulgated in 2007 already stipulated that the consumer should be 
provided with a pre-agreement and quotation693 with the precise information that 
should be disclosed, especially if it is a small or intermediate credit agreement.694 
 
• The second important provision is the Directive regarding the creditworthiness of 
the consumer. The EU Directive places a duty on the creditor to take all 
necessary steps to determine a consumer’s creditworthiness when doing the 
assessment for credit.695 The EU Directive requires the members of the EU to be 
responsible and to promote a fair relationship between consumer and creditor in 
the credit market. Recital 26 declares that creditors should refrain from 
irresponsible lending by granting credit to a consumer without determining 
whether the particular consumer can afford the credit.696 
 
In comparison with the NCA, this provision was also incorporated into the credit 
legislation of South Africa prior to the EU Directive. One of the purposes of the 
NCA is to promote a responsible credit market by encouraging responsible 
borrowing by consumers and discouraging reckless credit granting by credit 
providers697 (fair and equal relationship between credit provider and consumer). 
Furthermore, the NCA also requires that credit providers do an assessment prior 
to entering into a credit agreement with a potential consumer698, which is also 
considered a step to prevent reckless credit lending.699 The NCA took the 
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  Recital 20 requires that the cost of credit includes the disclosure of interest, commissions, taxes 
and fees. See also Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 211 
692
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assessment obligation a step further by requiring that the assessment should not 
only be restricted to the credit worthiness700 of the consumer, but also to whether 
the consumer understands the risk and cost of the proposed credit.701 
 
• The last provision of importance for this study is the requirement that the credit 
agreement must contain all essential information in a clear and concise manner 
that will enable consumers to know their rights and obligations under the credit 
agreement.702 
 
Comparing to the NCA, this prerequisite has also been included in the South 
African legislation. Section 64 of the NCA gives the right to the consumer to 
receive information in plain and understandable language. The Act actually explain 
“plain” by stating that “… if it is reasonable to conclude that an ordinary consumer 
of the class of persons whom the document is intended, with average literacy skills 
and minimal credit experience, could be expected to understand the content, 
significance and import of the document without undue effort …”.703 
 
In terms of the growing credit market, the EU directive has provided important 
guidelines for its members to follow. The aim to prevent over-indebtedness is a 
significant objective globally and cannot be ignore by any country, irrespective of 
whether the legislation of the particular country is basic or comprehensive. Consumers 
must be protected in the credit market, but not without balancing their rights and 
obligations against that of the credit provider. Moreover, each year consumers 
worldwide generally spend more money than they earn.704 
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7.3. Conclusion 
It is clear that over the last decades legislatures internationally have introduced 
legislation, research, and articles covering consumer credit and various other areas of 
consumer protection.705 More in-depth research is required into the development of 
reckless lending and/or irresponsible lending in countries such as the United States and 
the countries of European Union. However, the issue of the development of reckless 
and/or irresponsible lending falls beyond the scope of this study. The comparison with 
international legislation and measures discussed chapter was/is merely a background 
sketch to the globally identified need of debt management existing within the credit 
market.   
 
Reckless lending is not a unique phenomenon in South Africa; worldwide policy 
documents and articles encourage lenders to practice responsible lending and 
consumers to borrow money responsibly. Protective legislation is important but the 
balance of responsibility should be shared between the lender and the borrower. 
 
According to Otto, there are two approaches in the international market, namely:706  
• Some countries have developed concise legislation that provides the credit industry 
with basic principles but little detail. In this approach the courts and the legal 
authors provide the basic legislation with substance where needed. 
• In other countries, the legislation is more comprehensive, for example in Great 
Britain. In South Africa, the second approach is prevalent, as in the NCA. 
The United Kingdom was most likely the precursor for implementing comprehensive 
consumer credit legislation, considering this country has initiated consumer credit 
legislation back in 1974.707 In the light of this timely regulation, the next chapter will 
focus on drafting a comparative analysis between the NCA and the Consumer Credit 
Act708 of Great Britain.   
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CHAPTER 8: GREAT BRITAIN 
 
8.1. Introduction 
Hire-purchase agreements were unknown to Roman-Dutch law. It was developed in 
Europe during the middle of the nineteenth century with the increased growing of the 
commercial trading between countries. However, it was only at the end of the 
nineteenth century that Roman-Dutch law contracts as an authentic type of contract 
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came into use in South Africa.709 This was also the beginning of sellers exploiting 
purchasers. 
 
Over the last four decades, this exploitation gave rise to the development of various 
legislative measures aimed at protecting consumers and covering consumer credit. The 
country that initiated comprehensive consumer credit legislation was the United 
Kingdom by implementing the Consumer Credit Act, No 39 of 1974.710  
 
During September 2008 and March 2009 the banking system in the United Kingdom 
nearly collapsed, which resulted in banks being nationalised and rescued by the 
government.711 During that period, Great Britain experienced a deteriorating economy 
that lead to bad debts and loan arrears. There are authors who reckon the resultant 
credit-defaulting state of affairs was due to (unfortunate) legislative amendments712 at 
that time, as well as the increasing use of credit unions by the government as a 
mechanism to achieve its financial inclusion goals.713 
 
The subsequent discussion will continue to analyse the development of consumer 
legislation in the United Kingdom in terms of applicable points of interest vis-à-vis the 
Consumer Credit Act of that country. 
8.2. Overview of the Consumer Credit Act714 
Usury legislation in Britain is part of the credit market since the ninth century.715 
Legislation covering consumer credit used to focus on particular areas, for example 
moneylenders and hire-purchase agreements, and not on consumer credit in its 
entirety.  
 
                                                          
709
  Otto in Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 1-3 
710
  Otto in Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 1-4 
711
  Goddard et al. Crisis in UK banking: lessons for public policy (2009) 279-284 
712
  Amendment of the consumer Credit Act in 2006. 
713
  McKillop et al. Credit Unions in Great Britain: recent trends and current prospects (2011) 35 
714
  No 39 of 1974 
715
  Otto in Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 1-3 
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During 1965, the Crowther Committee was established to investigate the consumer 
credit situation in Great Britain.716 During March 1971, their report717 was published, 
recommending the need for reform of consumer credit legislation.718 A bill was drafted 
and introduced to Parliament, and on 31 July 1974, the Consumer Credit Act came in 
operation.719 This legislation was subsequently amended in 2006, and in 2010, the 
Consumer Credit Directive was implemented. The 1974 Act outlined the regulation for 
the providing of credit and hiring of goods throughout Great Britain to individuals720 
where the credit limit or payment for hire does not exceed £25,000.721 
 
The Consumer Credit Act of 1974 introduced consumer protection and regulated bodies 
trading in consumer credit. According to the Consumer Credit Act, these bodies must 
have a license to trade as such, which will be issued by the Office of Fair Trading 
(hereafter referred to as OFT).722 Noteworthy is that this license will be suspended or 
revoked in the event of irregularities.723 
 
The Consumer Credit Act identified three main types of agreements: (i) regulated 
consumer credit agreements, (ii) regulated consumer hire agreements and (iii) partially 
regulated agreements.724 The term “a hire agreement725” is not applicable to this study 
and will therefore not be discussed or included in references.  
 
The relevant definitions are: 
                                                          
716
  Keenan Business Law (2005) 420 
717
  Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit (Chairperson Lord Crowther) (1971) vol 1 Cmnd 
4596 (the “Crowther Report”)  
718
  Goode Consumer Credit Act: A student guide (1979) 5, also see Office of Fair Trading v Lloyds 
TSB Bank PLC & Ors [2006] EWCA Civ 268 (22 March 2006) 
719
  Goode Consumer Credit Act: A student guide (1979) 10 
720
  Individuals included natural persons, unincorporated associations, and partnerships of any size. 
721
  This limit was abolished with the 2006 Amendment Act. See discussion in paragraph 8.3 of this 
study. 
722
  s 21, Part III of the Consumer Credit Act, also see Goode Consumer Credit Act: A student guide 
(1979) 106 
723
  s 32, Part III of the Consumer Credit Act, also see s 25(2) and (2A) of the Amended Consumer 
Credit Act of 2006 
724
  Part II of the Consumer Credit Act 
725
  Which is defined as an agreement where an individual (a hirer) and the other person (owner) 
agrees that the goods are loaned to the hirer for use without the option to purchase (s 15, Part II of 
the Consumer Credit Act) 
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“regulated agreement” is defined as “… an agreement between an individual (the 
debtor) and any other person (the creditor), by which the creditor provides the debtor of 
any amount”.726 This amount is currently limited to £25,000.727 
 
“individual” includes a partnership or other unincorporated body and exclude 
corporations registered with the Companies House or credited by legislation.728 
 
“credit” includes cash loans and any other form of financial accommodation.729 The 
definition also states that the amount allowed as credit (or financial accommodation) will 
be equal to the total price of the goods, less the deposit (if any) and the total charges for 
credit.730  
 
The Consumer Credit Act consists of 193 sections and five schedules731, divided into 12 
parts. This act is “… designed to provide a comprehensive code regulating the 
consumer credit and almost every aspect of a credit granting operator”.732 Yet this 
legislation does not refer to the process of applying for credit, the measures needed to 
assess the consumer’s affordability, and neither is there any reference in the Act to 
reckless credit granting as known in South Africa.733 
 
During the worldwide financial crisis in 2007 to 2008, the EU published a Directive 
2008/48/EC 734 to member states that resulted in Great Britain adopting the Consumer 
                                                          
726
  s 8, Part II of the Consumer Credit Act 
727
   The original legislation had the limit at £5000, but the amount has been increased. According to the 
Consumer Credit Act of 2006 there is no upper limit. 
728
  Goode Consumer Credit Act: A student guide (1979) 55 
729
  s 9(1), Part II of the Consumer Credit Act 
730
  s 9(3), Part II of the Consumer Credit Act 
731
  Which is much larger than the original 96 pages as per Goode Consumer Credit Act: A student 
guide (1979) 37  
732
  Goode A Consumer Credit Act: A guide for students (1979) 37 
733
  However, later in this chapter there is a discussion on “irresponsible lending” which is based on the 
same principle as “reckless lending”. 
734
  Which the Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ LI33/66), also see Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 210.  
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Credit Directive on 23 April 2008. It replaced the 1987 Consumer Credit Directive.735 
The changes mainly affected creditors, credit-brokers and credit intermediaries, and 
would be applicable to all credit agreements. 
 
In this chapter, legislation and/or policies that influenced the credit market in Great 
Britain leading to various developments in the consumer protection sphere will be 
investigated. These aspects will be compared with the NCA in the light of the changing 
social conditions that prompted the law reforms.  
 
 
8.3.  Consumer Credit Act: Entry into credit agreement 
The process in which parties (debtor and creditor) enter into a regulated agreement 
requires that specified information must be disclosed to the debtor in the prescribed 
manner prior to entering into the particular agreement. 736 Should the regulations not be 
observed, the agreement will become unenforceable against the debtor.737 The 
Consumer Credit (EU Directive) Regulations 2010 substituted this section of the 
Consumer Credit Act on 1 February 2011.738 
 
The creditor is also required to provide the debtor with “… an adequate explanation” of 
the following:739 
• features of the agreement that will make the credit provided, incompatible for 
particular type of use; 
• how much the debtor will have to pay periodically; 
• features of the agreement that could have an adverse effect on the debtor in a 
manner the debtor could not have foreseen; 
                                                          
735
  Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, OJ L133, Page 66 (22 
May 2008). 
736
  s 55(1), Part V of the Consumer Credit Act 
737
  s 55(2), Part V of the Consumer Credit Act 
738
  S.I. 2010/1010, regulations 16, 99(1) with 100 and 101 
739
  s 55A(2)(a)-(e), Part V of the Consumer Credit Act, which is considered to be the pre-contractual 
explanation 
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• consequence for the debtor, should the debtor fail to repay the credit on the agreed 
times under the agreement, the legal proceedings that the creditor could institute 
and the possibility that the creditor may repossess the debtor’s home, and 
• the right to withdraw form the agreement, the effect thereof and how and when this 
right may be exercised. 
 
The creditor may give the pre-contractual explanation and advice orally or in writing740, 
while with the NCA it must be given in writing.741 The purpose of the pre-contractual 
agreement is to provide the debtor with the opportunity to ask the creditor questions or 
for further information and explanations,742 a stipulation that is much aligned with the 
South African legislation. 
 
 
8.4. Consumer Credit Act: Assessment of creditworthiness743 
The Consumer Credit Act provides basic requirements regarding the assessment of a 
debtor to determine the particular debtor’s creditworthiness. Section 55B merely states 
that the creditor must conduct an assessment prior to entering into a regulated 
agreement with a debtor or increasing the credit limit of a debtor.744 
Section 55B does not provide guidelines as to how the creditors should conduct the 
assessment for creditworthiness, except to require that the creditor must obtain 
“sufficient information” from the consumer and the Credit Reference Agency where it is 
necessary.745 The Act provides no meaning as to what will be considered “sufficient” 
information and it is for the creditors to decide whether they will obtain this sufficient 
information from either the consumer or the credit reference agency.746 
                                                          
740
  s 55A(3), Part V of the Consumer Credit Act 
741
  s 92 of the NCA also see Reg 28 
742
  s 55A(1)(c) & (d), Part V of the Consumer Credit Act 
743
  s 55B was inserted by the Consumer Credit Act (EU Directive) (S.I. 2010/1010, regulations 5, 99(1) 
with 100 and 101 
744
  s 55B(1) & (2), Part V of the Consumer Credit Act 
745
  EU Commission Directive 2011/90/EU (effective 1 January 2013) at par 7.3, page 30 and section 
55B(3)(a) & (b), Part V of the Consumer Credit Act, no 39 of 1974. 
746
  Though section 55B provide the creditors with the discretionary power to choose where to obtain 
the information from, it is important that the creditor must assess credit worthiness. Therefore OFT 
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Credit markets rely on credit scoring and behavioural scoring techniques. The 
applicable information is available from Credit Reference Agencies; a tool that provides 
creditors with the information needed when deciding whether a consumer has the ability 
to repay the loan, or the possibility exist that a consumer might default.747 
 
It is also the responsibility of creditors to explain the proposed credit agreement to the 
consumer, who applied for the credit. The features of the credit agreement, the cost, 
and the consequences of failure to make payments must be explained to the consumer 
to assist her or him to make a decision as to whether the proposed credit agreement is 
suited for the consumer’s needs and financial position.748 This explanation can be done 
orally or in writing749 allowing the consumer to ask for further information and/or 
explanations. 
 
This section in the Act does not state the reason or purpose to do an assessment of the 
debtor’s creditworthiness. However, it does state that for the purposes of this section, 
pawn transactions and agreements secured on land, will be excluded from a 
creditworthy assessment.750 The section also provides the necessity to have an 
assessment done, but it appears that no clear guidance is given to the creditor, or the 
penalty or consequences should the credit fail to comply.751 Furthermore, no reference 
is made to reckless credit granting by a creditor or the remedies available to a debtor 
should the credit grant credit, which the debtor cannot afford to repay. There are no 
clear available norms for determining affordability in the Act.752 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Office of Fair Trading) guidance on Irresponsible Lending, that covers affordability of credit, should 
be read together with the EU directive 2011/90/EU. 
747
  OFT 1107 of March 2010 (updated February 2011) par 4.23 at 42 also see McGuffick v The Royal 
Bank of Scotland PLC [2009] EWHC 2386 (Comm) (06 October 2009) 
748
  EU Commission Directive 2011/90/EU (effective 1 January 2013) at par 2.6 page 6 (Chapters 7 & 
8). 
749
  Regulation 6 of the Consumer Credit (Amendment) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/1969 
750
  s 55B(4), Part V of the Consumer Credit Act 
751
  Except for the general provisions in section 32, Part III of the Consumer Credit Act where the 
creditor’s license can be suspended or revoked or the licensee could receive a penalty of £50,000 
should the regulations of the Act be contravened 
752
  Bramley “Affordability Criteria for Mortgage Lending” (2011) at 2 
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“Affordability” has a variety of meanings, which suggested that different policies have 
different meanings subject to the levels of problems affecting different types of 
consumers in different circumstances.753 There are two approaches, namely housing 
cost to income versus income left after housing costs.754 Fundamentally, the 
affordability criteria consider hardship, housing needs and changes of circumstances. 
The OFT project on irresponsible lending emphasises that lending decisions are 
primarily based on the consideration of affordability.755 In other words, the consumer’s 
ability to repay (affordability of the product or amount) and the consumer’s expected 
level of risk (the possibility of repayment of the loan).756 
 
The OFT states in their Guidance for Creditors757 that creditors rely on assessments of 
affordability, therefore the information provided by the consumers ought to be accurate 
and up to date. Consumers have the responsibility to advice the creditors when there is 
a change in their circumstances.758 Over-indebtedness, on the other side, is defined as 
a situation “… where households or individuals are in arrears on a structural basis, or at 
a significant risk of getting into arrears in a structural basis”.759  
 
8.5. Consumer Credit Act: Pre-contractual information and agreements760 
The consumer is entitled to receive pre-contractual information in “good time”761 before 
the consumer enter into the proposed credit agreement with the creditor. The 
Agreement Regulations does not define a good time, or the form of the credit 
agreement or the ordering of the information.  
                                                          
753
  Bramley 1994 (vol 9) (no 1) Housing Studies 103-124, Bramley “Affordability comes of age” (2006) 
and Linneman et al. 1992 (Vol 29)(no 3) Urban Studies  
754
  Bramley “Affordability Criteria for Mortgage Lending” (2011) at 3 
755
  OFT 1107 of March 2010 (updated February 2011) par 4.11 at 42 
756
  McGuffick v The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC [2009] EWHC 2386 (Comm) (06 October 2009) 
757
  OFT 1107 of March 2010 (updated February 2011) at 12 
758
  OFT 1107 of March 2010 (updated February 2011) at 13 
759
  OXERA (2004) also see European Commission Research Note 4/2010 “Over-indebtedness: New 
evidence from the EU-SILC special module” by Nicole Fondeville et al. (November 2010) at 3 
760
  EU Commission Directive 2011/90/EU (effective 1 January 2013) at page 6 (Chapters 9 & 10).  
761
  A good time will depend on the precise circumstances of the transaction. Also see EU Commission 
Directive 2011/90/EU (effective 1 January 2013) at par 9.4 on page 35.  
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The Disclosure Regulations762 do stipulate that the information must be clear and legible 
and that the consumer must be able to leave with the information to consider the 
proposed credit agreement and to compare the agreement with offers from other 
creditors. This means that the pre-contractual information must be in a standard format, 
that is, the Pre-contractual Information Form.763  
 
 
8.6. Amendment of the Consumer Credit Act 
During July 2001, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry announced that the 
1974 Consumer Credit Act would be reviewed.764 As a result, the Department of Trade 
and Industry and the Department for Work and Pensions published a paper765 that 
indicated the need for reform. The need for reform was supported by the increasing 
dissatisfaction of consumers regarding the lending practices of creditors, the number of 
consumers that struggled with their debt repayment766 and the over-indebted 
suicides.767  
 
On 30 March 2006, the royal assent was given to the Consumer Credit Act 2006 and 
the amendments to the 1974 Act were implemented in Great Britain over a period of two 
(2) years.768 The amendments (2006) introduced the following main changes to the 
Consumer Credit Act of 1974: 
(i) Abolishing the £25,000 threshold 
                                                          
762
  Regulation 3 of the Consumer Credit (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/1481. 
763
  Regulation 8 of the Consumer Credit (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2004, SI 
2004/1481.EU Commission Directive 2011/90/EU (effective 1 January 2013) at par 2.7 page 6 
(Chapter 9 & 10).  
764
  Slaughter et al. “Consumer Credit Act 2006: Amendments to the Consumer Credit Act 1974” (2008) 
at 5 
765
  “Tackling Over-Indebtedness – Action Plan 2004” 
766
  Richards et al. “Irresponsible Lending?” (2008) at 502 
767
  Fletcher “Debt Suicides” The Mirror (2006) 
768
  Slaughter et al. “Consumer Credit Act 2006: Amendments to the Consumer Credit Act 1974” (2008) 
at 4 
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This amendment meant that all consumer credit agreements will fall under the 
scope of the Consumer Credit Act and this became effective as from 6 April 
2008.769 However, certain credit agreements are exempted from the operations of 
the 2006 Consumer Credit Act, namely: 
(a) credit agreements provided to businesses;770 
(b) high nett-worth771 debtors772; and 
(c) partnership of more than three persons.773 
 
This removal of limit resulted in all credit agreements entered into with consumers 
will be protected by the Consumer Credit Act, except those credit agreements 
entered into for business purposes of with debtors worth more than £150,000 or 
with partnerships consisting of more than three persons.  
 
(ii) Licence requirements 
The OFT may issue a licence for a fixed period of time, which may not exceed the 
maximum period774 prescribed by the Secretary of State.775 The 2006 
amendments also provided the OFT with the power to assess the competence of a 
business to provide credit before issuing a licence. This is referred to as the 
“fitness test” that became operational on 6 April 2008.776 When considering 
whether issuing of the licence, the OFT will consider evidence of past misconduct, 
knowledge, experience and skills that the people participating in the business have 
in relation to the licenced activity and the practices and procedures of the business 
to whom the licence will be issued.777   
                                                          
769
  Slaughter et al. “Consumer Credit Act 2006: Amendments to the Consumer Credit Act 1974” (2008) 
at 6 
770
  s 16B 
771
  A net annual income during the previous financial year of not less than £150,000 or net assets 
(disregarding the primary residence and certain pensions and insurance assets) throughout the 
previous financial year of not less than £500,000. 
772
  The debtor is a natural person, also see s 16A 
773
  SI 2007/1168 
774
  This period is currently not more than 5 (five) years. 
775
  s 34 
776
  s 25A 
777
  s 25A read together with Consumer credit licencing: General guidance for licenses applications on 
fitness and requirements (January 2008) OFT 969. 
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This power given to the OFT to issue licences is an ongoing responsibility. The 
OFT will also consider whether creditors are fit to hold their credit licence.778 
Should the OFT be dissatisfied with a creditor, they will issue a notice in this 
regard.779 
 
In McGuffick v The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC780 the court’s attention was drawn 
to section 25 of the Act781 where the OFT can consider whether a creditor is fit to 
hold a licence if there is evidence that the applicant is engaged in a business 
practice which can be considered deceitful or unfair or improper, which includes 
irresponsible lending.782 Therefore, section 25 of the Act reformed the licensing of 
providers of consumer credit services as well as the powers and functions of the 
OFT in relation to the issuing of the licence to provide credit to consumers. 
 
(iii) Unfair relationship test 
This test replaced the “extortionate credit bargain” test, which enables the 
consumer to challenge the unfair relationship with creditors783 in court. As a result, 
hereof the court has the power to re-write unfair credit agreements.784 
 
The reformed provisions became effective on 6 April 2007.785 Under the 1974 Act 
the consumer was required to make payments at the time of the credit agreement 
was made, which was grossly exorbitant and considered to be in contravention of 
                                                          
778
  s 33B 
779
  s 33B(2) and (3) 
780
  [2009] EWHC 2386 (Comm)(6 October 2009) 
781
  Consumer Credit Act of 1974 as well as the amendment of 2006 
782
  s 25(2B), which resulted in the OFT to set up the irresponsible lending project in August 2008, I.e. 
OFT 1107 
783
  s 140A 
784
  s 140B also see Doorstop Ltd. v Gillman & Lepervier [2012] JRC 199 (1 November 2012) 
785
  Slaughter et al. “Consumer Credit Act 2006: Amendments to the Consumer Credit Act 1974” (2008) 
at 15 
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the ordinary principles of fair dealing.786 The following instances will constitute an 
unfair relationship”:  
(a) any of the terms of the agreement;787 
(b) the manner in which the creditor has exercised of enforced their rights under 
the credit agreement;788 
(c) any other thing done (or not done) by or on behalf of the creditor, before or 
after entering into the credit agreement.789 
 
“Unfair” is a concept that is very well known in consumer protection.790 On 26 May 2008, 
the Unfair Commercial Practice Directive was implemented in Great Britain.791 This 
directive stated that a practice would be unfair if:792 
(a) It contravenes the requirements of professional diligence; and 
(b) It materially changes the economic behaviour of the consumer with regard to 
the credit agreement. 
 
“Professional diligence” is described as “the standard of special skill and care which a 
trader may reasonable be expected to exercise towards consumers which is 
commensurate with either (a) honest market practice in the trader’s field of activity; or 
(b) the general principle of good faith in the trader’s field of activity”.793  
These amendments appeared to provide clearer guidance to credit providers and 
consumers when entering into credit agreements. 
 
 
                                                          
786
  Slaughter et al. “Consumer Credit Act 2006: Amendments to the Consumer Credit Act 1974” (2008) 
at 15, also see Doorstop Ltd. v Gillman & Lepervier [2012] JRC 199 (1 November 2012) 
787
  s 140A(1)(a) 
788
  s 140A(1)(b) 
789
  s 140A(1)(c) 
790
  “The Unfair Commercial Practice Directive” Directive 2005/29/EC and “Consumer Protection from 
Unfair Trading Regulations” SI 2008/1277 
791
  Slaughter et al. “Consumer Credit Act 2006: Amendments to the Consumer Credit Act 1974” (2008) 
at 21 
792
  SI 2008/1277 Regulation 3 
793
  SI 2008/1277 Regulation 2 
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8.7. Household credit 
Like in most countries, household credit in Great Britain was adversely affected by the 
recession of 2007 to 2008 resulting in a significant increase of the outstanding 
household credit in comparison to the disposable income of the consumers.  
 
During June 2005 the total consumer debt in Great Britain amounted to £1.1 million and 
grew with £1 million every four minutes.794 Consumers received unsecured credit such 
as credit card products that they could not afford to repay as it added up to 100% of 
their salary. The products that were supposed to be a short-term financial purchasing 
credit instrument ended up in being a long-term debt.795  
 
In 2006, the household credit was 157.6 % to the household income that increased 
considerably to 166.4% in 2007.796 By 2009, it dropped to 164.9%. In the UK, the 
number of mortgage repossessions rose from 25,900 in 2007 to 47,700 in 2009.797 At 
this stage the government intervened by assisting banks to help borrowers to 
restructure loan repayments or to postpone the repayment of loans.798  
 
Recent statistical information published by the Bank of England depicted that total 
lending to individuals increased by £3.9 billion in July 2015, compared to the average 
monthly increase of £3.3 billion over the previous six months.799 There are still concerns 
that some households are merely “treading water”, which means that the impact of 
                                                          
794
  Talbot “Debt Facts and Figures” (2006) 
795
  Richards et al. “Irresponsible Lending?” (2008) at 502 
796
  European Credit Research Institute (ECRI), Lending to households in Europe (1995-2009) and 
Eurostat, National accounts 
797
  European Commission Research note 4/2010 “Over-indebtedness: New evidence from the EU-
SILC special module” by Fondeville et al. (November 2010) at 24, also see Bramley “Affordability 
Criteria for Mortgage Lending” (2011) at 20 
798
  The mortgage holders was able to postpone 50% of the loan repayments for a period of 2 years 
and to extend the repayment period of the mortgage loan at no extra cost. Also see Bramley 
“Affordability Criteria for Mortgage Lending” (2011) at 20. 
799
  Bank of England Statistical release, published on 1 September 2015. 
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household credit on the financial situation in Great Britain can be  more  severe than 
expected.800 
 
 
8.8. Irresponsible lending 
The financial crisis in Great Britain raised the accountability question: How blameable 
was the financial services sector for the financial crisis and the treatment of low-income 
borrowers? 
 
On the one side the OFT required greater reform of the banking sector to ensure that 
financial institutions accept responsibility when lending money (credit) to consumers.801 
On the other side the OFT has strengthened consumer protection802 by amending the 
Consumer Credit Act in 2006.803 Consumer protection was extended by the banking 
services to protect consumers against irresponsible lending by ensuring affordability, 
transparency of terms and conditions, and supporting a borrower when she or he 
experienced repayment difficulties. 
 
A method to prevent irresponsible lending was the introduction of the Responsible 
Lending Index (hereafter referred to as RLI).804 The RLI was a voluntary index for the 
credit industry that would allow lenders to measure themselves according to the degree 
of responsibility in their corporate process.805 However, the RLI was not welcomed in 
the whole credit industry. The British Bankers’ Association (BBA) and the Banking Code 
Standards Board (BCSB) did not support the original RLI concept, because they feared 
that their authority was being undermined, and questioned the need for another 
standard to be implemented in the credit industry.806 After negotiations between the 
                                                          
800
 ` Bramley “Affordability Criteria for Mortgage Lending” (2011) at 20 
801
  CHASM “What is responsible lending and borrowing” (March 2013) at 1 
802
  Kempson et al. “Extortionate Credit in the UK” (1999) at 29 
803
  See discussion in paragraph 8.6 of this study. 
804
  Richards et al. “Irresponsible Lending?” (2008) at 504 
805
  Richards et al. “Irresponsible Lending?” (2008) at 504 
806
  Richards et al. “Irresponsible Lending
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credit industry and the consumer organisations, the RLI gained more support; however, 
on 3 April 2006 APACS terminated the initiative.807 
 
It is significant newspaper articles published in Great Britain urged consumers to be 
responsible borrowers.808 CHASM concurred by stating that consumers should consider 
affordability when borrowing and should not knowingly over-indebt themselves. 
Consumers were warned not to take huge risks.809 As far back as 1999, the DTI has 
established that borrowers falsified income by forging wage slips.810 Consumers 
provided incorrect information because they were desperate for money and/or did not 
fully understand the implications of over indebting themselves.  
 
 
8.9. Conclusion: Comparison between South Africa and Great Britain 
A comparison of the Consumer Credit Act of Great Britain with the NCA of South Africa, 
point to the following noteworthy conclusions: 
• Both legislations refer to consumers being natural persons and/or individuals. 
However, the consumer credit legislation and directives in Great Britain include 
partnership of three or less persons811 as a consumer, while the NCA considers a 
partnership a juristic person.812 
• In both legislations, the creditor must be registered to trade as credit provider. In the 
Consumer Credit Act, Part III deals with the licensing of credit and hiring 
businesses, while Chapter 3 Part A in the NCA deals with the registration, 
requirements and procedure. Both legislations stipulate that the licence will be 
                                                          
807
  According to the letter advising that the RLI initiative will not continue, the APACS states that 
members collectively had a lack of general interest in the initiative. Also see Richards et al. 
“Irresponsible Lending?” (2008) at 509 
808
  On 3 May 2012 The Daily Telegraph quoted Mr. Phillip Hammond, the Defence Secretary of Great 
Britain, when he said that banks were not solely responsible for the financial crisis. He stated that 
that the consumers who took out loans where consenting adults who in some instances wants to 
blame others for their actions, while they should accept their share of blame for the Britain’s woes. 
809
  “What is responsible lending and borrowing” (March 2013) at 1 
810
  Kempson et al. “Extortionate Credit in the UK” (1999) at 11 
811
  SI 2007/1168 
812
  s 1 of the NCA 
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revoked if the licensee contravenes the applicable credit legislation and render 
themselves guilty of irregularities.813 
• Furthermore, the wrongdoer who holds a licence may be penalised with a fine 
should the wrongdoer contravene the respective legislation. According to the 
Consumer Credit Act the penalty is £50,000 compared to the NCA that can impose 
an administrative fine of R1 million or 10% of the annual turnover of the previous 
financial year, whichever is the greatest.814 
• The definition for “credit” differs vastly between the two legislations. The definition of 
the Consumer Credit Act is basic compared to that of the NCA.815 The Consumer 
Credit Act also refers to a deposit, which is no longer applicable to the South African 
credit market.816 
• The pre-contractual agreement can be given to the debtor orally or in writing, while 
the NCA requires it given in writing according to Regulation 28(a), Chapter 4, Part A 
where the legislature states that the pre-agreement testament must consist of 1 
document. The South African legislation appears to be more careful by requiring the 
pre-agreement to be in writing as opposed to the legislation in Great Britain.  
• Comparing the assessment of a consumer between the two legislations, the 
Consumer Credit Act covers the basic principles, while the NCA is more 
comprehensive and precise.817 
 
It appears that the NCA is more concise and clear in comparison to the Consumer 
Credit Act of Great Britain, even though in some instances the NCA is still vague (as 
discussed in Part II of this study). However, it can be said with certainty that the Act, at 
least as far as the prevention side of debt is concerned, is a great improvement on its 
predecessors and something we could be proud of.818  
 
                                                          
813
  s 32 of the Consumer Credit Act and s 57 and 150 of the NCA 
814
  See discussion in par 6.4 of this study 
815
  See s 1 of the NCA as well as the discussion in paragraph 2.3 of this study 
816
  In terms of the Credit Agreements Act, Act 75 of 1980, which was repealed with the NCA, a deposit 
had to be paid prior to a credit agreement coming into existence 
817
  See section 81 of the NCA as well as the discussion in Chapter 5 of this study 
818
  Renke 2011 (74) THRHR 229 
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PART IV: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
9.1. Introduction 
This dissertation investigated the recommended standard to be applied by the South 
African courts when dealing with reckless credit applications and the consequential 
orders that the Court has discretion to grant. It also identified problem areas created by 
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some of the provisions of the NCA and indicated some solutions to be considered in 
solving the challenges that rise from the NCA. 
 
As indicated throughout this dissertation, the intention of the legislature is not always 
clear in the provisions of the NCA relating to reckless credit. This uncertainty will have 
to be interpreted by the courts, which interpretational guidelines have been provided for 
in a few precedents as well as by some authors. 
 
The NCA regulations as well as the amendments aimed at addressing specific 
challenges in the consumer credit market as identified by the DTI is an ongoing 
process. The NCA and the Amendment Act brought about a single system of credit 
regulation that will regulate and administer the credit industry. 819  
 
Upon comparing the NCA with similar legislation in developed countries, namely Great 
Britain and European countries, it appears that the NCA is on par and in some 
instances ahead of global credit legislations.820 Reckless credit is an example; the NCA 
repeatedly encourage borrowers of all income levels to lend responsible and keep 
lenders accountable.821 However, the sanctions that have to be imposed on reckless 
credit agreements remain vague and uncertain.822 With the implementation of the NCA 
it most likely will reduce undesirable credit practices significantly, but it will take some 
time for the financial system to adjust and expand under the new law.  
 
 
9.2.  Summary of findings 
The NCA declares that all consumers, natural persons, juristic persons, or an 
association of persons, have the right to apply for credit. However, the consumer does 
not have the right to be granted the credit.823 Furthermore, the credit provider may not 
                                                          
819
  Chapter 2 
820
  Chapter 8 and 9 
821
  Part II 
822
  Chapter 6 
823
  Chapter 4 
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discriminate against the consumer when considering the credit application, and/or 
whether the consumer will be able to afford the repayment of the credit agreement.824 
Yet, the credit provider must ensure that the consumer is able to repay the loan 
(affordability assessment), otherwise the court may consider the credit agreement to 
have been reckless lending. 
 
In order to prevent reckless lending, section 81 of the NCA is possibly the most 
important section in the NCA. It compels the credit provider to do an assessment 
before825 entering into a credit agreement with a consumer.826 The NCA does not 
provide for such assessment mechanisms and therefore credit providers have to 
design, develop, and implement their own assessment mechanism, models and 
procedures as providing it is fair and objective and do not discriminate. A consumer has 
an obligation to disclose all information fully and honestly. The failure of the consumer 
to do so will constitute a defense for the credit provider against reckless credit 
allegations.827  
 
Section 3(c)(ii) and section 81(3) of the NCA clearly state that a credit provider must not 
enter into a reckless credit agreement with a prospective consumer, a hefty obligation in 
the light of the consequences attached to reckless credit lending.828 Depending on the 
type of reckless credit829 the consumer’s rights and duties in terms of the particular 
credit agreement will be set aside or suspended.830 Though the NCA is precise as to the 
consequences of reckless credit granting, the Act is vague and unclear as to what 
should happen if the contractual parties are guilty of reckless behaviour in terms of the 
reckless credit agreement. 
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  Par 4.3 
825
  Par 5.2 
826
  Chapter 5 
827
  Chapter 4 
828
  Chapter 6 
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  Par 5.4 
830
  Chapter 6 
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The NCA does not state that credit agreements that give rise to reckless credit lending 
are ab initio null and void as is the case in unlawful credit agreements.831 Therefore, the 
courts will have to exercise their own discretion and rely on common law. If performance 
in terms of the reckless credit agreement has not yet followed, the court may order the 
setting aside of the consumer’s future rights and obligations. Consequently, the 
particular credit agreement will be cancelled and the contractual relationship between 
the credit provider and the consumer will end. 832 
 
However, the situation is not as clear as to where partial performance occurred in terms 
of the reckless credit agreement as well as the performance of the merx (movable or 
immovable goods) in terms on the contract. In the case in point, the NCA does not 
provide a clear guideline. Therefore, the courts will have to rely on their own discretion 
when having to apply the provisions of the NCA and the common law.  
 
The provisions relating to reckless credit lending833 does not provide detailed 
information regarding restoration: whether the credit provider will be able to reclaim any 
amount of the credit granted or goods delivered to the consumer, and/or whether the 
consumer will be entitled to reclaim any payments made by the consumer to the credit 
provider. Section 83(2)(a) only states that the court may set aside all or any of the rights 
and obligations of the consumer under834 the reckless credit agreement. Various 
authors and court cases concluded that section 83(2)(a) also does not prohibit or limit 
the credit provider from claiming money or goods delivered in terms of another cause of 
action such as unjustified enrichment.835 
 
A credit agreement is a specific type of contract to which the law of contract and the 
principles of a valid and enforceable contract is applicable. A credit agreement is also a 
reciprocal contract in terms whereof each party to the agreement has rights and 
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832
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834
  Par 6.3.1. 
835
 Chapter 6 
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obligations. If the rights and obligations of the consumer to a reckless credit agreement 
are cancelled, it could imply that the rights and obligations of the credit provider will 
inevitably also fall away.836  
 
Reckless credit applications do not apply to juristic persons837 and to certain credit 
agreements as listed in section 78(2).838 Additionally, the court has the discretion to 
consider reckless lending without the consumer having to bring the issue to the court’s 
attention. In the matters where a consumer alleges reckless lending, the consumer must 
provide evidence to substantiate the allegation.839 
 
Should the court, during any proceedings, find a particular credit agreement to have 
been granted recklessly by the credit provider, the court may make an order setting 
aside all or part of the consumer's rights and obligations under that agreement; as the 
court determines to be just and reasonable in the circumstances.840 Alternatively, it may 
make an order suspending the force and effect of that specific credit agreement.841  
 
Reckless credit lending involves three types, namely:  
i. The first type of reckless credit lending is when the credit provider failed to conduct 
an affordability assessment on the credit application of a consumer, in which case 
the credit agreement will be declared reckless lending irrespective of whether the 
consumer was able to afford the repayment of the loan. 
ii. The second type of reckless credit occurs when the credit provider failed to explain 
the risk, cost and obligations under the particular credit agreement with the 
consumer to such an extent that the consumer understand and appreciate the 
risks, cost and obligations. The credit provider will find this difficult to prove, 
therefore it is concurred that a credit provider should include a clause in the credit 
                                                          
836
  Chapter 6 
837
  Chapter 2 
838
  Chapter 2 
839
  Chapter 6 
840
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841
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application and agreement confirming that the consumer understands and 
appreciate all the risks, cost, and obligations of the agreement.842 
iii. The third type of reckless credit is when the credit provider conducted a proper 
assessment and results indicate that the consumer cannot afford the repayment of 
the credit agreement, yet the credit provider continues to enter into the agreement 
with the particular consumer.  
 
Reckless credit and over-indebtedness will sometimes overlap, for example, the 
consumer can become over-indebted because of reckless credit granting.843 If the 
consumer failed to disclose all the relevant information upon application of credit, the 
agreement will not be considered reckless credit lending because failure to disclose 
requested information materially affects the ability of the credit provider to make a 
proper assessment.844 As a result, the court will not declare the particular credit 
agreement to be reckless credit granting. But if the consumer could still not afford to 
repay all the obligations under the credit agreement, the court will then declare the 
consumer over-indebted and his current credit obligations could be restructured.845 
 
In order to restructure the credit obligations, the court will consider the consumer’s 
current means and ability against the financial obligations as well as the date upon 
which these obligations will be fully satisfied.846 This consideration forms the basis for 
the restructuring order that will be enforceable on all effected parties. 
 
If a credit provider continues to grant credit recklessly, the NCR may file a notice on the 
particular credit provider to instruct the said credit provider to comply with the provisions 
of the NCA. If the credit provider should continue to act in contravention of the 
conditions of his registration as credit provider, the NCR will approach the Tribunal.847 
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Should the tribunal find that the credit provider acted in contradiction of the NCA and its 
registration conditions, the Tribunal has the discretion to make an order in terms 
whereof the credit provider has to pay an administrative fine that may not exceed848: 
• 10% of the wrongdoer’s annual turnover during the preceding financial year; or 
• R1 000 000. 
 
If the credit provider continues to act in contradiction with the NCA, the credit provider 
could be deregistered.849 
 
Though reckless credit agreements are not considered an unlawful (or illegal) 
contract850, it is advisable that the legislature should consider the same consequences 
applicable to credit providers who enter into reckless credit agreements as with unlawful 
agreements. The court should be granted further discretion to make an order in terms 
whereof the security (on which the reckless credit agreement is based) is forfeited to the 
State and that the credit provider will be able to claim for restoration of any performance 
based on, for example, unjustified enrichment of the consumer.851  
 
In the Gerber852 case, the court failed to consider the common law principles regarding 
enrichment and restoration. Auspiciously, this omission was rectified in the 
Opperman853 case as well as the Mbatha854 case. In the first instance, the constitutional 
court stated that it is unconstitutional to allow for arbitrary deprivation of property by 
preventing any claim by the credit provider against the consumer for the repayment of 
the money. In the second instance the court held “… that it is unlikely that the legislature 
intended that the consumer should keep the money and the box.” Both were significant 
court cases that shaped the issue regarding security in reckless credit agreements. 
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It is concurred that the aim of the NCA is to protect the consumer. The intention of the 
legislature is acknowledged. However, the legislature and the courts should not adhere 
to this protection to such an extent that the other purposes/aims of the NCA are ignored. 
This could result in the interpretation and application of the NCA becoming biased in 
favour of the consumer, while being unfair to credit providers and their rights.855  
 
The amendments are most welcome and brought about a step in the right direction. 
This applies to section 89(5)(c) that has been found to be unconstitutional, as well as 
the gap regarding what should happen to immovable as well as movable assets during 
the suspension period should rights and obligations are set aside.856 Yet, the 
investigation indicates that more steps are needed to address the gaps in terms of 
reckless credit. 
 
 
9.3.  A final word 
In conclusion, it is acknowledged that the NCA as well as the subsequent amendments 
brought about an improvement to the credit activities of the consumer in the credit 
market. However, the investigation at issue would suggest the NCA undertakes a self-
analysis to clear up the uncertainties in the Act. A hard look at and further amendments 
could only benefit all parties concerned. 
 
Practice and precedents will gradually clear up the uncertainties and issues still 
impeding the practical implementation of the NCA. It is concurred with Renke that the 
amendments in the NCA is a positive and gratifying development compared to the 
predecessors of the Act and to the relevant worldwide legislation. 857  
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